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Introduction
The proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) represents a
major step in the evolution of "sovereignty," which includes the power of a
nation-state to govern without external controls.' A panelist at the 1998
Cornell International Law Journal Symposium introduced the MAI as an
example of "multilateral sovereignty" to achieve commonly held goals of
global economic integration.2 This perspective posits that the MAI is an
exercise in sovereignty by subtraction, aiming to limit governing power
rather than promote its joint exercise.
1. See WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcToNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2179
(3d ed. 1971).
2. Rainer Geiger, Deputy Director of Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Remarks at the
Cornell International Law Journal Symposium, The International Regulation of Foreign
Direct Investment: Obstacles & Evolution, Cornell Law School (Mar. 6, 1998).
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Its critics call the MAI a "slow motion coup d'etat,"3 a "bill of rights for
investors,"4 a threat to sovereignty,5 and a "corporate rule treaty,"6 because
it (1) empowers foreign investors to challenge the law-making authority of
nation states and subnational governments, (2) is composed of a fifty-page
text of fourteen investor-protection standards that exceed the scope of any
existing agreement, 7 (3) and acts through an international forum with the
power to award monetary damages against the offending government.8
U.S. negotiators counter that the MAI protects foreign investors from dis-
crimination by giving them rights analogous to those they already enjoy
under the U.S. Constitution.9 In addition, U.S. negotiators maintain that
an agreement that poses significant limits on U.S. sovereignty is
unacceptable. 10
This Article suggests a more modest analogy than a virtual coup d'etat.
It simply seeks to explain that the MAI would have a greater impact on U.S.
law making power than acknowledged by MAI supporters, who claim that
it merely repeats domestic principles of non-discrimination. For example,
the MAI aims to limit U.S. States' traditional powers to discriminate.
The first objective of this article is truth in advertising: the MAI would
disrupt state and local lawmaking capacity. The capacity of cities, coun-
ties, and states to 'serve as our "laboratories of democracy"'" hangs in the
balance. States act as successful laboratories for testing future national
3. Lori Wallach & Ralph Nader, Forward to MAUDE BAR.ow & TONY CLARKE, THE
THREAT TO AMERICAN FREEDOM vii (1998).
4. Scott Nova & Michelle Sforza-Roderick, M.A.I. Culpa, THE NATION, Jan. 13-20,
1997, at 5. The attorney representing an investor in the first NAFTA investment case
posits that, "[t]he MAI investment provisions have quietly created a looming economic
constitution that protects the rights of foreign MAI investors ...... BARRY APPLETON,
MUNICIPALITIES AND THE MAI 8 (1998).
5. See TONY CLARK & MAUDE BARLOW, THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT
AND THE THREAT TO CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY 3 (1997).
6. ToNY CLARK & MAUDE BARLow, THE CORPORATE RULE TREATY 1 (1977).
7. See Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Multilateral Agreement on Investment:
The MAI Negotiating Text arts. III-IV (last modified Dec. 14, 1998) <http://
www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/negtext-htm> [hereinafter MAI Negotiating Text].
8. See id. art. V.
9. For example, "[t]he fundamental principle underlying this and other investment
agreements is the principle of non-discrimination. Such agreements do not generally
call into question the sovereign right of governments to regulate so long as the regulation
does not single out or discriminate against investors based on their nationality." Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment: Win, Lose or Draw for the U.S.?: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade, of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 104th
Cong., available in 1998 WL 110860, USTESTIMONY database, Mar. 5, 1998 (statement
of Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, U.S.
Department of State).
10. See Interview by Derrick McGinty with Amb. Jeffrey Lang, Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative, Washington, DC on the DERRICK McGiNTY HOUR (tape transcription at 2)
(NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 10, 1997).
11. "It is one of the happi incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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policy in virtually every sector of governance, including banking regula-
tion, economic development, government purchasing, consumer protec-
tion, working conditions, health and medical insurance, and
environmental law. 12
The second objective is to bring some order to the MAI sovereignty
debate. Previous writers have brought conceptual order to the comparison
of state sovereignty and international law under NAFTA and the WTO
agreements. 13 This article extends the analysis to the MAI to (1) inform
the bottom-up view of the MAI from the perspective of those who would
lose power if it is implemented, and (2) shape positive policy options to
maintain the constitutional balance between federalism and private inves-
tor protection.
Synopsis
Part I provides context, summarizing the "sovereignty" trade-offs inherent
in the parties' expressed negotiating goals. It then defines sovereignty
interests in constitutional terms, addressing, in particular, the balance of
state power within the federal system. Part I also summarizes the main
features of the MAI and how they may affect constitutional limits on state
power. After reviewing the arguments that MAI implementing legislation
can preserve state sovereignty or that legal conflicts are not likely to occur,
Part I summarizes the elements of the MAI threat to state sovereignty in
terms of: (1) expanding the coverage of state and local governments under
international agreements; (2) removing investment disputes from U.S.
12. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Testing Government Action: The Promise of Federalism,
in ETHICAL VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 41 (1993); INT'L CTR. OF THE AcADEMY FOR
STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE NAT'L COUNCIL FOR URBAN ECoN. DEV., MAI May
Jeopardize Local Development Programs, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ABROAD 1, 6 (Oct.
1997). See generally DAVID OsBoRNE, LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY (1988) (discussing
economic development and industrial policy).
13. SeeJohn H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance
and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. LAw 157,
188 (1997); Matt Schaefer, Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for Interna-
tional Trade Agreements to Perform Constitutional Functions with Respect to Sub-Federal
Governments?. 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 609 (1996-97); Charles Tiefer, Free Trade Agree-
ments and the New Federalism, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 45 (1998).
For other perspectives on the definition and importance of sovereignty interests, see
generally CLARK & BARLoW, supra note 5; CLAm & BARuow, supra note 6; Steven P.
Croley &John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to
National Governments, 90 Am. J. INT'L L. 193 (1996); Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea
Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing their Sovereign Rights? The GATT Dispute Settlement
Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161 (1996); William J.
Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements, 19 FoRD-
HAm INT'L LJ. 427 (1995); Julie Long, Note, Ratcheting up Federalism: A Supremacy
Clause Analysis of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements, 80 MINN. L. REv. 231
(1995); Samuel C. Straight, Note, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settle-
ment and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States 45 DUi LJ. 216 (1995); Earl H. Fry, Sover-
eignty & Federalism: U.S. and Canadian Perspectives, 20 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 303 (1994); The
Uruguay Round GATT Agreement: Hearings Before the Senate Commerce Comm., 103d
Cong., 201-04 and Annex A (F.C.D.H. Oct. 13, 1994) (testimony of Ralph Nader); Louis
Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. NEwsL., Mar.-May 1993, at 1.
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courts, which maintain a constitutional deference to state interests; (3)
constraining the role of the U.S. government as a buffer between states and
the international legal system; and (4) shifting power in the legislative pro-
cess through the economic leverage of investor remedies.
Part II analyzes how the MAI departs from the fundamental values of
federalism in the U.S. Constitution. This departure is manifest in the
following:
- Balancing tests that enable courts to uphold state legislation that pro-
tects the environment, public health, and local economic needs, even
when the legislation burdens foreign commercial interests. Without a
test that balances purpose with effect, the MAI would empower investors
to challenge state lawmaking capacity.
- National Treatment, limits on performance requirements, and General
Treatment, in such areas as: ownership of private land; gambling and
casino licenses; traditional or resident fishing rights; local business
ownership; franchise encroachment; recycled material markets; packag-
ing requirements; and community reinvestment policy.
- Compensation for expropriation, in such areas as: use of wetlands,
coastal land, and surface mines; mandates on health service providers;
law enforcement through civil penalties; and destruction of property for
military or public health purposes.
- Subsidy exceptions to rules against discrimination, which enable states
to discriminate in favor of state residents when dispensing the largesse
of taxpayer-funded resources. Absent this exception, MAI National
Treatment and General Treatment would empower foreign investors to
challenge subsidy programs that strengthen domestic competitiveness
such as: financing incentives; venture capital investments; targeted and
customized workforce training; and business recruitment screening
criteria.
- Market participation exceptions to rules against discrimination, which
enable states to enjoy the same freedom as private market actors to do
business as a purchaser and seller according to public moral values or
the economic self-interest of their residents. Absent this exception, MAI
National Treatment, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and General Treat-
ment would empower foreign investors to challenge market activities
that strengthen domestic competitiveness such as: use of public land;
domestic procurement preferences; minority procurement preferences;
environmental procurement preferences; and selective purchasing that
avoids doing business with companies based on human rights, labor
rights, or other noneconomic criteria.
Part III addresses whether the United States can shield its sovereignty
interests unilaterally by providing exceptions for subsidies, minority
affairs, procurement, social services, and other functions that the MAI does
not contain. This Part explains the three reasons why this is a difficult
task: (1) the high degree of specificity required to effectively take a coun-
try-specific exception; (2) the fact that exceptions would become the
targets for future "ratcheting" back to MAI compliance through a process
Cornell International Law Journal
called "standstill and rollback;" and (3) the likelihood that MAI dispute
panels would not recognize the application of exceptions that contravene
the purpose and objectives of the MAI.
The conclusion responds to the risk of relying on country-specific
exceptions by presenting positive options for maintaining the constitu-
tional balance between federalism and private investor protections. The
options include:
- Stronger congressional oversight, which includes a legal impact statement
and disclosure of the real legislative history of the MAI.
- Implementing legislation, which includes appropriations and implement-
ing language to limit enforcement of the MAI against states without con-
gressional involvement or approval.
- Multilateral downsizing of the MAI, which would reduce the number or
scope of investor protections, carve out significant areas of domestic
policy, create internal balancing tests with general exceptions, or limit
the availability of investor-to-state remedies.
The appendix outlines these options in much greater detail.
I. Overview of the MAI Sovereignty Debate
A. Trade-Offs in the MAI Sovereignty Debate
The MAI negotiations focus on "sovereignty" in terms of national objec-
tives. The countries negotiating the MAI are members of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 14 They are asking
each other to give up government authority in exchange for private investor
rights and market access. However, what one country defines as a barrier
to market access another country defines as an essential sovereignty inter-
est. This clash of values has placed the MAI on an indefinite work sched-
ule.' 5 In addition, the WTO may pursue the MAI agenda as part of its
Millennial Round of negotiations. Investment is also part of the work plan
for negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas.' 6
The United States seeks to use the MAI to dissolve subsidies and pref-
erences that prevent U.S. corporations from establishing themselves in the
European market. For example, the United States defines European "cul-
tural industry" subsidies as a barrier to market access for Hollywood
14. OECD member nations include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. See OECD,
OECD Member Countries (last modified Nov. 23, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/about/
general/member-countries.html>.
15. See Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Win, Lose or Draw for the U.S.?, supra
note 9 (statement of Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Busi-
ness Affairs, U.S. Department of State).
16. See Work Program for FTAA Negotiating Groups, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 3, 1998,
at 20.
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movie and television producers. 17 French-speaking countries defend cul-
tural industries as the epicenter of their language and culture. They main-
tain that the subsidy is a financing program.' 8 Furthermore, the United
States desires to limit preferences designed to strengthen regional econo-
mies. Most notable is the European Union's system of mutual preferences,
which the EU defines as a cornerstone of its emerging federal system.19
The most visible controversies involve U.S. sanctions on Iran, Libya,
Cuba 20 and Burma.21 Europeans argue that U.S. sanctions reveal a prefer-
ence for following international rules only when it suits the United
States.22 The United States responds that, like any treaty, the MAI con-
tains inherent limits regarding national interests.23
Furthermore, the EU wants the MAI to constrain the power of U.S.
"subnational" governments and, consequently, to interfere with the com-
plex U.S. federal system.24 Even though federalism is part of America's
constitutional balance of power, the U.S. government is willing to compro-
mise. According to U.S. negotiators, if they succeed in providing U.S. inves-
17. See UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1998 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT
ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRaERS 116-17 (1998) (radio and television broadcast quotas by
language and national origin).
18. Professor PatrickJulliard, Universite de Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne), Remarks at
the Cornell International Law Journal Symposium, The International Regulation of For-
eign Direct Investment: Obstacles & Evolution, Cornell Law School (Mar. 6, 1998).
19. See Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Win, Lose or Draw for the U.S.?, supra
note 9 (statement of Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Busi-
ness Affairs, U.S. Department of State).
20. See, e.g., Paul Blustein & Anne Swardson, U.S. Vows to Boycott WTO Panel: Move
Escalates Fight with European Union Over Cuba Sanctions, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1997, at
Al; Paul Blustein & Thomas Lippman, Trade Clash on Cuba Is Averted: U.S.-Europe Pack
Seeks to Ease Helms-Burton, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1997, at Al; BrianJ. Welke, Comment,
GATT and NAFTA v. The Helm-Burton Act: Has the United States Violated Multilateral
Agreements?, 4 TuLSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 361, 367 (1997).
21. See generally Memorandum of the European Union in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgement, National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) v. Baker, 26 F.
Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998) (involving state-level procurement preferences that dis-
criminate against companies that do business in Burma).
22. For example:
In July [1996], the Act [Helms-Burton] achieved what Brussels officials find rare
in European Union foreign policy, which was to firmly unite all EU ministers in
condemning it as a piece of unnecessary extraterritorial legislation.
[Also,] EU governments denounced the U.S. anti-terrorist law (Iran/Libya Act)
as unfairly imposing American rules on foreign companies. France vowed quick
retaliation if its companies are affected by U.S. sanctions for investing in the two
countries.
EU/US: EU Resists US Sanctions Laws on Cuba, Iran and Libya, EUROPEAN REPORT, Sept.
5, 1996, at 1.
23. U.S. officials argued that the WTO had no competence to judge a foreign policy
matter under the Helms-Burton law, and thus, the United States would simply not show
up at panel proceedings if the EU proceeded with a WTO complaint against the law. See
Blustein & Swardson, supra note 20, at Al.
24. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRmRS TO TRADE AND
INvEsTmENT-1994, at 55 (Apr. 1994) [hereinafter EU TRADE REPoRT-1994]; EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT-1997, at 19-
20 (Apr. 1997) [hereinafter EU TRADE REPORT-1997].
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tors with "access to substantial new markets, [they] are prepared to bind
the states and their subdivisions.. .,25 The United States plans to resolve
the MAI standoff, in part, by diminishing subnational powers in exchange
for greater market access.
B. Defining Sovereignty as the Balance of Power
Participants in the U.S. sovereignty debate concerning trade and invest-
ment agreements use "sovereignty" justifications to fortify their positions
on issues, such as economic nationalism,2 6 unilateral enforcement of fair
trade, 27 environmental protection, 28 and labor standards.29
This article focuses on a more constitutional version of U.S. sover-
eignty interests, involving the allocation of lawmaking power between the
federal government and the states. As John Jackson points out, there are
many sovereignty interests involving the allocation of power, such as verti-
cal allocation between national and international decision-makers or hori-
zontal allocation between legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
25. DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL, FIScAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAiRs, ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON
INVESTMENT (MAI) 3 (Sept. 1997).
26. Pat Buchanan, former Presidential Candidate, stated:
This is the constitution of the United States. The reason the founding fathers
went to Philadelphia was because there was chaos in internal and external trade
and they gave the Congress of the United States full authority to regulate trade
and commerce ... You [Congress] are supposed to represent us when these
deals are brought back by the President. Why don't you tell Clinton, 'negotiate
what you want, but we're not giving up our right to amend it.'
... [Iln 1994, the President came home with a 23,000-page General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade treaty... the first 20 pages brought in something brand
new - a world trade organization suddenly created a UN of world trade where
America lost its veto power and had no weighted voting. Now, if you [Congress]
had all the authority to amend, you could have said we will take that big fat
treaty, but we're not giving up our sovereignty.
Pat Buchanan, Remarks on CNN CROssFIRE 5, 10 (Sept. 18, 1997).
27. See The World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Review Commission
Act: Hearing on S.16 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 103d Cong. 11, 13-16 (1995)
(statements of Jerry Junkins, President and CEO of Texas Instruments; Curtis Barnett,
Chairman and CEO of Bethlehem Steel Corporation; and George Scalise, Senior Vice
President of the National Semiconductor Corporation and Chairperson of the Public
Policy Committee, Semiconductor Industry Association).
28. See Letter from 13 environmental organizations to Charlene Barshevsky, U.S.
Trade Rep. (Feb. 10, 1998) (The organizations included the Center for International
Environmental Law, Community Nutrition Institute, Defenders of Wildlife, Earth Island
Institute, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, National Audubon Society, National Envi-
ronmental Trust, National Wildlife Federation, Pacific Environment & Resources
Center, Rainforest Action Network, The Sierra Club, and Western Ancient Forest Cam-
paign) (on file with author). See also All Hail the Multinationals: The secret trade deal
that corporations hope you never hear about, SIERRA, July-Aug. 1998, at 16-17.
29. See Joint Non-governmental Organizations (NGO) Statement on the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI) to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (1997) (on file with author). Five hundred organizations and sixty-seven
countries endorsed the Joint NGO Statement. See also The Uruguay Round of GATT,
supra note 13, at 208, annex (testimony of Ralph Nader).
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government.30 Professor Matt Schaefer anticipated the objectives of the
MAI when he wrote that "constraining sub-federal actors in the U.S., Can-
ada and other economically powerful federations may be more important
to world welfare than constraining central government action in smaller
nations."3 1 He describes such limits on state-level power as a superna-
tional "constitutional function" that are necessary in the absence of suffi-
cient limitations in the national Constitution.32
In 1991, a GATT panel ruled that the constitutional allocation of
power between the U.S. federal government and states is irrelevant in an
international trade dispute.33 The EU posits that state law creates "market
fragmentation"34 in violation of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade. 35 In short, while U.S. state sovereignty is only part of a broader
framework, it is a central issue in MAI negotiations.
State sovereignty arguments against international agreements are
politically popular because many advocates for policy change believe that
citizens maintain greater access to subnational and even national govern-
ments than they do to international bodies. 36 Barriers to access include
weakened constituent relationships (e.g., voter accountability); lengthened
physical distances; increased structural distances (multiple layers of gov-
ernment); and conflicting jurisdictions, missions, cultures, and values.
Critics may dismiss this affinity for defining sovereignty as access to power
as politically convenient. Nonetheless, the essential balance underlying
U.S. principles of federalism is maintained by advocacy groups that
respond to conflicts while protecting individual rights.37
However, the weight of this essential balance has not deterred U.S.
negotiators from offering to bind the states so long as U.S. investors receive
a quid pro quo - access to new markets. Negotiators maintain that they
30. JohnJackson sets the tone for this article with his advice to "those who use sover-
eignty objections against policy proposals to make such objections more concrete and
explicit so that they can be better compared to contrasting arguments." Jackson, supra
note 13, at 188. Jackson creates a taxonomy of sovereignty issues based upon (1) gen-
eral implications of accepting substantive treaty norms, (2) institutional decision-mak-
ing procedures, (3) dispute settlement process, and (4) domestic constitutional or legal
traditions. See id. at 171-87.
31. Schaefer, supra note 13, at 614. Schaefer notes that states like California and
New York have economies larger than all but a handful of nations in the world. See also
Fry, supra note 13, at 308-09.
32. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 610, 620-21, 651.
33. United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic Malt Beverages, June 19, 1991,
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (1993) [hereinafter Alcoholic and Malt Beverages].
34. EU TRADE REPoRT-1994, supra note 24, at 9.
35. See EU TRADE REPoRT-1997, supra note 24, at 19, which states:
There are more than 2700 State and municipal authorities in the US which
require particular safety certifications for products sold or installed within their
jurisdictions. These requirements are not always uniform or consistent with
each other, or even transparent. In particular, individual States sometimes set
environmental standards going far beyond what is provided for at [the] Federal
level. Agricultural and food imports are also often confronted with additional
state-level requirements, which may lead to obstacles to trade.
36. See Jackson, supra note 13, at 171.
37. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 3942.
499
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can trade state sovereignty for market access under the federal treaty
power.38
During the WTO debate in 1994, Lawrence Tribe argued before the
Senate Commerce Committee that approving NAFTA and the Uruguay
Round agreements under the "fast-track" process was a violation of the
treaty approval requirements under the Constitution.39 Both houses of
Congress approved these agreements upon a simple majority vote dispite
the Constitutional requirement that the Senate approve a treaty by a two-
thirds supermajority. 40 Tribe argued that the treaty process is designed to
protect the sovereignty of U.S. states and the Senate, with two votes per
state, is the historical and political body with the constitutional capacity to
protect state interests. 4 1 Bruce Ackerman counters this argument with his
theory that, out of sheer dint of multiple deviations from the Treaty Clause,
Congress passed through a "constitutional moment" when it effectively
amended the Constitution through acceptance of its own practice.4 2
The import of presenting the MAI to Congress as a treaty goes beyond
political considerations concerning which house is most likely to give the
MAI favorable attention.43 Providing treaty status to the MAI may
strengthen Congress ability to trump the deference it must give state law
when it adopts an agreement under the fast-track process. The power to
preempt state law under the Treaty Clause is well established.44 Thus, a
38. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
39. See GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S.2467, Before the U.S. Senate
Commerce, Science and Transp. Comm. 103d Cong. 290-339 (1994) (statements and
remarks of Lawrence H. Tribe and Bruce Ackerman) [hereinafter GATT Implementing
Legislation Hearings].
40. See U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 1.
41. See The World Trade Organization and the Treaty Clause: The Consittutional
Requirement of Submitting the Uruguay Round of GATT as a Treaty, Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 103d Cong. 10, 24-26 (Oct. 18,
1994) (Testimony of Lawrence Tribe).
42. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golov, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REv.
4 (1995).
43. The House now appears to be a more hostile environment for consideration of
the MAI than the Senate. As a barometer, the House recently defeated fast-track negotiat-
ing authority on September 25, 1998, by a vote of 180 "for" to 243 "against." The bipar-
tisan opposition to fast-track included 71 Republicans who voted "against" and all but
29 Democrats who voted "for." See Special Report, Bipartisan Opposition Leads to 180-
243 House Defeat of Fast Track, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 28, 1998, at 1. Peter Beinart
tracked the political support curve for pre-1998 fast-track votes in the House:
The original vote to grant [fast-track authority] was 323 ;o 36. When the author-
ity expired in 1979, Congress renewed it by a vote of 395 to 7 and, in 1988 the
margin was 376 to 45. By 1991 ... fast track faced its first serious opposition
passing by only 40 votes. In 1993, it was renewed again, 295 to 126. The
authority expired in 1994 and is probably dead for the rest of the century.
Peter Beinart, The Nationalist Revolt: Fast Track Is Only the Beginning, NEw REPUBLIC,
Dec. 1, 1997, at 20.
44. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332
(1924); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1769). See also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 157 (2d ed. 1996); John H. Jackson, US Constitutional
Law Principles and Foreign Trade Law and Policy, in NATIONAL CONSnTTONS AND INrER-
NATIONAL ECONOMic LAw 65, 73-78 (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds.,
1993).
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treaty may imply a lower standard of accountability than the preemption
power under the Commerce Clause or the 14th Amendment. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court recently required Congress to make a clear
statement of its intent to preempt State law.45
C. Main Features of the MAI
MAI standards are different than constitutional standards for balancing the
interests of private investors with the power of government. The starting
point is the MAI definition of "investment," which covers "every kind of
asset."46 The MAI protects investors and their investments with fourteen
substantive investor protections, the most significant of which include the
following:47
- National Treatment and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment48 protect foreign
investors from treatment that is "less favorable" than treatment of
domestic or any other foreign investors. The MAI definition of invest-
ment extends the reach of these investor protections beyond current
trade agreements to include investments in non-MAI countries.4 9 They
are analogous to the dormant commerce clause doctrine that limits the
authority of U.S. states to impose burdens on interstate and interna-
tional commerce. 50 While analogous, the commerce clause doctrine
provides a major exception when states act as market participants,
rather than market regulators. Nor does the analogy hold with respect
to the balancing test that U.S. courts have developed under the last sixty
years of Supreme Court precedent.
- Limits on performance requirements51 under the MAI are analogous to
the National Treatment limits, except that discriminatory effect is not at
issue. An investor need only prove that prohibited requirements are
involved, such as export performance (in all cases) or hiring local resi-
dents (unless the investor receives a state subsidy).5 2 The MAI omits
45. See e.g., Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (no preemption of state law
under 14th Amendment authority to protect religious freedom); Wisconsin Public Inter-
venor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 603-08 (1991) (no preemption of state law under com-
merce clause authority to regulate the field of pesticide use). See also Elena S. Rutrick,
Local Pesticide Regulation Since Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 20 E-v. APF. 65,
68-71 (1993).
46. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. 11(2).
47. The MAI includes 2 "relative" and 12 "absolute" provisions that could affect state
sovereignty. The relative provisions include National Treatment and Most Favored
Nation Treatment. The absolute provisions include Transparency, Temporary Entry,
Nationality Requirements, Employment Requirements, Performance Requirements, and
Monopolies/State Enterprises. They also include General Treatment, Expropriation,
Protection from Strife, Transfers, Information Transfer and Data Processing, and Subro-
gation. There are a number of others, such as Investment Incentives, which negotiators
may defer for later rounds of negotiation or have yet to define.
48. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(National Treatment and Most
Favoured Nation Treatment).
49. See infra Part I.A, notes 102-07.
50. See infra Part II.B.3.
51. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(Performance Requirements)(1).
52. See infra Part II.C.1.
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significant NAFTA exceptions to promote domestic economic develop-
ment and trade-related performance requirements.5 3
- Expropriation and Compensations 4 provisions of the MAI are analogous
to Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment limits on taking of property with-
out just compensation. However, the definition and scope of expropria-
tion under the MAI are indeterminate compared to the highly developed
body of U.S. law.
- General Treatment under the MAI includes a nearly verbatim translation
of substantive due process limits on state regulation that "impairs" the
use or enjoyment of an investment.5s This standard is not broader than
National Treatment, and it does not require any showing of de facto dis-
crimination. The Supreme Court abandoned its own similar doctrine
more than 60 years ago.5 6 Moreover, General Treatment provides a for-
eign investor with "treatment no less favorable than that required by
international law."5 7 As suggested by an OECD Working Group, this
language could open the door for investors to use the MAI dispute pro-
cess to enforce standards set in WTO agreements.5 8
Like the WTO agreements, the MAI would provide enforcement
through state-to-state dispute settlement,' 9 but unlike the WTO, the
enforcement mechanism under the MAI would provide monetary damages
paid by the offending national government. 60 The major enforcement
clout is that the MAI would privitize the dispute settlment process. It
would empower investors to protect themselves by seeking monetary dam-
ages from any "competent" domestic tribunal or from international arbitra-
tion.6 1 The applicable law in investor-to-state disputes would be the MAI
text and applicable rules of international law, not the horizontal and verti-
cal checks and balances of the Constitution, which have resulted in
nuanced balancing tests after 210 years of interpretation by U.S. courts.62
In short, the MAI's fourteen investor protections, investor-to-state rem-
edies, and international dispute forum could create a system that rivals the
53. See infra Part II.C.1, notes 427-31.
54. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(Expropriation and
Compensation)(2).
55. See id. art. IV(Investment Protection)(1.2).
56. See infra Part II.C.3.
57. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(General Treatment)(1.2).
58. There seems to be agreement that the MAI should in no way [undermine]
rights of the contracting parties or the investor contained in other international
treaties. However, there is controversy as to what extent such other treaty rights
should be incorporated into the MAI because such incorporation may have the
consequence that the MAI dispute settlement mechanism would be available
with regard to such rights irrespective of whether these other treaties provide for
arbitration or not.
WORKING GROUP C, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
INVESTMENT PROTECTION, OECD DOCUMENTs: TowARDs MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT RULES
134, 146 (1996) [hereinafter OECD DOCUMENTS].
59. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(State-State Procedures)(C).
60. See id. art. V(Proceedings and Awards)(C)(6)(c).
61. See id. art. V.(Investor-State Procedures)(D)(2).
62. See id. art. V(Applicable law)(D)(14)(a).
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more deferential U.S. constitutional limits on the lawmaking power of
states regarding foreign investment.
D. Sovereignty Preservation Arguments
In terms of state sovereignty, the legal effect of adverse international deci-
sions against non-conforming federal or state law in the United States is
not automatic. 63 While the complaining nation may seek countermeasures
such as trade sanctions (under the WTO) 64 or monetary damages against
the U.S. government (under the MAI),6 5 the U.S. federal government can
act as a buffer by seeking a negotiated solution or by choosing to endure
the sanction (a tariff increase on U.S. goods or services) rather than
change the law. Federal officials used this authority as a key argument to
assuage sovereignty concerns regarding the MA16 6 and the WTO agree-
ments.6 7 The United States has already played the role of buffer and nego-
tiator in response to an EU complaint against a government procurement
law in Massachusetts 6 8 and in a dispute involving state treasurers and
Swiss banks.6 9 In contrast, the MAI empowers private investors to directly
sue for monetary damages, 70 which complicates and reduces the interme-
diary role for national governments.
While not "automatic," the impact of the MAI on state and local
authority could prove significant at the following three stages of the policy-
making process: preemption by federal courts, administrative implementa-
tion, and legislation.
1. Preemption by Federal Courts
MAI negotiators have offered to protect state sovereignty by denying foreign
investors or governments standing to sue states in federal courts.
NAFTA7 1 and the WTO agreements7 2 utilized this approach. Both imple-
63. See Jackson, supra note 13, at 172.
64. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes art. 22 Apr. 15, 1995, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND vol. 31, 33
I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
65. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(Disputes Between an Investor and a
Contracting Party)(D).
66. For example, AmbassadorJeffrey Lang said that, "... even if we disagree with the
results of a [MAI] dispute settlement process, we are free to continue to do what we were
doing before. There may be consequences for that, but we're not going to agree to any-
thing that limits our ability to take any action we want, at the state level or at the federal
level." McGiNTY, supra note 10, at 2.
67. See The World Trade Organization and U.S. Sovereignty Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong. 7-8 (June 14, 1994) (testimony by Rufus
Yerxa).
68. See Robert Greenberger, States, Cities Increase Use of Trade Sanctions, Troubling
Business Groups and U.S. Partners, WALL Sr. J., Apr. 1, 1998, at A20.
69. See David Sanger, How a Swiss Bank Gold Deal Eluded a U.S. Mediator, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 1998, at A1-6.
70. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(Disputes Between an Investor and a
Contracting Party)(D).
71. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(c) (1993); 19 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1994).
72. See 19 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1994); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) (1994).
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menting laws provide that only the U.S. federal government has standing
to sue states in U.S. courts to enforce the agreements. If applied to the
MAI, this limitation would prevent investors from suing in a domestic
forum, an option that the MAI explicitly provides. 73 By the same token, the
U.S. government would have standing to enforce the MAI against states in
federal court and need not wait for an adverse ruling by an international
arbitration panel. 74
In this regard, the NAFTA/WTO model places state law in an inferior
position to federal law. Namely, "no provision of the Agreement, nor the
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, which is
inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect. ''75 In other
words, even if the United States loses a WTO case against a federal law,
there are no domestic legal grounds to strike down the federal law. Never-
theless, the U.S. government could sue to preempt state law in federal
court because of a conflict with NAFTA, WTO agreements, or the MAI.
2. Administrative Implementation
Trade and investment agreements may constrain agency implementation of
laws or executive orders. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ceased its efforts to implement an executive order that included use of eco-
labels to promote procurement of environmentally preferable goods. Inter-
agency disputes seemed to cause the EPA's suspension of work on the
aforementioned executive order.
3. Legislation
The United States and foreign governments are lobbying against proposed
state legislation on the grounds that it conflicts with WTO agreements or
NAFTA. Specifically, they argue that proposed state laws risk future trade
sanctions.76 Corporate lobbyists are fortifying their political clout by argu-
ing that proposed legislation violates trade agreements. 77
73. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(Means of Settlement)(D)(2)(a)
(providing that if a case is not settled, "the investor may choose to submit it for resolu-
tion: a. to any competent courts or administrative tribunals of the Contracting Party to
the dispute.").
74. Referring to federal action to preempt state law under the WTO agreements,
Matt Schaefer observes that: "[wlhile U.S. federal government authority does not
depend on the existence of an adverse panel report, political considerations almost cer-
tainly make an adverse panel report a precondition to a federal suit." Schaefer, supra
note 13, at 643-44. The MAI would increase the pressure for pre-panel preemption of
states if there is a significant threat of monetary damages: "[s]uch a scenario [the threat
of retaliation] would put pressure on the U.S. government to ensure that the state whose
measures were held to be inconsistent with NAFTA or WTO commitments changes its
laws." Id. at 645.
75. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a) (1993); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a) (1994); 19 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1994) (emphasis added).
76. See Robert E. Pierre, Md. Bill Targeting Nigeria Stirs Ire; State Dept. Opposes Sanc-
tions Proposal, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1998, at B1; Fred Hiatt, Commentary: Foreign
Affairs in Annapolis, WAsH. PosT, Mar. 30, 1998, at A25.
77. The Illinois Retail Dealers Association successfully lobbied against Illinois legis-
lation that sought to replicate labeling standards based on the model of California Prop-
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While one can dismiss the impact of lobbying as merely a political
trend of the corporate age, it is a trend with significant legal teeth.78 First,
lobbying based on international agreements carries the inherent prestige of
an international agreement, and it provides a legal rationale for legislators'
votes that might well be cast for political reasons. Second, lobbying based
on international agreements carries the implied threat of retaliation from
another country or preemption by the U.S. federal government, particu-
larly when the message is carried by federal officials. Third, lobbying
based on NAFTA Chapter 11 or the MAI is based on the explicit threat of
litigation seeking monetary damages, particularly when the message is car-
ried by investors with the legal capacity to file a claim. The first investor
claim filed under NAFTA succeeded in convincing Canada to settle for
monetary damages and repeal a federal law.7 9
The magnitude of corporate monetary relief may diminish the role of
the federal government as a buffer. Moreover, the leverage that the risk of
monetary damages may create against the federal government may trans-
form the federal role from neutral buffer into active partisan on behalf of
the investor.
In sum, the U.S. negotiators seek to avoid a direct confrontation with
the U.S. Constitution by interposing the U.S. government as a buffer. By
proposing to block investor standing to use U.S. courts, they can block the
"automatic" effect of the MAI on state and local law. Nevertheless, this
preemption empowers the federal government at the expense of states.
This shift in the balance of power is a meaningful change in state
sovereignty.80
A second kind of sovereignty protection is to include state law in coun-
try-specific exceptions. Using NAFTA as a model, the negotiators propose
two kinds of exceptions that relate to states. The first is a blanket excep-
osition 65. They argued that the Uruguay Round Agreements would pre-empt state
authority. See 1993 IL H.B. 2181, 88th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1993-94).
78. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 621 (stating that even non-enforceable rights are
worth strengthening because they can be tools of persuasion in the domestic political
process).
79. Most prominently, the Ethyl Corporation of Richmond, Virginia lobbied against
legislation that banned cross-border transportation of its gasoline additive, MMT, in the
Canadian Parliament. Ethyl cited both the NAFTA standards of investor protection in its
complaint seeking $251 million in monetary damages through the investor-state dispute
process. Canada settled the case for $13 million to cover Ethyl expenses, lost profits,
and agreed to repeal the law. See Canada Settles NAFTA Dispute by Lifting Ban on Gaso-
line Additive, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 24, 1998, at 19; MICHELLE SFORZA & MARK VAL-
LIANATOS, PREAMBLE CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, ETHYL CORPORATION v. GOaRNMENr OF
CANADA: CHEMICAL FIRM USES TRADE PACT TO CONTEST ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1998).
80. Disturbingly, federal constraints upon state action grow even as states are
increasingly acknowledged as innovators in public policy. To revitalize federal-
ism, the three branches of the national government should carefully examine
and refrain from enacting proposals that would limit the ability of state legisla-
tures to exercise discretion of basic and traditional functions of state
government.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, POLICY ON FEDERALISM 1 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter NCSL POLICY ON FEDERALISM].
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tion for all existing nonconforming state measures. This strategy "grandfa-
thers" only existing law, while constraining future lawmaking capacity.
The second exception covers future lawmaking at both the federal and state
levels within a few key areas, such as procurement, subsidies, social serv-
ices, and minority affairs.
The question is to what degree the United States must negotiate limits
on the scope or duration of these exceptions. The Europeans, for example,
propose taking similar exceptions for the policies that the United States
targets as a high priority for the negotiations. 8 1 To the extent that these
exceptions survive the negotiating process, there are several factors that
significantly limit their viability. As explained in Part III.C, these factors
include (1) the high degree of specificity required to effectively take a coun-
try-specific exception; (2) the fact that exceptions would become the
targets for future "ratcheting" back to MAI compliance through a process
called "standstill and rollback;" and (3) the likelihood that MAI dispute
panels would not recognize the application of exceptions that contravene
the purpose and objectives of the MAI.
Finally, a third kind of sovereignty protection, the option to withdraw,
was prominently discussed in the WTO sovereignty debate.8 2 However,
the option to withdraw is notably diminished by the MAI. The United
States may withdraw from the WTO after giving six months notice.8 3
While this may not be a practical option, it makes Congressional oversight
a more significant concern for dispute resolution panels that might other-
wise interpret vague MAI terms against U.S. sovereignty interests.84 In
comparison, the MAI would require nations to wait at least five years from
the date the MAI enters into force before they could give a six-month notice
to withdraw, but the MAI would continue to apply for fifteen years to any
investment that exists at the time of notice.8 5 It may take less time to
amend the U.S. Constitution than to withdraw from the MAI.
E. Likelihood of Conflict Arguments
1. Trade Is Not Investment
There are two other arguments that relate to the likelihood of MAI/state
law conflict other than sovereignty defenses. The first is a legal argument
that many of the state laws cited below should be challenged under NAFTA
81. See Foreign Investment: Environmental Discussions Top Agenda of OECD Invest-
ment Treaty Negotiations, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1918, 1919-20 (Nov. 5, 1997).
82. See The World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Review Commission
Act, supra note 27, at 11-20 (statements of Amb. Alan Wolff, former General Counsel
and Deputy United States Trade Representative; and Amb. Alan Holmer, former Deputy
United States Trade Representative). See also Jackson, supra note 13, at 172.
83. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, art.
XV(2), 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
84. See Jackson, supra note 13, at 186 (discussion of proposal by Sen. Dole to create
a WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission); see also A Bill to Establish a Commission
to Review the dispute Settlement Reports of the World Trade Organization and or Other
Purposes, S. 16, 104th Cong. (1995).
85. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. XII(Final Provisions).
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or WTO trade agreements rather than under an investment agreement.
However, the jurisdictions of trade and investment agreements are not
mutually exclusive. For example, Canada failed in its attempt to dismiss
the NAFTA investment complaint of the Ethyl Corporation on jurisdic-
tional grounds. The case involved a challenge against a Canadian law that
banned the inter-provincial transport of a gasoline additive. 86 Canada
argued that the trade measure was not appropriate for investor-to-state dis-
pute resolution. After the NAFTA panel rejected this argument, the Cana-
dian government promptly settled the case for $13 million in damages and
a commitment to repeal the federal law.8 7
The issue regarding the laws cited in Part II is not whether they could
be attacked under a trade agreement, but whether they are also vulnerable
to challenges under the MAI because an investor can prove damages to an
investment.8 8
2. History of Investment Disputes
Advocates of the MAI argue that the MAI is not likely to threaten state
lawmaking powers because NAFTA and bilateral investment agreements
(BITs) include many MAI provisions, and in the history of NAFTA and
BITs, no one has challenged U.S. law.8 9 There are two errors in this argu-
ment. First, as a matter of economics, the United States has negotiated its
BITs to protect U.S. investors in developing countries, which are unlikely to
have investors with investments in the United States on any meaningful
scale. As for NAFTA Chapter 11, the first case was only recently settled in
favor of the investor. Not surprisingly, the attorney representing the inves-
tor in that case believes that the success of his strategy will set a precedent
that other trade lawyers will follow.90 Shortly after the Ethyl settlement
was announced, another major NAFTA complaint was filed against Canada,
this one involving regulation of hazardous waste.91
NAFTA and the BITs do not equate with the MA. The MAI contains
much broader investor protections. For example, even though NAFTA
Chapter 11 is the model for the MAI, the MAI adds a sweeping new
86. The Ethyl complaint was based on three investor protections in Chapter 11: (1)
national treatment; (2) performance requirements; and (3) expropriation. See Proposed
Canadian Ban of Gas Additive Violates NAFTA, Says US-Based Ethyl Corp., Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1409 (Sept. 11, 1996).
87. See Canada Settles NAFTA Dispute by Lifting Ban on Gasoline Additive, Inside U.S.
Trade, July 24, 1998, at 19. The NAFTA complaint by the Ethyl Corporation of Rich-
mond, Virginia sought $251 million in damages. See Neville Nankivell, Ottawa May Live
to Regret Decision to Ram Through Law on MMT, FIN. POST, July 11, 1998, at 17; SFoRzA
& VALLIANATOS, supra note 79, at 1.
88. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. II(Scope and Application)(2).
89. See Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Win, Lose, or Draw for the U.S.?, supra
note 9 (statement of Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Busi-
ness Affairs, U.S. Department of State).
90. See Ethyl Corp. files NAFTA claim over passage of MMT legislation, Daily Envtl.
Rep. (BNA) 2 (Apr. 16, 1997).
91. The U.S. company, S.D. Meyers, is seeking $10 million from Canada for its ban
on the export of PCB waste between 1995 and 1997. See Company to Sue Canada Over
Alleged Breach of NAFTA Rules, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 4, 1998, at 9.
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"impairment of use" provision to the NAFTA scope of General Treatment.92
Unlike the MAI, neither NAFTA Chapter 11 nor the WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement cover local government. The BITs have a much
more limited scope for application of National Treatment and MFN Treat-
ment.93 The scope of the MAI contracting parties, definition of investment,
and investor protections is unique in legal history.
F. Gears of the Power Shift
The shift in the balance of power in the federal system directly effects the
capacity of the federal government to preempt state law that conflicts with
MAI investor protections. While this is certainly possible, it is the least
likely scenario for how the MAI could constrain state lawmaking powers.
To summarize the foregoing review, the MAI is most likely to affect state
sovereignty at the following four levels, all of which are explained in Part II:
- International law. The MAI significantly expands the coverage of state
and local governments under existing international agreements. 94 For
example, it would expand investor protections under NAFTA to cover
local government and procurement, and it would expand NAFTA Gen-
eral Treatment to include protection from "impairment" of use or enjoy-
ment of an investment.
- Dispute settlement and constitutional law. The MAI would take invest-
ment disputes out of U.S. courts, which constitutionally defer to state
interests.
- Buffering role of the U.S. government. The MAI's investor-to-state reme-
dies would short-circuit the state-to-state buffering role of the U.S. gov-
ernment to restrain a complaint against state law for political or policy
reasons. 95 The threat of MAI monetary damages would also create a
much more direct fiscal disincentive as compared with WTO trade
sanctions. 96
- Power-shift in the legislative process. MAI investor protections would fur-
ther empower the lobbying clout of multinational corporations in the
federal, state, and local legislative process. Not only could foreign inves-
92. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(General Treatment)(1.2).
93. For example, U.S. BITs do not apply National Treatment to air transportation,
ocean and coastal shipping, banking, insurance, government grants, government insur-
ance and loan programs, energy and power production, custom house brokers, owner-
ship of real property, ownership and operation of broadcast or common carrier radio
and television stations, ownership of shares in the Communications Satellite Corpora-
tion, common carrier telephone and telegraph services, submarine cable services, use of
land and natural resources, mining on the public domain, primary dealership in U.S.
government securities, and maritime or maritime-related services. Nor do U.S. BITs
apply MFN Treatment to mining on the public domain maritime or maritime-related
services, primary dealership in U.S. government securities, and ownership of real prop-
erty. See, e.g., Annex to the Russian Federation-United States Treaty Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 31 I.L.M. 794 (June 17, 1992);
Protocol to United States-Argentina Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investment, 31 I.L.M. 124 (Nov. 14, 1991).
94. See infra Parts II.A., II.B., and I.C.
95. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 627.
96. See Parts I.D and II.C.
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tors claim that laws inconsistent with the MAI violate international stan-
dards, they could threaten to seek damages under the MAI and cite the
taxpayer burden that the new remedies would create. The magnitude of
this threat could also induce the federal government to lobby against
state legislation. 97
II. The MAI vs. the Current Balance of State/Federal Powers
Some MAI investor protections are analogous to constitutional provisions
against discrimination. In particular, two MAI "relative" treatment provi-
sions are analogous to the dormant commerce clause of the Constitution.
The analogy, however, does not convey at least four major differences
between the MAI and U.S. constitutional norms.
- Relative provisions. First, the MAI discrimination provisions (National
Treatment and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment) do not contain the sov-
ereignty exceptions and balancing tests that the Supreme Court has
articulated under the U.S. Constitution.
- Absolute provisions. Second, the MAI would create "absolute" investor
protections (such as General Treatment and limits on performance
requirements) that go far beyond the "relative" investor protections
against discrimination.
- Indeterminate language. Third, the most important investor protections
of the MAI are expressed in vague, indeterminate language. For exam-
ple, some commentators have described the MFN language (where it
appears in WTO agreements) as "political theatre"98 and an "oratory
wish list."99 The MAI empowers dispute panels to interpret such broad
language. While U.S. constitutional norms are also broad, the Supreme
Court has interpreted them over the past 210 years into a highly
nuanced system of precedent.
- Judicial deference to legislative purposes. Fourth, U.S. constitutional
norms are interpreted within a legal framework that separates power
vertically (federal/state) and horizontally (judicial/legislative/execu-
tive). Except for some types of discrimination, courts will give substan-
tial deference to legislative purposes through balancing economic and
non-economic interests. MAI panels would likely apply MAI provisions
with a singular purpose of investor protection.
This part of the Article summarizes (1) selected MAI provisions; (2)
the most likely areas of potential conflict with state or local law; (3) the
sovereignty issues raised by that conflict; and (4) the significance of pro-
posed MAI provisions for mitigating the subtraction of state sovereignty.
The purpose of this analysis is not to endorse the wisdom or timeliness of
the state law examples. Rather, it is to illustrate how the MAI could create
97. See Part II.C.
98. Robert E. Hudec, International Economic Law: The Political Theatre Dimension,
17 U. PA. J. INt'L ECON. L. 9 (1996).
99. Yong K. Kim, The Beginnings of the Rule of Law in the International Trade System
Despite U.S. Constitutional Constraints, 17 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 967, 1006-07 (1996).
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legal standards for lawmaking that would rival constitutional standards
and change the balance of power in the U.S. federal system.
A. National Treatment
1. MAI Provisions
The MAI would require Contracting Parties to give investors from another
MAI country "no less favorable" treatment in a range of investment activi-
ties. Treatment of another MAI investor must be "no less favorable than the
treatment it accords [in like circumstances] to its own investors and their
investments with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and sale or other
disposition of investments." 100 The MAI forbids not only explicit discrimi-
nation, but also discrimination in effect ("de facto" discrimination). 10 1
MAI negotiators have not decided whether National Treatment requires
subfederal jurisdictions to treat foreign investors at least as favorably as in-
state or out-of-state investors.' 02
In addition to "no less favorable" treatment, the MAI provides a Gen-
eral Treatment requirement that, "[i]n no case shall a Contracting Party
accord treatment less favourable than that required by international
law."10 3 This means that courts and policymakers should interpret MAI
National Treatment by using the National Treatment text and panel deci-
sions under other international agreements such as GATT, NAFTA, WTO
agreements and perhaps European Community law where relevant. 104
100. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(Treatment of Investors and Invest-
ments)(1). The "[in like circumstances]" language is not part of the consensus text.
101. See OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Commentary to the MAI
Negotiations Text (last modified Dec. 14, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/
negtext.htm> [hereinafter MAI Commentary].
102. Two alternatives exist. First, a state could treat a foreign investor at least as
favorably as it would treat an U.S. investor from another state. Alternatively, the state
could treat the foreign investor at least as favorably as it would treat investors from that
same state. See id. art. III, 7. A proposal from one OECD country would resolve this
question in favor of "in-state" treatment:
1.4 If a subfederal entity of a Contracting Party accords to its own investors and
their investments treatment more favourable than to investors and investments
of other sub-federal entities of the same Contracting Party it shall in accordance
with paragraphs 1 to 3 extend the more favourable treatment to investors of
other Contracting Parties and to their investments.
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex 1. Even if negotiators do not address the
question of favorable investor treatment in subfederal jurisdictions, such "in-state" treat-
ment is likely to result if MAI panels follow previous GATT panels that dealt with sub-
federal measures. See Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, at 274.
103. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(Investment Protection)(1). General
Treatment is discussed in greater detail in Part II.C, infra.
104. In the recent Shrimp/Turtle case before a WTO dispute panel, the United States
argued for the broadest possible scope of "customary international law." Countries
challenging U.S. law argued the scope should include only international agreements
ratified by all parties in the dispute. The United States argued that the scope of "custom-
ary international law" should also include "international conventions; international cus-
tom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; general principles of law
recognized by nations; judicial decisions; and scholarly writings." WTO Secretariat,
United States: Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Certain Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, at
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Interpretation using international law expands the following standards of
National Treatment:
- "Investors and their investments" - definition and location. The MAI
applies National Treatment to "every kind of asset," ranging from owner-
ship shares in an enterprise to concessions and revenue-sharing con-
tracts.105 An investor10 6 is also entitled to National Treatment even if
his investment is located outside the country or state allegedly not pro-
viding National Treatment. 107 This expands the National Treatment
doctrine in trade agreements.
- "No less favorable" - investor benefits. MAI negotiators rejected a propo-
sal to provide the "same" or "comparable" National Treatment in favor
of "no less favorable" treatment. The rationale for the "comparable"
standard was "to prevent unlimited competition for international invest-
ment funds with consequential costs and distortions of investment
flows."1 0 8 However, most delegations to the MAI considered that a
"comparable" standard would unacceptably weaken the standard of
treatment from the investor's viewpoint." 10 9 Investor protection appears
as the MAI objective, although this protection distorts the free flow of
investment capital at taxpayer expense.
- "No less favorable" - explicit discrimination. GATT panels have ruled that
parties cannot use the defense that an explicitly discriminatory practice
is minimal in its effect. 110
- "No less favorable" - effects test. GATT Panels have interpreted the GATT
National Treatment language"' to require an effects test,1' 2 to deter-
mine whether domestic laws violate National Treatment by creating a
99 (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp Report] (citing the United States as quoting arti-
cle 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice).
105. The MAI defines "investment" as "every kind of asset owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by an investor," including an enterprise, ownership shares or
stocks, contract rights and property rights such as leases. MAI Negotiating Text, supra
note 7, art. II(Scope and Applications)(2).
106. The MAI defines "investor" as (i) a "natural person having the nationality of, or
who is permanently residing in, a Contracting Party.. ." and (ii) "a legal person or any
other entity constituted or organized under the applicable law of a Contracting Party,
whether or not for profit, whether private or government owned or controlled, and
includes a corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture, association
or organisation." Id. art. II(Scope and Applications)(1).
107. See MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. III(Treatment)(2). Compare MAI Nego-
tiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(National Treatment)(1) (prescribing no territorial limit)
with MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(Performance Requirements)(1), and MAI
Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(General Treatment)(1) (both limited investments
"in its [the Contracting Party's] territory").
108. MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. III(Privatization), C1 3.
109. Id.
110. See Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, at 270-71. See also United
States: Taxes on Petroleum & Certain Imported Substances, June 17, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D.
(34th Supp.) at 156 (1988) (stating "the impact of a measure inconsistent with the Gen-
eral Agreement is not relevant for a determination of nullification or impairment by the
Contracting Parties").
111. GATT states that imported products "shall be accorded treatment no less favour-
able than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regula-
tions and requirements" affecting their internal sale. General Agreement on Tariffs and
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risk of discrimination.' 1 3 The General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) also creates an explicit effects test, providing that, "[flormally
identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less
favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favor of serv-
ices or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or
service suppliers of any other Member."' 1 4
"In like circumstances" - basis of comparison. MAI negotiators have yet to
decide whether to include or exclude the phrase "in like circumstances."
The arguments on either side are similar. The main dispute concerns
whether the MAI text should explicitly recognize exceptions allowing de
facto discrimination.1 1 5 However, interpretation under the relevant
international law makes the presence of the phrase in "like circum-
stances" inconsequential. For subnational measures, NAFTA uses the
similar phrase, "like product," in connection with the terms "directly
competitive or substitutable." 1 6 The use of the term "like product"
would not support many non-market based classifications to distin-
guish investors. For example, the United States tried to defend a Minne-
sota tax benefit for microbreweries that Canada challenged as a
violation of National Treatment under GATT. The panel agreed with
Canada that classification of companies on the basis of size is not a
relevant basis of comparison for taxation of beer. Microbeer competes
with macrobeer, or as the panel put it, "beer is beer."11 7 Nor was it
relevant that the tax treated companies the same, regardless of national-
ity. The fact that Canadian companies selling beer in Minnesota were
large firms meant that the state law was a de facto violation of National
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 at 111.4 [hereinafter
GATT].
112. See Japan: Customs Duties, Taxes & Labeling Practices on Imported Wines &
Alcoholic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 119 (1988).
113. See EEC: Payments & Subsidies Paid to Processors & Producers of Oilseeds &
Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 125 (1991).
114. General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, The Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Legal Texts 325 (GATT Secreta-
riat 1994), 33 1.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
115. The argument for not including the phrase is that: "National treatment and MFN
treatment are comparative terms. They permit fair and equitable difference in treatment
justified by relevant differences of circumstances. In this context, nationality is not rele-
vant." The argument for including the phrase is that:
[g]overnments may have legitimate policy reasons to accord differential treat-
ment to different types of investments.
In like circumstances' ensures that comparisons are made between investors
and investments on the basis of characteristics that are relevant for the purposes
of the comparison. The objective is to permit the consideration of all relevant
circumstances, including those relating to a foreign investor and its investment,
in deciding to which domestic or third country investors and investments they
should appropriately be compared, while excluding from consideration those
characteristics that are not germane to such a comparison.
MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. III, 1 6.
116. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 301,
32 I.L.M. 296-456, § 605-800 [hereinafter NAFTA].
117. Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, at 297.
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Treatment." 8
In sum, National Treatment under the MAI protects investors from
explicit discrimination, regardless of the purpose or economic significance
of the discriminatory measure. Even if a measure is not discriminatory on
its face, the MAI protects investors from treatment that places them at a
competitive disadvantage. The MAI may tolerate some "relevant" differ-
ences of treatment, but the MAI not has defined policy objectives to deter-
mine relevancy.
2. Potential for Conflict
The following categories of state law are likely to violate National Treat-
ment under the MAI. The categories are drawn from a broader survey con-
ducted in early 1997.119 The examples begin with the most explicit forms
of discrimination and then move on to laws that might place foreign inves-
tors at a competitive disadvantage. For reasons discussed below in subpart
III.A.3, those regulatory statutes that discriminate on the basis of citizen-
ship would probably not survive a constitutional challenge. The more
interesting state sovereignty questions arise regarding market participation
(procurement and use of state-owned land) and laws that may create de
facto disadvantages for foreign investors because of constitutionally per-
missible environmental or social objectives.
- Ownership of private assets. At least nineteen states restrict in some way
the ownership of private assets, including real estate, the use of public
lands, and business licenses based on residency or citizenship. In two
states (Nebraska and Oklahoma), the restrictions are based in the state
constitution.12 0 Eight states (Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin)' 2 1 limit owner-
ship of land by nonresident foreign citizens. Six states (Colorado, Indi-
ana, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South Dakota) 122 limit foreign
ownership of land without reference to residency. Other limits on for-
eign ownership include sale of state land (Arizona, Colorado, Montana,
and Oregon),12 3 mining claims (Nevada),1 24 water rights (Oregon), 1 25
118. See id. at 296.
119. For the full survey, see WESTERN GoVERNoRS' ASS'N, MULTILATERAL AGREEm-N ON
INVESTMENT: PoTENTIAL EFFEcTs ON STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMEr (1997) [hereinafter
WESTERN GovERNORs' REPORT].
120. See NEB. CONST. of 1875 art. I, § 25 (1920); OKL. CONST. art. XXII, § 1 (1981).
See also WESTERN GovERNoRs' REPORT, supra note 119, at 10.
121. See IowA CODE ANN. § 567.3(1) (West 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.300
(Banks-Baldwin 1996); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 500.221 (West 1966); Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-
1-23 (1995); NEB. REv. STAT. Am. §§ 76-408 to 409 (Michie 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 47-10.1-02 (1995); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 41, 43, 44, and 46 (West 1996); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 710.02 (West 1995).
122. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 36-1-124 (1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-8-2 (Michie
1966); Mo. Rev. STAT. § 442.571 (West 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. 88 76402 to 406 (1995);
OKI,& STAT. tit. 60, H8 121-124 (1995); S.D. CODiFiED LAWS AN. 8H 43-2A-2 to 43-2A-7
(Michie 1997).
123. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. H8 37-610 (West 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. § 36-1-124
(1990); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 77-2-306, 77-2-334 (1975); OR. Rev. STAT. § 273.255
(1995).
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and public utilities (Alaska and Hawaii). 126
- Use of public land. Nine states restrict use of public land according to
residency or citizenship. These restrictions include permits for mineral
extraction (Alaska, Montana, and Wyoming), 12 7 oil or gas extraction
(Arizona), 128 logging (Arizona, Idaho, and Oregon), 129 and preferences
to adjoining property owners for leasing state land (Oregon and
Wyoming).130
- Limits on gambling and casino licenses. At least eight states limit gam-
bling and related interests on the basis of residency. Alaska, 13 1 North
Dakota, 13 2 Oregon, 133 Nebraska, 134 and South Dakota 13 5 limit gam-
bling licenses to state residents or require an in-state preference for
amusement or gambling concessions and services. These laws could
affect a range of business owners from the corner pub to large hotels
and riverboat casinos. Texas 136 and Wisconsin 13 7 make state residence
a requirement to own a racetrack where pari-mutual wagering is con-
ducted. North Dakota requires corporations with an ownership interest
in a race horse to have a place of business within the state.13 8
- Preferences for traditional and residentfishing rights. A number of states
explicitly discriminate in favor of state residents in the allocation of
commercial fishing rights in coastal waters. These policies include sig-
nificantly higher fees for nonresidents (Alaska, California, and Ore-
gon) 139 and limits on permits for cultivating oysters (Maryland) 140 and
harvesting lobsters (Massachusetts). 14 1 Other states set limits that do
not explicitly discriminate, but create de facto conservation limits on
124. See NEv. Rv. STAT. § 517.010 (1995).
125. See OR. REv. STAT. § 543.050, 543.260 (1995).
126. See ALAsKA STAT. § 42.20.010 (Michie 1995); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 269-17.5
(Michie 1995).
127. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 38.05.045, 38.05.135, 38.05.140, 38.05.185, 38.05.190
(Michie 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-3-305A (1975); Wyo. STAT. §§ 36-3-102(b), 36-6-
101(a) - 36-6-101(c) (1995); State of Wyoming Board of Land Commissioners and Wyo-
ming Farm Loan Board Rules and Regulations Governing Leasing of Sub-Surface
Resources, Ch. 6, §§ 5, 13(b) (effective Mar. 1, 1982), Ch. 7, § 3(c), 7.
128. See Apjz. CODE ADMIN. 12-5-503, 12-5-515, 12-5-705B, 12-5-801(c), 12-5-1101(1),
12-5-2102 (1994); ARiz. Rev. STAT. § 37-291(A) (Michie 1997).
129. See ARiz. ADMIN. CODE 12-5-1001 (1994); ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 37-291(A) (West
1997); IDAH-O CODE § 58-1004 (1995); OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (1995).
130. See OR. REv. STAT. § 273.825 (1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105(a) (Michie
1996).
131. See AtsKA STAT. § 43.35.030 (Michie 1995).
132. See N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 99-01-20-03, 05 (1995).
133. See OR. REv. STAT. § 461.215 (1995).
134. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 9-614 (1995).
135. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 42-7A-43 and 42-7B-25 (Michie 1995).
136. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 179e, § 6.06(a)(12),(b),(d) (West 1998); 16
TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 301.1 through § 305.102 (West 1995).
137. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 562.05(3)(w)(a) (West 1995).
138. See N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 69.5-01-05-16(1) (1995).
139. See AsKA STAT. § 16.43.160(b) (Michie 1996); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE
§ 7852(a) and (c) (West 1998); OR. Rev. STAT. § 508.285 (1995).
140. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. §§ 4-11A-09, 4-11A-05 (1990).
141. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 130, § 38 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
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commercial fishing licenses based on size of the fleet (California) 14 2
and priority for traditional fishing families when stocks are depleted
(Washington).' 4 3 These limits would dearly tend to limit access by for-
eign fishing fleets.
Examples of National Treatment Conflicts:
19 States with Limits on Ownership of Private Land striped - this limit only)
9 States with Limits on Sale or Use of State Land (triangles - this limit only)
8 States with Limits on Fishing Rights (grey checker - this limit only)
8 States with Limits on Gambling/Casino Licenses (black - multiple)
10 States with Multiple Conflicts (black)
SAlaska
- Protection of local business ownership. A number of states have laws that
protect local ownership of businesses. Maryland,' 44 Florida,145 and
New Hampshire1 46 forbid petroleum refiners from owning more than a
maximum percentage (e.g., five percent) of the service stations in the
state. All of these laws have been tested and upheld by federal
courts.1 4 7 Minnesota forbids out-of-state bank holding companies from
acquiring more than a thirty percent market share of retail commercial
banks within the state.1 4 8
- Franchise encroachment. Several states may adversely affect the rights of
foreign franchisors or franchisees to purchase, sell, or control owner-
ship interests by increasing bargaining power of local franchisees. Iowa
requires a franchisor that wants to open a franchise near an existing one
to give the existing businesses a prior right to either buy the proposed
142. See CAL. FIsH & GAE CODE § 8230(b)(4) (West 1998).
143. See WASH. REv. CODE. ANN. § 75.28.720 (West 1997).
144. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 56, § 157E (1992).
145. See FL.A. STAT. ch. 526.151(1) (West 1991).
146. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 339-C:1 and 339-C:21 (1995).
147. See Maryland v. Exxon, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); State ex rel. Gas Kwick v. Donner,
453 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Opinion of theJustices, 117 N.H. 533 (1977).
148. See MINN. STAT. § 48.61 (1996).
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outlet or receive compensation for diverted market share. 149 Massachu-
setts empowers an existing franchisee to ask a state court to enjoin a
new franchise on the grounds that the new franchise is unwarranted
given anticipated market conditions, endangers the permanent invest-
ments of the existing franchisee, or fails to increase competition to the
benefit of the public.150
- Recycled material markets. Private and public sectors promote recycled-
content markets through procurement strategies. Thirteen states use
private market regulation or tax benefits to promote a market for
recycled newsprint, glass, or plastic.151 Twenty-nine states use public
procurement preferences to do the same.' 5 2 California, 153 Oregon,' 5 4
and Connecticut 55 are leaders among the eight states that mandate a
minimum percentage of recycled content in newsprint. California l5 6
and Wisconsin' 57 are among the states that mandate a minimum per-
centage of recycled content in glass or plastic containers. From the per-
spective of foreign firms, the minimum recycled-content requirements
for newsprint and containerg represent the most problematic laws. If a
foreign producer of newsprint or beer bottles, for example, does not
have efficient access to the recycled content, it is placed at a comparative
disadvantage in gaining access to that market. There is little doubt that
these laws are effective in influencing investment decisions. In 1989,
there was one Canadian paper mill that could process recycled paper;
today there are twenty-three. 158 Other Canadian companies have
shifted their capital investments for production into the United States,
prompting a company executive to complain that "[r]ecycled-content
laws have single-handedly changed the economics of location of the
industry."15 9 Canada officially cites state recycled content laws as a
149. See IowA CODE §523H.6(1) (1995); see Holiday Inns Franchising v. Branstad,
537 N.S. 2d 724 (Iowa 1995).
150. See MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 93B, § 4(3)(1) (1995). See also Heritage Jeep-Eagle v.
Chrysler Corp., 655 N.E. 2d 140 (1995).
151. The 13 states include Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Mary-
land, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
See RAmOND COMMUNICATIONS, STATE RECYCLING LAws UPDATE 9 (Year-End ed. 1995).
152. The 29 states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id. at
Purchasing Preferences for Recycled Products (chart).
153. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 42760 (West 1996).
154. See OR. REv. STAT. § 459.505 (1994).
155. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 229-256n (1995).
156. See CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE § 4549 (West 1996).
157. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.297 (West 1997).
158. See Paul Bagnell, Recycled Paper Running Short: Pulp and Paper Makers Urge
Canadians to Recycle More So They Can Stop Importing So Much from the U.S., FIN. POST,
Oct. 31, 1996, at 13.
159. Geoffrey Elliot, quoted in Countries Can't Use Trade to Promote Environmental
Action, Conference Told, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 901 (May 20, 1992).
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leading barrier to U.S. market access.1 60
- Packaging requirements. In addition to federal requirements for packag-
ing, at least twelve states regulate the content of packaging materials,
eleven of which do so for environmental and public health purposes.16 1
In addition, some of these states regulate packaging content as part of
hazardous waste reduction or disposal programs,162 sales of agricul-
tural goods,163 or state recycling initiatives. 164 Investors may challenge
intrastate variation under National Treatment as placing foreign firms
at a commercial disadvantage because of the additional cost of
compliance. 165
- Domestic procurement preferences. Forty-three states engage in explicit
discrimination in favor of government purchasing from domestic produ-
cers or suppliers. This comprises a major portion of the foreign com-
plaints about U.S. barriers to trade.166 Three examples of domestic
preferencing include: thirty-seven states with "buy local" programs;167
160. See CANADIAN DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, REGISTER OF
UNITED STATES BARRIERS To TRaE 15 (an. 1999); U.S. Barriers Still in Place, Says 1995
Canadian Register, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 625 (Apr. 5, 1995).
161. See ALA. CODE § 41-9-195 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 46.06.090 (Michie 1977); Aiuz.
REv. STAT. § 49-922 (1997); CAL. PUB. RFs. CODE § 42310 (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 22a-255j (1997); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/8 and 5/21.5 (West 1998); IOWA CODE
§ 455D.19 (1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 1737 (West 1997); NJ. STAT. ANN.
13:1E-99.1 (West 1999); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAv § 15-0514 (McKinney 1998); and
OR. REv. STAT. § 459.005 (1997).
162. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONsERv. LAW § 27-1510 (McKinney 1998) (regulating
packaging for disposal of medical waste); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 1731 (1997)
(regulating hazardous waste due to packaging content); ALAsIA STAT. § 46.06.031
(Michie 1977) (regulating hazardous waste due to packaging content, among other
sources of waste).
163. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 239.093 (West 1997) (requiring information identifying
manufacturer, price, net weight, etc. for food packages); NJ. STAT. § 4:10-35 (1998)
(requiring specified packaging for potatoes).
164. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. 13:1E-99.1 (West 1999) (tax on sale of litter-generating
products); N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERv. LAW § 27-0717 (McKinney 1990) (bureau of waste
reduction and recycling); AL& CODE § 41-9-195 (Michie 1996); ARiz. REv. STAT. § 49-834
(West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.7195 (West 1997); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-3419 (West
1997).
165. See EU TRADE REPORT - 1997, supra note 24, at 19-20.
166. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMissION, REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE AND
IN.STMENT 36-37 (1994); CANADA DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE, REGISTER OF UNITED STATES BARRIERS To TRADE 13 (1996); JAPAN SUBcoMMITTEE ON
UNFAIR TRADE POLICIES AND MEASURES, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE COUNCIL, REPORT ON UNFAIR
TRADE POLICIES 19 (1994).
167. The 40 states that have "buy local" programs include Alabama, Alaska, Arkan-
sas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See James D. Southwick, Binding the
States: A Survey of State Law Conformance with the Standards of the GATT Procurement
Code, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 57, 79 (1992).
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sixteen states with "buy America" programs; 168 and fourteen states that
have both.169 There is considerable variety amongst the domestic pref-
erence. States can apply them to products (which does not exclude all
foreign bidders), to bidders (which does not exclude all foreign prod-
ucts), or to both.170 Most states use additional rules to ensure that
domestic preferences promote economic development without creating
a net loss for taxpayers. For example, Oregon, 171 Kansas, 172 and
Texas 173 are among twenty-five states that apply their domestic prefer-
ences in the case of a tie bid.174 All things being equal, these states
prefer to enjoy the multiplier effect of spending tax dollars at home.
Other states, including California, 175 Wisconsin, 176 and Minnesota, 177
require state agencies to purchase U.S.-made goods or produce.
Minority procurement preferences. In addition to the domestic prefer-
ences, which are explicit violations of National Treatment, there are
other preferences that are probably defacto violations. While neutral in
their language, these preferences might have an adverse or anticompeti-
tive impact on foreign companies. The most popular among these are
minority procurement preferences. For example, Washington' 78
requires bidders for public contracts to meet goals for inclusion of sub-
contracts with minority and women-owned businesses. Wisconsin 179
has a preference for minority contractors or subcontractors in terms of a
minimum percentage of annual construction work during each fiscal
year. High-volume preferences like these have drawn complaints from
foreign governments.' 80 The domestic preferences noted above would
also violate the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement
168. The 16 states that have "buy America" programs include Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin. See id. at 75.
169. The 14 states that have both include Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Texas, and Wisconsin. See id. at 75, 79.
170. See id.
171. See ORE. REv. STAT. § 279.021 (1994).
172. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3740 (1995).
173. See TEx. REv. Clv. STAT. ANN. § 903(c) (West 1995).
174. Ten states have a local preference for tie bid cases on products only: Connecti-
cut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode
Island (food products only), and South Carolina. Three states have a preference for local
bidders in the case of a tie bid: Louisiana, Kansas, and Tennessee. Twelve states have a
local preference in case of a tie involving in-state bidders and products: Alabama, Illi-
nois, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas,
Virginia, and Utah. See Southwick, supra note 167, at 79-82.
175. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 4331 (West 1996).
176. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 16.754 (West 1996) (only when it is "economically
feasible").
177. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 16B.101 to 103 (West 1966) (only when it is "economi-
cally feasible").
178. See WASH. REv. CODE § 39.04.220(3) (Michie 1996).
179. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 16.855 (West 1996).
180. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 166, at 37.
Vol. 31
1998 Sovereignty by Subtraction
Examples of National Treatment Conflicts:
Domestic Procurement Preferences
37 States with "Buy Local" Preferences (light grey - local only)
16 States with "Buy America" Preferences (striped - America only)
14 States with both (dark grey)
T.
T Als  T
/ Buy American
I] Buy Local[] Both T- Tie Bid Only
(AGP),' s ' which applies national treatment and other GATT disciplines
to state procurement 1 8 2 However, the United States listed several coun-
try-specific reservations to avoid an AGP conflict with other procure-
ment programs, including those that promote business development by
minorities, women, veterans, and development of distressed areas and
general environmental quality.' 8 3 In addition, individual states listed
their own reservations regarding the AGP.' 8 4
- Investment incentives. Virtually every state employs large scale invest-
ment incentives; the number of state incentives grew 100% between
1983 and 1989.185 Very few of these programs explicitly discriminate
181. See Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP), Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, Annex 4, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations:
The Legal Texts 438 (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994) thereinafter AGP].
182. Most governors committed their states to the AGP without legislative ratification
even though the legislatures enacted the procurement policies at issue under the AGP.
183. See AGP, supra note 181, Annex 5, l 1, and Annex 2, ~ 2-3.
184. For example, reservations for individual states include Hawaii (software devel-
oped in the state and construction); Kansas (construction; automobiles and aircraft);
Kentucky (construction); Mississippi (services generally); New York (transit cars, buses
and related equipment); Oklahoma (construction); South Dakota (beef); Tennessee (con-
struction and services generally); and Washington (fuel, paper products, boats, ships
and vessels). See id. United States Appendix to the Agreement on Government Procure-
ment, Annex 2.
185. See WILLIAMI Sci-iVieK ET At., BIDDING FOR BUSIN~ESS: AR CITIES AuN STATES SELL-
ING Tnu 'SuLVuS SHORT? 20 (1994).
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in favor of state residents. 186 The MAI would raise the issue of whether
there is a de facto violation of National Treatment. 18 7 The definition of
"actionable subsidies" under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM) would support an investor making a
claim under MAI. The SCM prohibits WTO members from causing
adverse effects, including injury to the domestic industry of another
member, 188 and maintaining tax breaks or subsidies that result in dis-
placement of foreign imports, price undercutting by the subsidized
product, or other competitive advantages.' 89 The following are exam-
ples of programs that could make a difference in the global competitive-
ness of a firm, particularly when used in conjunction with each other.
- Tax breaks for raw materials for manufacturing. Forty-five states' 90 pro-
vide complete excise tax exemptions for raw materials. As a result of
transportation costs, this exception may provide an advantage to estab-
lished domestic firms. These states include Washington (exemption
from sales tax),19 1 California (exemption from sales and use tax)192
and Texas (tax exemption for nonprofit development corporations that
purchase raw materials). 193
- Industrial development bonds. Forty-nine states offer subsidized revenue
bond financing as an incentive for economic development invest-
ments. 194 Arizona, 195 California, 196 and Montana' 97 are among the
186. The ones that discriminate include Montana (does not allow a small business
with a nonresident alien shareholder to take an investment tax credit. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 15-31-123); Oklahoma (requires applicants for agricultural loans to be state residents.
OL.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 74 § 5063.23 (West 1996)); and Arizona (limits eligibility for eco-
nomic development assistance to businesses or other qualified projects clearly in the
best interest of the state. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 41-1505.07 (1998)).
187. An OECD working group recommended absolute MAI limits on development
incentives (not just National Treatment) because: (1) they distort private-market invest-
ment patterns; (2) they often provide a windfall, i.e., an incentive to do something an
investor would have done anyway; and (3) they tend to stimulate competition among
governments that is costly to taxpayers without producing a net gain in national or
global productivity. OECD DOCUMENTS, supra note 58, at 131. The Working Group rec-
ommendation was not heeded by the MAI negotiators who felt that "companies should
be able to continue to benefit from incentives and that the MAI should not interfere with
how governments seek to promote investment" apart from non-discrimination rules, at
least until a second round of negotiations. OECD, MAIN FEmTUR.S OF THE MAI 11 55
(1996); Anders Ahnlid, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Special Topics 1 4 (Dec.
1996) http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/ahnlid.htm). For a summary of the domestic
debate on incentives, see WILUAM ScI-,waxE aT AL., IMPROVING YOUR BUSINESS CLIMATE: A
GUIDE TO PUBLIC INVESTMErr IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1997); and NATIONAL COUNCIL
FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INCENTIVES: A GUIDE TO AN EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE
PoucY (1996).
188. See WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 14, 1994,
art. 5(a), WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SCM].
189. See id. art. 6.3.
190. See ScHwEICE ET AL., supra note 187, at 18.
191. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 82.04.435, 82.08.02565 (West 1996).
192. See CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 6377(a)(1) (1996).
193. See TEx. Clv. STAT. art. 5190.6, § 2(4), 32 (West 1996).
194. See ScHwEaK ET AL.., supra note 187, at 19.
195. See Amiz. REV. STAT. § 41-1505.07 (1995).
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many states that designate financing programs for state-based busi-
nesses that engage in export development. If the criteria for financing
are part of explicit conditions that include export performance, it would
count as a prohibited subsidy under the SCM, 198 which would support
an investor claim under the MAI.199
- Customized job training. Forty-four states promote global competitive-
ness of state-based firms through investments in work force training.200
Among the leaders are California, 20' Alaska,202 and Nebraska.203 As
with designated financing programs, a key National Treatment issue is
the extent to which the state agencies explicitly include export promo-
tion as a condition of participating in the program.
One way that state and local officials can affect the conditions of
global competition is by combining their incentives into a package for
recruitment, retention, or expansion of firms. Incentive packages for
recruiting new firms can raise National Treatment issues because of their
unique nature. The recruitment process has generated "disappointed bid-
der" litigation. The MAI would give disappointed foreign bidders a new
cause of action and a friendlier forum if a domestic firm wins an incentive
package to the exclusion of the foreign firm.
An effect-test discrimination could arise from the efforts of some
states to reform how they allocate investment incentives.204 For example,
North Carolina screens companies that apply for state incentive programs
and limits the awards to only those companies that agree to: (a) make high-
impact investments that support job creation, higher than average wages,
and productivity-boosting technology; (b) make investments that would
not otherwise occur (e.g., in economically afflicted areas); and (c) guaran-
tee to meet performance standards.20 5 This more disciplined approach
may pose a National Treatment conflict because the job creation criteria
196. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15392.7 (1996).
197. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 90-9-402, 2-15-3015 and tit. 80, ch. 12.
198. See SCM, supra note 188, art. 3.1(a).
199. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(General Treatment)(1.1).
200. See ScHwEKE Er AL., supra note 187, at 18.
201. See CAL. UNEmp. INS. CODE § 10200 (West 1996).
202. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.47.758 (Michie 1995).
203. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1203 (1995).
204. States are under growing criticism that their incentive packages do not booft
productivity or stimulate investments that would not otherwise occur. The City of Rio
Rancho, New Mexico provides an example of an ill-conceived investment package. In
1993, the city awarded Intel Corp. an incentive package based on the company's "ideal
incentive matrix." It included $118 million in incentives and environmental regulatory
relief. The package was so large that the city was unable to afford essential services such
as water and schools for the growing population that was attracted by the Intel facility.
See David Friedman, The New Civil War: Politicians Dangle Wasteful subsidies to Lure
Companies to relocate or Stay Put. At What Cost?, INC., May 15, 1996, at 98. See generally
ScHwEKE Er AL., supra note 185, at 49-54; ScHwElE Er AL., supra note 187; and NATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 187.
205. See Corporation for Enterprise Development, Making Development Incentives
More Accountable, in IMPROVING YOUR BUSINESS CLIMATE 9-10 (1996); OFmCE OF THE Gov-
ERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, REPORT BY GovERNoRs BusINEss INCENTIVEs TASK FORCE
(1994).
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make it easier for a domestic firm or a firm that uses domestic suppliers
(as opposed to a foreign firm's existing nonlocal inputs) to win the incen-
tives. The screening criteria also concentrate state resources enough to
boost the global competitiveness of companies based in that state.206
A more fundamental National Treatment conflict is raised by incentive
programs aimed at business retention. These "stay-at-home programs" are
much more likely to exclude foreign investors who are competing with the
firms that local officials are trying to retain.207
While state officials want to preserve their ability to promote eco-
nomic development resources,208 they would prefer to do so in a way that
provides net new jobs for their own and neighboring states and minimizes
wind-fall benefits for investors at taxpayer expense.20 9 Rather than deal
with such bottom-up issues of inter-governmental competition, MAI negoti-
ators concluded that "companies should be able to continue to benefit
from incentives and that the MAI should not interfere with how govern-
ments seek to promote investment. '"210
3. Sovereignty Issues
From the high altitude of political debate, where the air is thin, National
Treatment under the MAI covers ground that looks similar to the dormant
foreign commerce clause under Article I Section 8 of the Constitution.211
Like National Treatment, the dormant commerce clause can be used to
negate the use of state government power that places foreign traders and
investors at a commercial disadvantage. It is "dormant" because the
Supreme Court invented the doctrine to preempt state law in the absence
of congressional action that conflicts with state law.2 12 The dormant com-
merce clause precludes state action that discriminates against foreign com-
merce, either explicitly or in effect. This is also the general purpose of
206. Another potential MAI issue is that some state and local governments do not
publish their screening criteria. This would violate the transparency obligations under
the MAI. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(Transparency)(1).
207. See Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State
Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 853-55 (1996).
208. See WESTERN GovERNoRs' AssocIA-nON, MULTLATERAL AGREEMENT ON INvESTMENT
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE PAcTs, Resolution 97-010 (July 24, 1997) [hereinafter
WGA RESOLUTION].
209. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 83A, § 5-1101 (1996), in which the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly found that "the widespread adoption of tax subsidies intended to move
jobs from one state to another reduces revenues in all participating states without
increasing the total number of jobs." Id. art. 84, § 4. The General Assembly proposed
that the governor negotiate an agreement with neighboring states to repeal "any law in
each state that provides a tax subsidy ... that is intended to create new jobs or entice
new jobs to the state." Id.
210. MAIN FEATuREs OF THE MAI, supra note 187, 1 55; Ahnlid, supra note 187, at 914.
211. The Commerce Clause reads: "Congress shall have Power ... To regulate com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
.. " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
212. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-2 (2d ed. 1988).
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National Treatment.2 13
Lawrence Tribe interprets congressional authority to regulate foreign
commerce under Article I Section 8 as "all but exclusive."21 4 By negative
inference, the federal courts have interpreted this broad power as a man-
date for states to withdraw efforts to affect national interests in foreign
commerce. 2 15 To this end, the Constitution and the MAI share a common
purpose of promoting free trade. The fundamental difference is that the
Constitution simultaneously embodies a commitment to promote free poli-
tics with a system of "dual sovereignty."2 16
At various times, and as recently as the late 1970s, the Supreme Court
has overturned state laws that burden foreign commerce, even in the
absence of discrimination or anything that resembled a conflict with fed-
eral law. The most recent exercise of what Charles Tiefer calls this "strong
preemption" doctrine was the Court's decision in Japan Line Ltd. v. County
of Los Angeles.2 17
The Japan Line decision extended the life of a doctrine that the United
States must speak with "one voice" in international commerce or foreign
affairs. 218 The Court applied one-voice doctrine to invalidate a California
property tax on containers in foreign commerce, even though the court
upheld the tax under the interstate commerce clause. 219 Japan Line's claim
of multiple taxation triggered the argument for a single voice, which the
Solicitor General supported with an amicus brief that cited a threat of retal-
iation from the European Union.220 In effect, the Supreme Court volun-
teered to police state laws that rankled foreign nations at the request of the
Executive Branch and when Congress had taken no action to support or
oppose such a policy.22 1
In the 1994 decision of Barclays Bank PLC. v. Franchise Tax Board of
213. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory
State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1401
(1994).
214. TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-21. Notwithstanding his view of the general preemp-
tive sweep of the commerce clause, Tribe observed that the inference of preemption of
state authority without explicit words to that effect presents "no small problem" within
the context of specific cases where states have a valid local regulatory purpose. Id. at
§ 6-2, n.6. *
215. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
216. "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Fed-
eral Government serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 458 (1991). See generally THE FEDERALiST No. 39 (James Madison) (discussing role
of separation of powers between federal and state governments as a safeguard for
liberty).
217. 441 U.S. at 434. See Tiefer, supra note 13, at 49-59.
218. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445. For the application of "one voice" doctrine to
foreign affairs power, see Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), which overturned an
Oregon law that barred inheritance of property by citizens of communist countries that
did not give reciprocal inheritance rights to U.S. citizens.
219. See id.
220. 'Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452, n.17.
221. See Tiefer, supra note 13, at 50.
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California,2 22 however, Justice Ginsburg wrote an opinion for a nearly
unanimous court2 23 that neutered the one-voice doctrine without explicitly
overturning it. Barclays Bank and the Colgate-Palmolive Company chal-
lenged the California "unitary" formula for apportioning world-wide
income to establish the base for state income taxation. The companies
cited the risk of multiple taxation and the burden of compliance as viola-
tions of the dormant foreign commerce clause.2 24 As in Japan Line, the
Executive Branch supported the multinational plaintiff with a brief that
cited the threat of retaliation and the need for national uniformity.2 25 The
United Kingdom and the European Community formally entered the case
to express their opposition to the California unitary tax law.226
The Barclays opinion rejected the risk of retaliation as simply not rele-
vant, except to Congress, which the court cited as the appropriate branch
for making such a political decision to preempt state authority. 22 7 The
Court dismissed Executive Branch statements on the need for "one voice"
in the absence of congressional action as merely "precatory."22 8 Rather
than reject the value of a national government that could speak with one
voice, the Court sought to clarify constitutional roles as to which branch of
government should do the speaking. Under Article I Section 8, the Court
reasoned that Congress is the branch that can preempt states when one
national voice is required,2 29 not the Executive Branch. 230
222. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. 298.
223. While Justice Blackmun expressed reservations in his concurring opinion about
giving too much deference to state sovereignty based upon congressional inaction, 512
U.S. at 59 (Blackmun, J., concurring), Justice Scalia expressed a preference for even
stronger deference so long as there is no facial discrimination against foreign commerce
and no violation of established precedent. See 512 U.S. at 62-63 (Scalia, J., concurring
and dissenting). Justice O'Connor wrote for herself and Justice Thomas in support of
the Court's reasoning that the "one voice" doctrine did not apply, but she dissented on
the analysis of multiple taxation. See 512 U.S. at 65 (O'Connor, J., concurring and
dissenting).
224. See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 307.
225. See id. at 328, nn.29-30.
226. See id. at 328, n.30.
227. See id. at 351.
228. Id. at 356.
229. See id. at 338, 351, 355. The allocation of "one voice" power to Congress as a
statutory preemption doctrine (not a dormant commerce or foreign affairs doctrine)
could be understood as a synthesis of two dissonant opinions. The earliest is Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which held that state
interests in federalism are protected not by categories of autonomous rule, but by the
representation of state interests within the political process of Congress. The latest is
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), which recently ruled that Congress must exercise
its power to preempt (under the 14th Amendment) with sufficient specificity that it
remains accountable for its exercise of preemptive power. Considering that this shift
was coupled with a strong presumption against preemption in Barclays (Congress can
express its intent not to preempt by doing nothing), the echoes of Garcia-type limits on
state power are barely audible.
230. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 634 ("courts may even find toleration [for state
action] evinced where Congress has explicitly prohibited private causes of
action... even though the state action at issue violates the treaty. This would accord
with the policy behind such a ban: private causes of action themselves might be an
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Throughout the history of dormant commerce clause doctrine, a con-
sistent purpose of judicial scrutiny is to guard against the risk that local
legislatures will make decisions that are harmful to traders or investors
who are not represented in the political process. 231 The Court in Barclays
found that the "foreign domicile of the taxpayer (or the taxpayer's parent)
is a factor inadequate to warrant retraction" of the Court's previous holding
that unitary taxation does not create an unconstitutional risk of multiple
taxation.232 In terms that anticipate the sovereignty arguments under the
MAI, the Barclays court observed that "the image of a politically impotent
foreign transactor is surely belied by the battalion of foreign governments
that has marched to Barclays' aid, deploring worldwide combined report-
ing in diplomatic notes, amicus briefs, and even retaliatory legislation."233
Under this post-Barclays context, MAI negotiators claim that National
Treatment is consistent with U.S. constitutional norms. There are two pos-
sible arguments that could sustain this claim. The direct argument, which
is addressed in this part, is that the MAI only limits state measures that are
unconstitutional. The indirect argument, which is addressed in part IV, is
that the country-specific exceptions protect constitutional state powers.
Within the scope of this article, it is only possible to skim the surface
of a National Treatment/dormant commerce clause comparison. The goal
of this comparison, however, is modest. It is simply to illustrate that while
National Treatment and the dormant commerce clause share a common
theme, they differ fundamentally in the respect they afford to the values of
federalism.
a. Explicit Discrimination - Prima Facie Violation v. Strict Scrutiny
Under the National Treatment test of "no less favorable treatment," a law
that explicitly discriminates against a foreign investor would constitute a
prima facie violation of the MAI.2 34 The defendants would have to show
that the measure qualifies under one of the two general exceptions: protec-
tion of essential security interests or preservation of public order.235
Neither applies to the state laws cited above.236
Under the dormant commerce clause, there is a presumption that a
facially discriminatory statute is unconstitutional.237 This presumption is
interference with the commerce clause"). See NAFTA Statement of Administrative
Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-159, at 450 (1993); NAFTA, supra note 116, at 289.
231. This concern about the abuse of the political process against those who are not
represented locally "reflects not a cynical view of the failings of statesmanship at a sub-
federal level, but only an understanding that the proper structural role of state
lawmakers is to protect and promote the interests of their own constituents." TRIBE,
supra note 212, § 6.5.
232. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 338.
233. Id.
234. See supra note 110 (explicit discrimination).
235. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(2),
(3).
236. See infra Appendix II.A. for a discussion of general exceptions.
237. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Oregon Waste Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Dep't of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
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sometimes referred to as a "per se rule;" a compelling state interest and
demonstration that there are no viable alternatives can overcome the pre-
sumption.238 The more appropriate description in these cases is "strict
judicial scrutiny."
In Maine v. Taylor,23 9 the Court's strict scrutiny test upheld a statute
that imposed an outright ban on importing baitfish to state waters that
border Canada. Maine successfully defended its law by convincing the
courts that its import ban was the only way that the state could protect its
fisheries from parasites that infected non-native shipments.240 The com-
merce clause test for explicit discrimination is strict, but it allows the court
to defer to legitimate state interests, unlike National Treatment under the
MAI.
If there is one category of laws where MAI National Treatment and the
dormant commerce clause could be proven analogous, it would be where
states explicitly prohibit foreign investors from owning land or acquiring
permits to fish, use water, or operate casinos or other businesses. The
argument that these laws discriminate on the basis of citizenship or resi-
dency without a sufficient redeeming noneconomic purpose is well devel-
oped by scholars.24 1
Notwithstanding the potential case against them, at least seventeen
states explicitly discriminate against ownership of land by foreign inves-
tors, and two of these prohibitions are enshrined in state constitutions.242
Most of these laws avoid a European-style concentration of wealth in the
hands of absentee lairds, which would tend to make the state an economic
colony but also deprive the state of a civic class of resident landowners. 243
In some states, the popularity of this policy lives on,244 with several legisla-
ture enacting such statutes during the family farm crisis of the 1970s.245
The 'most vulnerable state statutes are those that discriminate on the
238. See Fort Gatiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept, of Natural Resources,
504 U.S. 353 (1992); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988); Maine v. Taylor,
447 U.S. 131, 135 (1986).
239. 447 U.S. 131 (1986).
240. See id. at 143. See also TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-6; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385, 398 (1948) (upholding discrimination only if the out-of-state interests "constitute a
particular source of the evil at which the statute is aimed.")
241. See, e.g., Mark Shapiro, The Dormant Commerce Clause: A Limit on Alien Land
Laws, 20 BROOKINGSJ. Iwr'L L. 217 (1993); Charles H. Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Re-
Evaluation, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 15 (1962); Fred L. Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in
American Real Estate, 60 MINN. L. REv. 621 (1976); William B. Fisch, State Regulation of
Alien Land Ownership, 43 Mo. L. REv. 407 (1978).
242. See supra notes 120-22.
243. See James A. Fretcher, Alien Land Ownership in the United States: A Matter of
State Control, 14 BROOKINGSJ. INT'L L. 147 (1988). Sadly, some of these laws were also
adopted during xenophobic episodes of concern about Japanese immigration or Com-
munist control of assets, but most were repealed after the Supreme Court indicated that
it would accept a challenge to them on equal protection grounds (after previous deci-
sions to the contrary). See Shapiro, supra note 241, at 221 (citing Takahashi v. Fish and
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 425 (1948) and Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948)).
244. See WGA RESOLUTION, supra note 208, l B.2.c.
245. See Shapiro, supra note 241, at 221-23.
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basis of citizenship alone rather than residency and citizenship. 246 How-
ever, the residency requirement stands on more rational ground - the
unique intra-state character of land. Some commentators and sitting
Supreme Court Justices believe character of land is a compelling local con-
cern 247 and outside the scope of "interstate or foreign commerce" as
understood by the framers of the Constitution.248
The textualists on the Court argue that wholesale preemption of state
power is unjustified by a negative inference from the grant of congressional
commerce power in Article I Section 8.249 Defining land as "not com-
merce" is one literal boundary for inhibiting the expansion of federal -
and now multinational - power at the expense of states.
The archaic roots of sovereignty are visible in the laws that limit access
to fisheries and water rights.250 Yet, it was not until the 1970s that the
Supreme Court overruled cases holding to the common law doctrine that
states own wild fish, game, and other natural resources. 25' However,
rather than declare the death of all state dominion over birds of the air and
fish of the sea, the Court has employed a balancing test2 52 and recognized
a strong state interest in both conserving natural resources, including ani-
mals 25 3 and minerals. 254 The Court has not overruled the cases in which
the state asserted ownership of tidewater habitat of nonmigratory spe-
cies.25 5 In addition, a number of state laws that reserve the right to har-
vest shellfish and lobsters to their own residents remain on the books.25
6
As with land ownership laws, the Court has yet to erase the boundary that
limits nonresident access to tidewater resources.
The Court has struck down state laws that impose a discriminatory
license fee against nonresidents wishing to hunt and fish if the fee has no
246. See supra notes 120-26.
247. "Even when federal general law was in its heyday, an exception was carved out
for local laws of real property." United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S.
580, 591 (1973); see Fretcher, supra note 243.
248. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 963 (1982) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
249. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610-20 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 331-32 (ScaliaJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
250. See supra notes 140-43.
251. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (invalidated an Oklahoma law
that prohibited interstate shipping of minnows harvested within the state), which over-
ruled Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (upheld South Dakota law that prohib-
ited interstate shipping of game birds killed in the state); see also Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977).
252. See TiUBE, supra note 212, § 6-10; Pike v. Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
253. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
254. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982). Regarding access to under-
ground water, the court held that while a state may not hoard resources for the benefit of
its own residents, it may impose reasonable barriers to access for non-protectionist
purposes.
255. See McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877); Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C.
371 (1823).
256. See supra notes 140-71.
527
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environmental or administrative justification. 25 7 However, these cases dis-
play constitutional nuances that are not shared by National Treatment,
such as a de minimis test in which the courts will tolerate disparate treat-
ment of nonresidents.258 Yet, at least one modern case has excepted a
political rationale for high "trophy" fees. In Montana Outfitters Action
Group v. Fish & Game Commission,259 a federal court upheld a highly dis-
criminatory nonresident fee (a fee ratio of 28:1 in favor of state residents)
for elk hunting. The court reasoned that the elk are no longer migratory
and the fee was needed to maintain the political motivation of Montana
citizens to subsidize a conservation program that primarily benefits out-of-
state hunters. 260 This logic could have much broader application in the
future to "discriminatory" user-fees that support eco-tourism.
In the realm of land ownership and access to fishing or hunting rights,
the argument over what is "commerce" has little to do with commerce.
Instead, it has much to do with the need to strike a balance between state
and federal power. States which adopt discriminatory laws to limit foreign
access to resources risk violating the dormant commerce clause. However,
the very lack of subtlety in the most discriminatory state laws illustrates
the conflict between the allocation of power under the MAI as compared
with the Constitution.
The MAI could take the next generation of commerce clause cases out
of the Supreme Court (in favor of a friendlier international forum), thus
arresting the natural evolution of constitutional law. Such a relocation is a
major sovereignty concern for states, especially since the Barclays opinion
revealed that nine justices would not defer to the Executive Branch con-
cerns about international retaliation to a state law that is not facially dis-
criminatory. One year after Barclays, in United States v. Lopez, the Court
* again reset the balance of federal and state powers in the direction of the
traditional deference to state powers. 261 Judicial deference to state author-
ity becomes even more significant when the laws are facially neutral in
their treatment of foreign as compared with domestic investors.
257. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), which
was decided under the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV § 2 (for citizens,
not corporations), but comports closely to commerce clause analysis. The leading prece-
dent in the P&I line of cases is Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), in which the
Court invalidated a shrimp license fee disparity of $2,500 for non-resident boats to $25
for resident boats. Regardless of the constitutional basis for the claim, the Supreme
Court's analysis of discrimination cases involving access to commercial fishing is very
much the same. See Constitutionality of State Laws Which Discriminate Against Nonresi-
dents or Aliens as to Fishing and Hunting Rights, 52 L. Ed. 2d 824.
258. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 371.
259. 417 F. Supp. 1005 (DC Mont. 1976).
260. See id.
261. Lopez was not a preemption case, but the Court ruled that Congress must meet a
burden of proof before it legislates in an area of traditional state regulation. When Con-
gress adopted the Gun-Free School Zones Act, it exceeded congressional authority under
the commerce clause since possession of a gun in a local school zone is not economic
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549
(1995).
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b. Facially Neutral Laws - Effects Test v. Balancing Test
The National Treatment standard of "not less favorable treatment" for for-
eign investors creates an effects test for laws that are not facially discrimi-
natory.2 62 The only question in determining a violation is whether the less
favorable treatment results in a commercial disadvantage for foreign as
compared to domestic firms. This is a question of "simple business eco-
nomics, applied to undisputed facts," not a balance of regulatory benefits
versus burdens.26 3 As noted above, there are no MAI general exceptions
that are appropriate defenses for the state laws cited above.26 4 In this
respect, National Treatment is significantly expanded in comparison to
GATT, which provides for a variety of general exceptions under Article XX,
including public morals, human or animal health, and conservation of
exhaustible natural resources, among others.2 65
In contrast to the MAI, since the 1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court has
sought to balance the interests of dual sovereignty by scrutinizing both the
purpose and effect of a state law. The Court will uphold a state law if (1) it
is rationally related to a legitimate state end, and (2) the regulatory burden
imposed on commerce is outweighed by the state interest involved.266
Whether the burden is outweighed turns on the nature of the local interest
and whether it can be protected by less restrictive means.2 67
There are legions of state laws that regulate in a manner that creates a
differential burden on foreign and interstate commerce without facial dis-
crimination. The laws cited above involving recycled content, packaging,
and local competition are merely examples. 2 68 In their comprehensive
comparison of GATT National Treatment and the dormant commerce
clause, Professors Farber and Hudec identify two types of GATT disputes
involving the National Treatment effects test. The first provides different
treatment for two classes. The classification, however, places most of the
foreign products, services or firms in the disadvantaged category. The sec-
ond creates a uniform standard of treatment. It also creates a greater bur-
den of compliance and results in a competitive disadvantage for foreign
262. See supra note 112 (effects test).
263. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 213, at 1431.
264. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, arts. VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(1)
and (2).
265. See infra the discussion of general exception in Appendix II.A. The National
Treatment under the WTO requires a rigorous two-step process of finding first, the viola-
tion, and second, whether the offending measure fits within the rigorous test for Article
XX exceptions. The defending nation bears the burden of proof. See Farber & Hudec,
supra note 213, at 1426.
266. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945); Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S.
263, 270 (1984); TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6.5.
267. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
268. See supra notes 149-51 and 165. There are 2,700 state and local laws that
require safety certifications that create expensive compliance burdens for foreign firms,
as do the voluminous state laws on labeling of food, appliances, pharmaceuticals, and
alcoholic beverages. See EU Trade Report - 1997, supra note 24, at 17-23.
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firms because of their different geographic or market positions.2 69
For example, the Maryland gasoline retailer law could be challenged
as a discriminatory classification under the MAI because it prohibits verti-
cally integrated oil refiners, none of which were based in Maryland when
the law was enacted, 270 from owning a retail service station.2 7 1 This is
certainly "less favorable" treatment that would flunk a National Treatment
challenge under the MAI. 2 72 However, the Supreme Court upheld this law
under the commerce clause balancing test in Exxon v. Maryland.27 3 The
Court recognized the legislative purpose to preserve retail competition and
prevent unfair trade practices such as predatory pricing.274
The Exxon Court deferred to the facial neutrality of the Maryland law
because it applied "evenly" to all vertically integrated firms, whether in-
state or out-of-state. The fact that there were no in-state vertically inte-
grated firms did not concern .the Court, even though the factual context
meant that this law functioned as an anti-takeover policy restricting market
access. The Court reasoned that the Commerce Clause "protects the inter-
state market, not particular inter-state firms, from prohibitive or burden-
some regulation. '2 75
Lawrence Tribe suggests that the Court upheld the Maryland law
because it did not adversely affect the interstate flow of goods (save for two
companies) as it existed at the time.27 6 By contrast, National Treatment
under the MAI is an instrument of protection for market access by individ-
ual firms, regardless of any adverse consequences that a large firm's pric-
ing may create for smaller local competitors. The underlying clash of
values is illustrated by Tribe's commentary, which explains that "the nega-
tive implications of the commerce clause derive principally from a political
theory of union, not from an economic theory of free trade."2 77 As a conse-
269. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 213, at 1422.
270. Only two of 199 stations affected by the law were owned by out-of-state compa-
nies. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 137-38 (1978) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
271. The law required those that did own stations to divest them. See MD. CODE ANN.
art. 56, § 157E (Supp. 1997). Similarly, the Massachusetts franchise law permits a local
franchisee to challenge a franchisor's decision to open another franchise on grounds
that to do so would encroach upon the local market. See MAss. GEN. LAws ch 93B,
§ 4(3)(1) (1995).
272. See Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33; Taxes on Petroleum, supra note
110.
273. 437 U.S. 117 (1978). The Court later distinguished the statute in Exxon on
grounds of facial neutrality from a Florida statute that it overturned on commerce clause
grounds. The Florida statute discriminated among financial service companies based
on the extent of their contacts with the local economy. See Lewis v. BT Investment Man-
agers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 45-49 (1980).
274. See 437 U.S. at 121, 127.
275. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127-28 (Stevens,J.). Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that
the overwhelmingly local composition of the retailer market was a context that created a
discriminatory burden on out-of-state oil companies while protecting the in-state retail-
ers. See id. at 140-41 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
276. See TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-6.
277. Id. § 6-6.
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quence, the Court frequently resolves the balancing of interests in favor of
deference to a state.
There are many state laws in Farber's and Hudec's second category of
uniform standards that create disparate costs of compliance. For example,
in American Can Company v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission,27 8 the Ore-
gon Supreme Court upheld what Justice Scalia calls a "garden variety"
2 79
imposition on interstate commerce. In American Can, the court upheld the
Oregon "bottle bill," which required beverage producers to use returnable
containers, as an appropriate legislative means of addressing environmen-
tal needs. In National Treatment terms, such content requirements not
only shift a disproportionate cost of compliance to out-of-state producers,
they also impose inappropriate "production or process methods" on "like
products."280
In Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof to establish that their com-
pliance burdens were not only disproportionate, but sufficiently burden-
some to violate constitutional standards.28 1 GATT panels have ruled that
even a risk of discrimination would violate National Treatment. 28 2 Once a
plaintiff establishes a primafacie violation of competitive disadvantage in a
GATT case, the government has the same burden of defense as if the law
were facially discriminatory. 283
Professors Farber and Hudec illustrate the structural difference
between GATT National Treatment and the dormant commerce clause.
The commerce clause provides for an intuitive balance between regulatory
justification and commercial disadvantage. Whereas Article III of GATT
separates the question of legal violation from the question of legal justifica-
tion, a primafacie case for violation requires only a showing of commercial
disadvantage. Once the violation is established the burden shifts to the
defending government to prove that the measure being challenged falls
under one of the general exceptions.28 4 However, as noted before, the
GATT general exceptions simply are not available under the MAI. As a
result:
... because the finding of violation involves only the issue of commercial
burden under a monolithic "less favorable treatment" standard, GATT may
find it difficult to control disguised protectionist measures at one end of the
spectrum without having to find all other regulation with adverse trade
278. 15 Or. App 618, 517 P.2d 691 (Op. Ct. App. 1973). Accord Brotherhood of Loco-
nmotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Chicago, 393 U.S. 129, 142 (1968).
279. See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 209 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
280. See discussion of "like circumstances," supra notes 111-18.
281. 512 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1994). See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1977).
282. See EEC - Payments & Subsidies Paid to Processors & Producers of Oilseeds &
Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Oct. 16, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at [ 141 (1989-
90).
283. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 213, at 1422.
284. See id. at 1426.
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effects to be in violation .... 28 5 .. [The GATT panel decisions on facially
neutral measures do not solve] the question of how to confine this analysis
so that it will not sweep up all government regulations that involve any dif-
ferential commercial burden for foreign goods.286
Farber and Hudec, absent the use of a U.S. Supreme Court balancing
test, invented a solution based on common sense and a more intuitive inter-
pretation of the competitive impact of such laws. They point to the refined
definition of National Treatment within the WTO General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) as an "updated restatement" that WTO members
adopted.287 In particular, GATS provides that the test of modifying "condi-
tions of competition," does not apply to "inherent competitive disadvan-
tages which result from the foreign character" of the firms affected by the
law.2 88
Farber and Hudec presume that the "inherent disadvantage" exception
to GATS National Treatment will avoid finding violations when the regula-
tion has "routine normalcy (dare we say, credibility?)" that makes it look
like it has no protectionist purpose. They interpret "inherent" disadvan-
tages as synonymous with "inevitable," meaning that GATS National Treat-
ment should apply to a regulation, even if it is enacted in good faith and
without protectionist motives, if the legislature could "avoid disadvantaging
the foreign supplier."289 The net effect of the Farber and Hudec interpreta-
tion is to reinvent National Treatment with a built-in balancing process
akin to Article XX analysis.
While it may be within the interpretative power of a WTO or MAI dis-
pute panel, the Farber and Hudec intuitive test of balancing regulatory pur-
pose with commercial effect is more aspirational than predictive. Since the
time of Farber and Hudec's article, subsequent GATT Article XX decisions
have evidenced a "monolithic" focus on the supremacy of trade values with
little or .no deference to domestic legislative purposes. 290 Without the
structural counter-balance of GATT's Article XX exceptions, it is reasonable
to expect that MAI dispute panels would be even less likely than WTO
panels to show deference to conflicting regulatory purposes.
Unless and until the Farber and Hudec interpretation transforms inter-
national dispute panels' approaches, the comparison of MAI National
Treatment and the dormant commerce clause boils down to the following
for laws that are not facially discriminatory: The MAI provides a mono-
lithic test of commercial effect. The dormant commerce clause provides a
test that balances commercial effect with legislative purpose. The MAI
does not provide such a test.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1427.
287. Id. at 1428.
288. GATS, supra note 114, art. XVII.
289. Id.
290. See infra cases cited at notes 579-80.
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c. Alcoholic Beverages - State Regulation Under the 21st Amendment
The 21st Amendment would prove irrelevant to a challenge of state law
that regulates alcoholic beverage dealers, producers, or products under the
MAI.29 1 Under the dormant commerce clause, however, the 21st Amend-
ment places a finger on the balancing scale as a constitutionally protected
state interest.2 92 Section 2 of the amendment reads: "The transportation
or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States
for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited."
The Supreme Court has adjusted the commerce clause balance for
interstate or foreign commerce in alcohol by deferring to state laws that
would otherwise violate the dormant commerce dause.29 3 However, the
state law must regulate "the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in
liquor."294 The 21st Amendment does not protect a state alcohol law that
amounts to "mere economic protectionism." 29 5 In addition, a nonprotec-
tionist state law that conflicts with federal regulation of interstate or for-
eign commerce, such as antitrust enforcement, is merely a factor in a
court's analysis.2 9 6
Two cases suggest that the 21st Amendment probably expands state
sovereignty to impose regulatory burdens that would not survive a
National Treatment challenge under the MAI. This would fail because the
increased costs of compliance disadvantage the competitive position of for-
eign firms. In State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Company,2 9 7
the Supreme Court upheld a license fee on the business of importing
liquor from another state, which is otherwise a violation of the dormant
commerce clause. In North Dakota v. United States, the Court also upheld a
state law that imposed burdensome reporting and labeling requirements
on the federal government regarding liquor at military installation sales
291. See Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, 1 5.47.
292. See TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-24 (the 21st Amendment is a "constitutional
adjustment"of the balance of federal/state powers); NowAK & RoTUNDA, CoNSnTUoNAL
LAw § 8-8 (1991) (the 21st Amendment gives states "wide latitude" to regulate without
federal interference).
293. The 21st Amendment has placed liquor in a category different from that of
other articles of commerce. Though the precise amount of power it has left in
Congress to regulate liquor under the Commerce Clause has not been marked
out by decisions, this much is settled: local, not national, regulation of the
liquor traffic is now the general Constitutional policy.
Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 138 (1944) (Black, J., concurring).
294. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
295. Id.
296. See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945) (upholding fed-
eral prosecution of price fixing in the liquor distribution business); California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
297. 299 U.S. 59 (1936). More recently, however, the Court invalidated a state tax on
foreign liquor imports, holding that the 21st Amendment does not constrain limits on
state power under the export/import clause, which is an explicit limit on state power as
compared with the implicit limits of the dormant commerce clause, and which also has
implications for foreign policy. See Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling
Company, 377 U.S. 341, 346 (1964).
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within the state.298
These cases upheld regulatory burdens and effective discrimination,
which are similar to the laws that the United States was unable to defend in
the Canadian challenge against state laws in the Beer II decision. 299 These
included relatively higher licensing fees 300 and requirements that foreign
producers use wholesale distributors 301 and common carriers.302
d. Subsidies - Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause
Compared to the turbulent rapids that mark the course of state regulatory
power, the rivers of subsidy that flow from state and local government are
much calmer waters. Relatively few of the hundreds of subsidy laws and
programs are facially discriminatory.30 3 Although the Supreme Court has
"never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies,"30 4 the Court
recently acknowledged in West Lynn Creamery v. Healy that "direct subsidi-
zation of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of the negative
commerce clause."305 Even Supreme Court decisions rejecting regulations
as discriminatory have recognized that direct subsidies are a valid excep-
tion to the preemptive scope of the dormant commerce clause.306
Where subsidies do run afoul of the dormant commerce clause, it is
because they are tax subsidies that are "functionally indistinguishable"
from discriminatory taxes that function like tariffs.307 The dissenters in
West Lynn Creamery,30 8 complained not about the holding, but the implica-
tions of Justice Stevens' "functional" rationale, which maintains that the
dormant commerce clause forbids state laws that "artificially encourage in-
state production" or "neutralize the advantage possessed by lower cost out-
of-state producers."30 9 This rationale would support a "commercial disad-
vantage" claim that a state law violates National Treatment.
While the dissenters sought to use their rationale to attack any state
298. 495 U.S. 423 (1990).
299. See Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, at 206.
300. The states included Alaska and Vermont. See id. I 6.1(m).
301. The states included Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id. '1 6.10).
302. The states included Arizona, California, Maine, Mississippi, and South Carolina.
See id. '1 6.1(1).
303. See, e.g., supra notes 191-203.
304. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994).
305. Id. (quoting New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988),
and citing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 815 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
306. See C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 395 (1994) (after
rejecting a local law that required delivery of all solid waste to a newly constructed
processing center, the Court said that the town could simply finance the facility out of
general taxes or municipal bonds); South-Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke,
467 U.S. 82, 99, 103 (1984). (plurality opinion and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
307. See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,(1994); Bacchus Imports v.
Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
308. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
309. Id. at 193 and 205 (quoting Baldwin v. GAF Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)).
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subsidy,310 the majority holding dealt specificly with taxes that coupled an
in-state producer subsidy with a simultaneously adopted tax on all produ-
cers, from which the subsidy is drawn as a functional "tax rebate."311 The
rebate character of the subsidy distinguishes it from all direct subsidies
that stand alone on funds from general revenue.312 This decision shows
how the Court uses a formal distinction between types of subsidies to stop
short of a doctrine that would encroach any further on state power.313
The Court's own rationale and commentators suggest that the com-
merce clause deference to direct subsidies will continue, even in the era of
free trade. In addition to the federalism rationale advanced by the dissent-
ers, the majority was satisfied that a simple subsidy "merely assists local
business," whereas a tax rebate shifts the burden discriminately to out-of-
state competitors.314 Thus, the courts can rely on taxation with represen-
tation as a discipline on subsidies paid from general taxpayer funds.315
Taxpayers are often willing to pay for subsidies that support nonprotection-
ist "positive externalities," such as job creation, business retention, and
environmental protection.316 Even in non-subsidy cases, the Supreme
Court has accepted the regulatory legitimacy of protecting local jobs as
opposed to protecting the market share of local business.317
As noted in Part III.A.2 above, some subsidy targets (elg., "stay-at-
home" packages) could be challenged as inherently more protectionist than
others (e.g., new business recruitment).318 Likewise, more subtle screen-
ing of subsidies, designed to eliminate investor windfalls, restrain inter-gov-
ernmental competition, and maximize net new jobs, will disadvantage
foreign firms. 3 19 There is little indication, however, that the Supreme
Court would find such targeting or screening criteria to constitute a "func-
310. See 512 U.S. at 213 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Blackmun, 3.).
311. 512 U.S. at 199.
312. See id. at 197.
313. See Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State
Business Development Incentives, 81 CoRNELL L. Ray. 789, 836-46 (1996); Note, Func-
tional Analysis, Subsidies, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 Hv. L. REv. 1537,
1541-42 (1997) [hereinafter Note, Functional Analysis].
314. 512 U.S. at 197.
315. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 313, at 847.
316. See Note, Functional Analysis, supra note 313, at 1547-48.
317. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 460 U.S. 204
(1983) (local construction contracts with public funds); Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen v. Chicago, RI & PR Company, 393 U.S. 129 (1968) (minimum-size train
crews); TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-13. When nation A imposes a protective tariff (or tax
subsidy that functions as a tariff) on goods from nation B, it is very difficult, if not
impossible, for nation B to take countermeasures like retaliatory tariffs (because the
original product does not benefit) or counter-subsidies (because goods are exported to
multiple countries). In the case of a simple subsidy, the counter-measure of a counter-
subsidy is more feasible because the reciprocally subsidized products compete wherever
they are sold in the same market. See Note, Functional Analysis, supra note 313, at 1545,
n.57.
318. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 313, at 850.
319. See supra note 205-09.
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tional" violation of the dormant commerce clause.320
The ultimate basis of a National Treatment challenge to state subsidy
programs is their economic effect on the conditions of competition. The
relevant effect is not limited to their efficacy in influencing business loca-
tion decisions.3 2 1 Rather, the relevant effect is on competitiveness of firms
that receive the subsidies in comparison to those that do not. These effects
will vary drastically based on the industry and the unique situation of sub-
sidy receivers and competitors. Especially when used in multi-million dol-
lar packages, the most innovative state programs could establish a prima
facie case that a subsidy package uniquely places a foreign investor at a
competitive disadvantage.
The value of state innovation in this sector is not merely that it pro-
motes local economic competitiveness.3 22 The most progressive state
experiments today are the ones that actually impose disciplines on that
competition. Foreign investors who can make a case that the screening
criteria or subsidy strategies work to their commercial disadvantage can
challenge these disciplines.
e. Market Participation - Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause
Just as U.S. courts show considerable deference to subsidies, even though
they commercially disadvantage foreign firms, the courts are not likely to
invoke the dormant commerce clause to invalidate state procurement and
other market activities. No matter how discriminatory it may be, market
activities are not "regulation" of international or interstate trade, which is
the national interest that courts are empowered to safeguard from excessive
burdens of subnational regulation. 323 While state regulation of foreign
commerce will attract closer scrutiny by the courts, the exception for mar-
320. Even in a tax exemption context, "the [Supreme] Court has pointedly refused to
distinguish between incentives affoded new and existing business operations," even
though the latter are obviously more likely to exclude out-of-state firms. Hellerstein &
Coenen, supra note 313, at 854 (citing Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S.
388, 406 (1984) (declining to draw any distinction between a discriminatory tax that
"diverts new business into the State" and one that "merely prevents current business
from being diverted elsewhere")). See also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
623-624 (1978) (distinguishing between protectionism and "incidental burdens on
interstate commerce").
321. A study of 74 foreign investment projects by 30 companies showed that incen-
tives did influence the location decisions of foreign investors in two-thirds of the cases
studied. See STEPHEN E. GUISINGER Er AL., INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND PERFORMANCE
REQUIREMENTS: PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT 47-49
(1985). Studies of U.S. domestic business, however, conclude that subsidies have at best
a marginal effect on the choice of location. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, Selected Issues in
State Business Taxation, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (1986); Richard Pomp, The Role of
State Tax Incentives in Attracting and Retaining Business: A View from New York, 29 TAx
NOTES 521, 525 (1985); SCHwEKE r AL., supra note 185, at 35. Stephen Guisinger
observes that if competing investment incentives offset each other, the absence of incen-
tives could be a costly change in policy. "If one country were to eliminate its incentives
while others maintain theirs, the country's share of foreign investment projects might
decline substantially." GUISINGER ET AL., supra, at 38-39.
322. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 313, at 851.
323. See Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980).
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ket participation applies equally to laws that affect domestic and interna-
tional commerce.324
In general terms, the MAI would significantly expand the application
of National Treatment to market activities of state and local government in
comparison to existing international agreements. Under GATT, National
Treatment generally carves out government procurement altogether; the
MAI would not.3 2 5 GATT retains a number of general exceptions that rec-
ognize legitimate government purposes related to market activities of state
government, such as conservation of exhaustible natural resources;326 the
MAI would not.3 27 Both NAFTA Chapter 11328 and the General Agreement
on Trade In Services (GATS) have a general exception for government pro-
curement; the MAI would not.3 2 9 The WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement (AGP) does provide for National Treatment,330 but it does not
cover local government 33 1 or state procurement below a minimum level,3 32
and it applies only to those states that choose to join the agreement.333
The MAI, on the other hand, applies to all subnational governments and
lacks a minimum threshold.33 4 Finally, the MAI's investor-to-state reme-
dies provide the most significant change in the reach of National Treatment
in comparison with existing agreements.
Just as the Supreme Court has developed a functional rationale for its
deference to state subsidies, it has developed several rationales for its defer-
ence to state market participation. For example, states are entitled to pro-
mote the economic welfare of their own citizens when managing publicly
owned resources.335 In addition, when acting as market participants,
states are entitled to exercise the same control as any other market actor
over how and with whom they do business.336 Lawrence Tribe has
observed that these public and private rationales are inconsistent alterna-
324. See South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984) (plurality
opinion); NoWAx & RoTuNDA, supra note 292, § 8.9.
325. See GATT, supra note 111, art. 111.8; MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, arts.
II(Scope and Application)(1) and VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(2).
326. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX.
327. See id. art. 111.8; MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, arts. ll(Scope and Applica-
tion)(1) and VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(2). The MAI general exceptions are protec-
tion of "essential security interests," maintenance of "international peace and security,"
and maintenance of "public order." Id. art. VI(2). These may be relevant to military
procurement, which is not a significant state-level activity.
328. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1108.7.
329. See GATT, supra note 111, art. 111.8; MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, arts.
I(Scope and Application)(1) and VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(2).
330. See AGP, supra note 181, art. 111.1(a).
331. See id. Annex 2 - United States.
332. The AGP minimum threshold for subnational government is 35,000 SDRs
(approximately $500,000 US) for goods and services and 5 million SDRs (approxi-
mately $7 million US) for construction. See id. Annex 2 - United States.
333. At present, 37 states have accepted the AGP through correspondence from the
governor. See id. Annex 2 - United States.
334. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, arts. II(Scope and Application)(1) and
VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(2).
335. See id.; McReady v. Virginia, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 391 (1877).
336. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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tive rationales for the market participant exception.33 7 However, both
rationales are consistent with the distinction between regulating the private
market versus managing public resources, where states act as "guardian
and trustee" of the public interest.3 38 Neither rationale is consistent with
National Treatment under the MAI, which tests a law only in terms of
whether it places foreign investors at a commercial disadvantage.3 39
When states limit use or sale of state land to their own citizens, 3 40
they act within the economic welfare rationale of the market participation
doctrine. The Supreme Court has upheld state limits on distributions of
"government largesse" to state residents,3 4 1 who should be free to reap
what they have sown with their own investment of tax dollars.3 42 When
states limit nonresident access to natural resources that the state does not
literally own (e.g., access to an underground aquifer), the Court has over-
turned the limit as a regulatory burden on commerce. 3 43 Likewise, when a
state imposes regulatory limits on the "downstream" use of state-owned
resources after they are harvested (e.g., milling of timber), the Court has
overturned the limit as a regulatory burden.3 44 The Court has upheld,
however, residency limits on the sale or use of state-owned land or
resources as within the scope of market participation. 3 45 Such discrimina-
tion on the face of these laws would establish a prima facie violation of
National Treatment. 3 46
The domestic purchasing preferences of most state governments 34 7 do
not have any regulatory complications, and are therefore within the scope
of the private market rationale. While the purchasing preferences for small
and minority businesses are facially neutral, foreign governments have crit-
icized their implicit bias that excludes foreign firms from approximatly
twenty percent of procurement in California and Texas to as much as sev-
337. See TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-11.
338. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 (quoting Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915)).
339. It is difficult, if not impossible, to see how the general exceptions to the MAI
would apply to state activities as market participants. The MAI general exceptions are
protection of "essential security interests," maintenance of "international peace and
security," and maintenance of "public order." MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art.
VI(Exceptions and Safeguards)(2).
340. See supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text (limits on sale or use of public
land).
341. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 441.
342. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 313, at 845.
343. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
344. See South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
345. Although the Court invalidated Alaska's requirement that timber companies pro-
cess logs in the state before exporting them, the Court acknowledged a number of alter-
native ways for the state to promote economic welfare. These included restricting sales
to state residents, operating state-owned sawmills, and providing direct subsidies to in-
state processors. See id. at 95. In McReady v. Virginia, the Court recognized the state's
right to sell its own land to its own citizens or to manage the land "to be used as a
common by its people for the purposes of agriculture." 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 391, 395-96
(1877).
346. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explicit discrimination).
347. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text (buy-America or buy-local pro-
curement preferences).
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enty percent in Kentucky.348
Environmental purchasing preferences for recycled content have had a
dramatic impact on the cost of market access for foreign investors.349 The
national treatment issue is whether they continue to require significant
processing costs that are disproportionately higher for foreign firms
because of their geographical or market positions.350 The answer is likely
to be yes if increasing numbers of states expand their environmental prefer-
ences beyond paper into other materials (e.g., wood, plastic, glass, and
cermamics). A potential state defense is that recycled materials are not
"like products" or that the foreign firms that use virgin materials are not in
"like circumstances," with their recyclable competitors. However, this
defense has failed in the context of GATT litigation when products that
compete with each other are treated differently based on how they are
made rather than how they perform as products.351
State and local market participation is a highly sensitive issue under
the MAI because the market is so large. Individual foreign firms would
have a strong economic incentive under the MAI to file National Treatment
complaints against state laws that limit market access. The commerce
clause justification is that the market participation exception allows states
to act like firms in the private market. A discriminatory effect is not rele-
vant, so long as the courts view the states' market participation as serving
a nonregulatory purpose. Yet even state regulation of foreign commerce
receives a sliding-scale degree of deference when courts balance purpose
and effect under the dormant commerce clause.
Farber and Hudec read GATS as a "restatement" that relaxes the effects
test ("conditions of competition") when the adverse conditions are "inher-
ent competitive disadvantages which result from the foreign character" of a
firm.35 2 But the way to defend a law under this inherent-disadvantage test,
they argue, is to establish the law's routine normalcy, so that the regulation
does not look protectionist, even though it may have an adverse affect on
commerce. 353 This is where the analogy to a balancing test stops because
a search for routine normalcy begs the question. How can a state be a
laboratory if it cannot experiment with solutions that are beyond the rou-
tine? There is no escape from the fact that the most liberal interpretation
of an effects test cannot turn it into a balancing purpose test as well.
National Treatment under the MAI is an effects test only. By contrast,
the purpose-and-effect balancing of the dormant commerce clause is
designed to reconcile competing values of national versus local allocation
of power and economic versus noneconomic objectives of government.
The movement that the balancing test produces -is not a weakness or cover
348. See EU TRADE REPORT - 1997, supra note 24, at 27; see also Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages, supra note 33 (like products).
349. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (Canadian paper mills).
350. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 313, at 1422.
351. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (like products).
352. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 213, at 1429.
353. See id.
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for protectionism. The movement in the balancing test is like the pendu-
lum of a clock. The gravitational pull between legislative purpose and
commercial effect is an energy source. By subtracting legislative purpose
out of the balance, the MAI would stop the clock, and with it, the dynamic
of state laboratories when their experiments affect foreign commerce.
4. Significance of Proposed MAI Revisions
The Chairman's Proposal to change the National Treatment text would
make permanent the phrase that requires member nations to provide
"treatment no less favourable tha[n] the treatment it accords in like circum-
stances to its own investors and their investments.. .354 This language is
followed by an interpretative note in the text that recognizes that govern-
ments may have legitimate policy reasons to treat foreign investors differ-
ently in relation to domestic investors or investors from third countries. 355
If a law pursues a policy objective that is legitimate under the MAI, the
Chairman's Proposal makes it possible to justify "different treatment" if the
measure is otherwise not discriminatory.35 6
The example in the Chairman's Proposal is limited to "securing com-
pliance with domestic laws that are not inconsistent with national treat-
ment .... -"357 In other words, if a law violates National Treatment in the
first place, then a panel would not even consider whether there are "like
circumstances." A "different effect" on foreign investors could not rise to
the level of defacto discrimination. As noted above, defacto discrimination
means an effect on the competition of domestic as compared with foreign
competitors. By negative inference, "in like circumstances" could justify a
different effect that has no bearing on competition.
One could argue that the inclusion of the phrase, "in like circum-
stances," makes it more likely that a recycled-content statute would pass
under national treatment since there is no explicit discrimination. How-
354. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex 2(2)(1).
355. The full text of the interpretive note reads:
National Treatment and most favoured nation treatment are relative standards
requiring a comparison between treatment of a foreign investor and investments
and treatment of domestic or third country investors and investments. Govern-
ments may have legitimate policy reasons to accord differential treatment to dif-
ferent types of investments. Similarly, governments may have legitimate policy
reasons to accord differential treatment as between domestic and foreign inves-
tors and their investments in certain circumstances, for example, where needed
to secure compliance with domestic laws that are not inconsistent with national
treatment and most favoured nation treatment. The fact that a measure applied
by a government has a different effect on an investment or investor of another
Party would not in itself render the measure inconsistent with national treat-
ment and most favoured nation treatment. The objective of "in like circum-
stances" is to permit the consideration of all relevant circumstances, including
those relating to a foreign investor and its investments, in deciding to which
domestic or third country investors and investments they should appropriately
be compared.
Id. Annex 2(2)(3) n.8.
356. Id. Annex 2, 2(13).
357. Id. Annex 2(3)-(17), 2(15) n.3.
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ever, the arguments against these laws include that they either place foreign
producers at a competitive disadvantage, or they distort investment deci-
sions at the expense of foreign producers. In addition, the laws discrimi-
nate based on how a product is made, not how it is used. In short, the
insertion of "in like circumstances," with its interpretative note, is unlikely
to offset the authority of international law.
B. Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) Treatment
1. MAI Provisions
The MAI would protect investors from discrimination based upon their
activities in third countries. This activity usually arises in the context of
sanctions or withdrawal of public purchasing on human rights grounds.
Canada and the EU propose further MAI language that would make sanc-
tions on investors or secondary boycotts an explicit violation of the
MAI. 3 58 Such a bright line, however, is not necessary. The MAI provisions
for MFN 359 are implicit and likely to result in the same degree of investor
protection, and ultimately the same degree of controversy, as a ban on boy-
cotts or sanctions.
There are two elements that expand MFN Treatment under the MAI in
comparison to GATT, NAFTA, and WTO agreements. The first is the MAI's
expansive definition of "investment"3 60 and "investor."36 1 An investor
from a MAI-member nation need only have a minority interest in an invest-
358. While over half of the OECD nations likely support this language, the United
States opposes it because of its explicit conflict with the Helms-Burton sanctions on
investors that have investments in Cuba. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91. The proposal reads:
No Contracting Party may take measures that
(i) either impose or may be used to impose liability on investors or invest-
ments of investors of another Contracting Party;
(ii) or prohibit, or impose sanctions for, dealing with investors or investments
of investors of another Contracting Party;
because of investments an investor of another Contracting Party makes, owns or
controls, directly or indirectly, in a third country in accordance with [interna-
tional law and] regulations of such third country.
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex I (Draft Article on Secondary Investment Boy-
cotts) (emphasis omitted) (brackets in original).
359. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting Party
and to their investments, treatment no less favourable than the treatment it
accords [in like circumstances] to investors of any other Contracting Party or of
a non-Contracting Party, and to the investments of investors of any other Con-
tracting Party or of a non-Contracting Party, with respect to the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment,
and sale or other disposition of investments.
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(National Treatment and Most Favoured
Nation Treatment)(2) (brackets in original).
360. The MAI defines "investment" as "[e]very kind of asset owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by an investor" including, among other assets, an enterprise, own-
ership shares or stocks, contract rights, and property rights such as leases. Id. art.
II(Definitions)(2).
361. The MAI defines "investor" as a "natural person having the nationality of, or who
is permanently residing in, a Contracting Party" and "a legal person or any other entity
constituted or organised under the applicable law of a Contracting Party, ... whether
private or government owned or controlled, and includes a corporation, trust, partner-
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ment located in a non-member nation to challenge a policy that discrimi-
nates against the third-nation investment.362 The second element is that
MFN under the MAI is not limited to treatment of investments in the terri-
tory of a Contracting Party.3 63 MAI negotiators explained that their intent
is to protect the "international activities of established foreign inves-
tors."'36 4 The lack of territorial limits for MFN stands in contrast to the
"absolute" investor protections, such as General Treatment and limits on
performance requirements. The latter are limited to investments in the ter-
ritory of a Contracting Party.3 65
In this regard, the standing of investors to seek a remedy for treatment
of non-MAI countries is more liberal under the MAI than under NAFTA.366
Thus, the MAI definitions, coupled with MFN treatment, create a global
umbrella for protection of investments, as long as the complaining investor
is a national or resident of a non-MAI nation.
2. The Potential for Conflict
Human and labor rights advocates argue that the MAI would prohibit Con-
tracting Parties and subnational governments from using their sovereign
purchasing power to enforce human and labor rights.367 The leverage for
ship, sole proprietorship, joint venture, association or organisation." Id. art.
II(Definitions)(1).
362. The MFN provisions would prohibit discrimination based on differential treat-
ment of one MAI-member nation when compared with other MAI-member nations.
However, differential treatment based on human rights abuses by OECD nations is not
the focus of current policy debates. Rather, the current policy debates focus on human
rights violations by non-OECD nations. This third-party dynamic raises two causes for
concern about how the MAI might affect economic measures that discriminate against
human rights violators. First, MFN treatment might constrain enforcement measures
against non-OECD/non-MAI member rogue states. Second, if the MAI comes into force,
the umbrella of MFN protection would make a strong incentive for rogue states to join
the MAI. Military regimes in Myanmar and Nigeria, for example, show great enthusiasm
for most goals of the MAI. See Ken Silverstein, So You Want to Trade with a Dictator?,
MOTHER JONES, May/June 1998, at 40.
363. See MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. III(National Treatment and Most
Favoured Nation Treatment)(2). Compare MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art.
III(National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation Treatment)(2), with id. art.
III(Performance Requirements(l), and id. art. IV(1).
364. The broader context of MAI negotiators' explanation was that if the MAI were to
limit MFN to a Contracting Party's treatment of investments "in its territory," the Con-
tracting Parties would "not have obligations with regard to investors of another Con-
tracting Party in a third country." MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. lII(National
Treatment and Most Favoured Nation Treatment)(2). Instead, the MAI negotiators
intended "not to unduly limit the scope of the agreement, for example by excluding the
international activities of established foreign investors and their investments." Id.
365. Compare MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IlI(National Treatment and Most
Favoured Nation Treatment)(2), with id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(1), and id.
art. IV(1).
366. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1117 (requiring investors to own or control an
investment in a non-MAI nation before they can claim a remedy under NAFTA on behalf
of that investment in a non-MAI nation).
367. See JIM EGAN & JAMES ISBISTER, INQUIRY INTO THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON
INVESTMENT 5 (1998); HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM OF HARVARD LAw SCHOOL, THE MULTILAT-
ERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION
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enforcement, they argue, is to deny violators access to markets, or at the
very least, to avoid doing business with investors that violate human rights,
do business with repressive regimes, or contribute to economic activity
upon which repressive regimes depend for tax revenues, foreign currency,
and political legitimacy.36 8 A U.N. subcommission on human rights called
on OECD nations to review the draft MAI to ensure that its provisions are
consistent with their human rights obligations.3 69
Within the past thirty years, a majority of U.S. states and many cities
set human rights standards for companies with which they do business.
The best known example is the South Africa selective purchasing boycott,
in which nineteen states and sixty-two local governments participated.3 70
In 1998, twenty-three state and local governments used purchasing prefer-
AND THE WORK OF INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS NGOs 4 (1997). The Harvard report
also reviews the potential impact of the MAI on economic measures that fall outside the
scope of this Article. These include U.S. investment bans, visa limits, limits on invest-
ment incentives, and conditions on foreign aid or debt relief. These measures also
include sovereignty interests of prospective MAI members, such as the South African
constitutional commitment to domestic ownership as a component of land reform. See
id. at 19.
368. Burton Levin, a former U.S. Ambassador to Burma, stated that "[floreign invest-
ment in most countries acts as a catalyst to promote change, but the Burmese regime is
so single-minded that whatever they might obtain from foreign sources they pour
straight into the army while the rest of the country is collapsing." See Craig Forcese,
Municipal Buying Power and Human Rights in Burma: The Case for Canadian Munici-
pal 'Selective Purchasing' Policies (1998) (unpublished paper on file with author) (quot-
ing CANADIAN FRIENDS OF BuRmA (CFOB), DIRTY CLOTHEs-DRTY SYSTEM 51 (1996)).
369. Commission on Human Rights, Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 4(a), The International Eco-
nomic Order and the Promotion of Human Rights 1 5 (Aug. 21, 1998). A delegate to the
subcommission supported this resolution by arguing that
This freedom for investors could have tragic consequences as the MAI could
counter and negate the positive measures that states have taken or may propose
to take to end discrimination faced by vulnerable people and communities in
relation to the human rights to food, health, housing, land and work Necessary
measures such as food subsidies, control of land speculation, agrarian reform,
and the implementation of health and environmental standards are all under
threat of being viewed as 'illegal' under the MAI.
Mr. Miloon Kothari, Statement at the 50th Session of the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriniination and Protection of
Minorities 3 (Aug. 12, 1998) (transcript on file with author).
370. See Kevin Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and
Local Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REv. 469, 471 (1987); South Africa: The Eagle
Waits to Peck, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 1986, at 34. There is considerable variety among the
South Africa laws, which applies to banks with loans in South Africa, companies selling
strategic military or police products, firms not receiving a minimum "Sullivan Princi-
ples" rating, and firms doing business in South Africa. The "doing business in" statutes
are the model for the Massachusetts Burma Law. These states included California, Mas-
sachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, NewJersey, and Wisconsin. See id. at 473. For addi-
tional scholarship on South Africa laws, see also Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main
Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies, 86 FORMGN POL'Y 158 (1992); Anne R. Bowden,
Note, North Carolina's South African Divestment Statute, 67 N.C. L. REv. 949 (1989); Peter
J. Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion Upon the Federal
Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REv. 813, 815 (1986); GraceJublinsky, Note, State and
Municipal Governments React Against South African Apartheid: An Assessment of the Con-
stitutionality of the Divestment Campaign, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 543 (1985).
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ences to avoid business with companies that operate in Burma371 and
Cuba,372 extract oil from Nigeria,373 operate in Northern Ireland without
following the MacBride code of corporate responsibility, 374 or withhold
financial assets (in Swiss banks) from the families of Holocaust victims. 3 75
At least eight other states and four cities considered similar legislation in
1998.376
These policies will inspire future investor-to-state disputes under the
MAI. Most recently, the Swiss government threatened a WTO complaint in
response to the announcement that California, New York State and City,
and Pennsylvania would lead a U.S. boycott of services by Swiss banks in
America if Switzerland and the private banks do not negotiate a settlement
with Holocaust survivors and descendants. 377 However, a few weeks after
the states' policy was announced, the Swiss banks came to a compromise
settlement with the class of Holocaust survivors and heirs.378
On another front, the European Union and Japan filed a September
1998 WTO complaint against the Massachusetts Burma law, which the
371. The 22 jurisdictions include the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the county of
Alameda, CA; and the cities of Ann Arbor, MI; Berkeley, CA; Boulder, CO; Brookline,
MA; Cambridge, MA; Carrboro, NC; Chapel Hill, NC; Madison, WI; New York, NY;
Newton, MA; Oakland, CA, Palo Alto, CA; Portland, OR; Quincy, MA; San Francisco, CA;
Santa Cruz, CA; Santa Monica, CA; Somerville, MA; Takoma Park, MD; West Hollywood,
CA. FRANKLIN RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, BURMA SELECTIVE PURCHASING
LAws (1998); INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
WITH COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SELECTIVE PURCHASING LAws app. F chart (1998) [hereinafter
IRRC REPORT]. For a specific example, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, § 22(G-M) (1966).
372. The jurisdiction is Dade County, FL. See USA Engage, States and Municipalities
with Prepared or Enacted Sanctions Laws (visited Dec. 29, 1998) <http://
www.usaengage.org/resources/map3.html>; USA Engage, State and Local Sanctions
Watch List (visited Jan. 11, 1999) <http://www.usaengage.org/news/status.html>.
373. The jurisdictions include Berkeley, CA; Amherst, MA; Alameda Co., CA; and
Oakland, CA. See IRRC REPORT, supra note 371, app. F chart.
374. The 14 jurisdictions include the states of New Jersey and New York. The 12
cities include Albany, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Lakewood, New York City, Philadel-
phia, Rensselaer City, Rochester, San Francisco, Scranton, and Yonkers. See id.
375. The leading jurisdictions included the City of New York and the states of Califor-
nia, New York, and Pennsylvania. See Henry Weinstein & John Goldman, Nazi-Era
Claims Spark Sanctions on Swiss Banks, L.A. TIMES,July 2, 1998, at Al; New York governor
signs bill to punish firms who don't resolve Holocaust-era insurance claims, JERUSALEM POST,
July 10, 1998, at 5.
376. The states included Connecticut (Burma), California (Burma), Maryland (Nige-
ria), Massachusetts (Indonesia), North Carolina (Burma), Rhode Island (Indonesia),
Texas (Burma), and Vermont (Burma). The cities included Davis (Burma), Los Angeles
(Burma), Minneapolis (Burma), New York (Burma), and Seattle (Burma). See USA
Engage, USA ENGAGE, Ferr Trade, Unilateral and Economic Trade Sanctions (visited Sept.
25, 1998) <http:\\www.usaengage.org>.
377. See John Goshko, Sanctions on Swiss Banks to Proceed, WASH. POST, July 2, 1998,
at A-3; John Zarcorostas, Bern withdraws threat over Holocaust claims, J. COM., July 8,
1998, at 3A; David Sanger, How a Swiss Bank Gold Deal Eluded a U.S. Mediator, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 1998, at 1-6. The issue still lingers regarding insurance claims of Holo-
caust survivors, where insurance is a traditional domain of state regulation. Weinstein
& Goldman, supra note 375, at Al; New York governor signs bill to punish firms who don't
resolve Holocaust-era insurance claims, supra note 375, at 5.
378. See John Goshko, Swiss Banks' Pact Ends NY Threat of Sanctions, WASH. POST,
Aug. 14, 1998, at A14.
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Solid = State and City; Stripe = City.
U.S. government has pledged to defend.379 In the meantime, a coalition of
multinational companies has challenged the same law in U.S. federal court
on constitutional grounds.380 The EU has filed an amicus brief in support
of the plaintiffs.38 1 In fact, the EU is represented by the same law firm that
represents USA*Engage, the corporate coalition challenging the state law.
Lest the EU present itself as a unified Europe in this conflict, the European
Parliament responded to the EU's own WTO complaint by passing a resolu-
379. See Michael S. Lelyveld, US vows to defend action by state, J. CoM., Sept. 11, 1998,
at 3A, EU to Request WTO Panel Ruling On Massachusetts Law, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept.
11, 1998, at 1. The EU Demarche complains of three violations of the AGP: (1) art.
VIII(b), which prohibits conditions on a tendering company that are not essential to
ensure the firm's capability to fulfill a contract; (2) art. X(3), which prohibits qualifica-
tion criteria based on political rather than economic considerations; and (3) art. XIII(4),
which prohibits making contract awards based on political rather than economic consid-
erations. See European Commission Demarche to the U.S. Department of State,
reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 31, 1997, at 10. The European Union did not cite
violation of the AGP provisions on MFN treatment, which provide for "treatment no less
favorable than..,. that accorded to products, services and suppliers of any other Party."
AGP, supra note i81, art. I.L(b). In comparison, the MAI provisions for MFN treatment
would offer a stronger complaint than the AGP provisions because the MAI provides for
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to "investors of any other Contracting
Party or of a non-Contracting party, and to the investments of investors of any other
Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting party...." MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7,
art. III(National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation Treatment)(2) (emphasis added).
380. See National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D.
Mass. 1998). See infra notes 387-404 and accompanying text.
381. See Amicus Curiae Brief for Plaintiff, National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) v.
Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998). See also Nancy Dunne, EU in Burma Law
Protest, FIN. TIMES, July 13, 1998, at 3.
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tion that criticized the European Commission for requesting a WTO panel
and deplored the escalation of human rights violations in Burma.38 2
3. Sovereignty Issues
The state policies that incite such legal battles are not foreign expeditions.
For example, California Treasurer Matt Fong represents 20,000 California
Holocaust survivors or their children.38 3 In the footsteps of the European
refugees of the 1940s, thousands of expatriate Nigerians and Burmese
became residents and citizens of the United States to avoid prison, torture,
or ethnic cleansing.3 84 U.S. state legislators responded to their constitu-
ents' liberty interests, just as the state officials leading the boycott against
Swiss banks acted to protect their constituents' financial rights.3 8 5
Multinational corporations, who support both the MA!3 86 and the liti-
gation against Massachusetts, 38 7 complain that state initiatives are burden-
some incursions into two exclusive zones of federal power: conduct of
foreign policy 388 and regulation of foreign commerce, 38 9 both of which
382. Relevant excerpts from the resolution include:
The European Parliament...
3. Believes that, in the interest of a foreign policy founded upon the principles
of human rights and democracy, the scope of the WTO to take these principles
into account should be enlarged rather than restricted and calls upon the Euro-
pean Union to use its weight as the biggest trading power of the world to this
end;
4. Criticizes in this context the Commission decision to insist on a conflict
resolution panel within the WTO over the law of the US State of Massachusetts,
which set a pricing penalty on purchases of goods by state authorities from
companies that do business in Burma.
EUROPEAN PARLiAmENT, RESOLUTION ON HuNLAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BuRmA 1 (Sept. 17,
1998).
383. See Goshko, supra note 377, at A3; Weinstein & Goldman, supra note 375, at Al.
384. See U.S. DEP'T OF ST., 1997 HuMAN RIGHTS REPORT - NIGERIA AND BURMA (Feb.
1998); U.N. SPEcIA RAPPORTEuR, MYANmAR (1997).
385. See, e.g., Mark Matthews, Challenging Nigeria and Big Oil; Hopkins Student Fights
Homeland's Rulers, BALT. SUN, Jan. 4, 1998, at IA; Teresa Malcolm, Oil Blight Lingers for
Ogoni, NAT'L CATHOLIc REP., Mar. 27, 1998, at 4.
386. Multinational corporations complain as members of the U.S. Council for Inter-
national Business.
387. Multinational corporations complain as members of the National Foreign Trade
Council (NFTC) and USA*Engage.
388. See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion
for Consolidation and Expedited Consideration of the Merits, at 6-12, 17-19, NFTC v.
Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998) [hereinafter NFTC Memorandum]. For the
"one voice" theory of foreign relations power, plaintiffs rely primarily on Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
389. See NFTC Memorandum, supra note 388, at 27-28. For the "one voice" theory of
foreign commerce power, plaintiffs rely primarily on Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979). For a range of scholarship on the Burma law controversy,
see Daniel M. Price andJohn P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States State and
Local Sanctions, HARv. INT'L LJ. 443 (1998); Jennifer Loeb-Cederwall, Note, Restrictions
on Trade with Burma: Bold Moves or Foolish Acts?, 32 NEw ENG. L. REv. 929 (1998); Anne
Q. Conaughton, Factoring U.S. Export Controls and Sanctions Into International Trade
Decisions, 27 STETSON L. REv. 1211 (1998); Michael Wallace Gordon, The Conflict of
United States Sanctions Laws with Obligations Under the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, 27 STETSON L. REv. 1259 (1998); David R. Moran, No Panacea: Analyzing Sanctions
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require the United States to speak with "one voice." They argue that
human rights standards for government purchasing are not valid local leg-
islative purposes, and even if they are, their discriminatory nature is impos-
sible to justify under a strict-scrutiny balancing test.3 90 Considering the
nature of the state's legal arguments, 3 9 1 the arguments by the Natinal For-
eign Trade Council (NFTC) are a rough translation of MFN Treatment
under the MAI into the language of constitutional doctrine. The following
points illustrate how MFN Treatment and constitutional law may differ.
This, of course, depends on whether the courts accept all of the plaintiffs
assertions.
- Speaking with "one voice." More than 30 years after the Supreme Court
used the "one voice" doctrine upon which the NFTC relies (for both
foreign affairs and commerce clause), a nearly unanimous Court repu-
diated the doctrine in Barclays.392 Arguably, MFN Treatment under the
MAI would resolve any ambiguity over which federal "voice" the courts
should enforce (ie., the Executive rather than Congress) and whether
the federal government's voice preempts all state voices (even harmoni-
ous voices).
- Meaning of discrimination. In the constitutional litigation, Massachu-
setts argues that its standard treats all companies similarly regardless of
their status as foreign or domestic. The dormant commerce clause is
not violated because it has a valid purpose for avoiding companies that
do business with Burma, and it does not encroach upon a federal com-
mercial interest such as protectionism.3 93 In contrast, the MFN stan-
dard of "treatment no less favorable" than that given to an investment
from any other country precludes even the question of discrimination
among third-party nations unless the general exceptions make that dis-
crimination possible.
- Balancing test. The NFTC asserts that there is nothing to balance
because the federal interest is exclusive. Massachusetts points to state
regulatory statutes that were challenged as intrusions into federal for-
eign affairs power. The Supreme Court weighed these similar statutes
and found one acceptable and the other exceedingly intrusive into the
Before Imposition, 27 STETSON L. REv. 1403 (1998); Alejandra Carvajal, Note, State and
Local "Free Burma" Laws: The Case for Sub-National Trade Sanctions, 29 LAv & Poi'Y
INT'L Bus. 257 (1998); David R. Schmahmann &James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of
State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma
(Myanmar), 30 V~AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1997).
390. NFTC Memorandum, supra note 388, at 23, 34.
391. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary Judge-
ment, NFTC v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998) [hereinafter Massachusetts
Memorandum].
392. See discussion of Barclays, supra Part II.A.3 and notes 222-32, 281-83 and
accompanying text.
393. See Massachusetts Memorandum, supra note 391, at 38-40. As noted above in
the discussion of National Treatment, supra Part II.A., the dormant commerce clause
protects the market, not individual firms. See Exxon v. Maryland, 436 U.S. 117, 127-28
(1978). See also Lewis, supra note 370, at 492-502.
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conduct of foreign affairs.3 94 As noted under National Treatment, the
MAI uses a monolithic test of commercial disadvantage that is akin to
the exclusive federal interest argument. The only permissible justifica-
tions that the MAI would "balance" under its general exceptions are
"essential security interests," United Nations obligations for mainte-
nance of international peace and security,39 5 and maintenance of "pub-
lic order," which applies when a "serious threat is posed to one of the
fundamental interests of society."3 96
- Market participation. The absence of relevant MAI general exceptions is
parallel to the NFTC position that the market participation exception
does not apply to exclusive federal powers in the execution of foreign
affairs and regulation of foreign commerce. 39 7 Even if the exception
does apply, the NFTC argues that the exception is limited to protection
of local economic interests, not factors unrelated to the immediate busi-
ness between the state and the corporation.3 98 While recognizing the
Supreme Court's caution that it has had "no occasion to explore the
limits imposed on state proprietary actions by the foreign commerce
clause," 39 9 Massachusetts cites both federal and state courts that have
applied the exception to foreign commerce. This includes human rights
criteria outside the scope of contract goods or services.40 0 These cases
reason that when states act as market participants, they exercise the
same rights as private corporations undertaking the same activity.40 1
In 1986, the United States Justice Department endorsed the market par-
ticipant exception as applied to South Africa boycott legislation,40 2 as
did Professor Tribe in 19 8 8 .40 3 In short, Massachusetts' argument
394. See Massachusetts Memorandum, supra note 391, at 47-49.
395. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(2).
396. Id. art. IV(3), (2)(2.5) n.2.
397. See NFTC Memorandum, supra note 388, at 31-32.
398. See id. at 27.
399. Massachusetts Memorandum, supra note 391, at 31 (quoting Reeves v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429, 438 n.9 (1980)).
400. See id. at 30 (citing Trojan Techs. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d
903, 909-13 (3d Cir. 1990); Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 752(Md. 1989); K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. New Jersey District Water Supply Comm'n,
381 A.2d 774, 784-89 (NJ. 1977).
401. Matthew Porterfield argues that as market participants, state governments enjoy
First Amendment protection for both political speech and policy decisions on how the
state should spend and invest its funds. See Matthew C. Porterfield, The First Amend-
ment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN.J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1998) (Part IV.B -
Selective Investment and Purchasing Laws as Protected Activity Under the First
Amendment).
402. In response to the South Africa boycott upon which the Massachusetts Burma
law is modeled verbatim, the U.S. Justice Department, under Attorney General Edwin
Meese, concluded that "[tihe role of the state as 'guardian and trustee for its people' in
spending or investing their funds is as strong when the state's market participation
affects foreign as when it affects interstate commerce." Constitutionality of South African
Divestment Statutes Enacted by State and Local Governments, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel
49, 54-55 (Apr. 9, 1986).
403. See TRIBE, supra note 212, § 6-22, which opined:
[U]nder the Supreme Court's market participant exception to the Commerce
Clause, a state would be free to pass laws forbidding investment of the state's
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enjoys wide support.
The constitutional litigation in Massachusetts helps prove the first sov-
ereignty impact of the MAI version of MFN treatment. This includes
authorization of an extraterritorial forum, rather than the Supreme Court,
to decide whether a state government should be able to act as "a guardian
and trustee of its people"40 4 when conducting its own business as a market
participant.
The second sovereignty impact is that the MAI would deny to states
any of the sovereignty doctrines that remain standing after the Burma law
litigation has reached its final destination. These include the Barclays
interpretation of the "one voice" doctrine, the Exxon interpretation of mar-
ket discrimination, the balancing test for competing federal and state inter-
ests, and the market participation exception.
The third category involves the status of state governments under
international law. Those state sovereignty arguments that remain standing
after NFTC v. Baker, regardless of the fate of this particular statute, are
vulnerable with respect to the MAI's influence on the balance of state
power in at least three categories: (1) the scope of legitimate market partic-
ipation under international agreements; (2) the availability of general
exceptions under international agreements (which would "balance" against
strict application of MFN Treatment); and (3) the capacity of the U.S. gov-
ernment to serve as a diplomatic buffer.
The MAI would reduce the scope of permissible market participation
compared to existing international agreements. Similar to the MAI version
of MFN Treatment, both the NAFTA investor protections40 5 and the
GATS406 have MFN provisions that reach treatment of activity in non-MAI
countries. However, neither NAFTA40 7 nor GATS40 8 apply MFN treatment
to government procurement. In effect, NAFTA and GATS have an exception
for market participation, but the MAI does not.
The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement covers thirty-seven
pension funds in companies that do business with South Africa, or rules requir-
ing that purchases of goods and services by and for the state government be
made only from companies that have divested themselves of South African com-
mercial involvement.
404. Atldn v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903).
405. Apart from the exceptions that include government procurement, MFN under
NAFTA Chapter 11 is equivalent to the MAI: "Each Party shall accord to investors of
another Party treatment no less favorable than it accords, in like circumstances, to inves-
tors of any other Party or of a non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of invest-
ments." NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1103.1. NAFTA's next section requires "invest-
ments of investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in
like circumstances, to investments of investors of any other Party or of a non-Party ....
Id. art. 1103.2.
406. "[E]ach member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and
service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to
like services and service suppliers of any other country." GATS, supra note 114, art. 11.1.
407. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1108.7.
408. See GATS, supra note 114, arts. XIII.1 & XIV(e).
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U.S. states 40 9 but no cities. Thus, even if the United States were to lose a
WTO complaint based on the AGP, it would have no legal bearing on cities.
In contrast, the MAI covers local, state, and national governments. 4 10
Finally, the WTO agreement only applies to purchases that exceed
$500,000 for goods and services and $7 million for construction.4 11 This
threshold opens the door to selective purchasing in a state like Massachu-
setts, where a large majority of state contracts fall below the threshold.4 12
In effect, the AGP includes two exceptions for market participation that the
MAI does not: one for jurisdictions that do not accept the AGP and a mini-
mum threshold for all jurisdictions.
The MAI represents a radical change in the availability of general
exceptions to MFN Treatment under existing international agreements.
The AGP provides general exceptions that include "public morals, order
and safety," 4 13 the scope of which is yet to be addressed in any GATT or
WTO dispute. Steve Charnovitz argues persuasively that human rights
standards for business partners would fall within the scope of public
morals based on the history of GATT Art. XX(a), several European treaties,
and multiple human rights conventions.4
14
Although recent WTO and GATT decisions have opposed the extrater-
ritorial aims of U.S. trade regulations, 4 15 government procurement repre-
sents a wholly different context. In theory, this context gives the WTO
room to consider whether discrimination to protect "public morals and
order" is an appropriate form of market participation for government pro-
curement.4 16 The lack of general exceptions in the MAI would close the
409. See AGP, supra note 181, U.S. Annex II. There is considerable controversy on
whether Massachusetts ever consented to join the AGP; the letter responding to the U.S.
Trade Representative's request certainly did not say so. See Letter from William Weld,
Governor of Massachusetts, to Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative (Dec. 3, 1993)
(on file with author). The other states that joined the AGP did so by letter, with no
legislative authority to waive or suspend statutes that are not consistent with the AGP.
410. See OECD DocuMawrrs, supra note 58, at 123.
411. The minimum threshold is 355,000 SDRs (approximately US $500,000) for sup-
plies and services and 5 million SDRs (approximately US $7 million). See AGP, supra
note 181, U.S. Annex II.
412. Interview with Harold R. Fisher, General Counsel, Operational Services Divi-
sion, Executive Office of Administration and Finance of the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts (Mar. 2, 1998) (notes on file with author).
413. AGP, supra note 181, art. XXIII.1.
414. See Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. IiNT'L. L. 689,
710, 713, 728 (1998).
415. See Shrimp Report, supra note 104, 1 187; Charnovitz, supra note 414, at 46-48,
71-77. See also Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the
Environment, 83 GEo. LJ. 2131, 2194 (1995) (discussing the territorial principle).
416. See Charnovitz, supra note 414, at 729. See also Christopher McCrudden, Inter-
national Economic Law and Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of
"Selective Purchasing" Laws under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, 2J. Iwr'L
EcoN. L. (forthcoming 1999). Additional scholarship on the public morals exceptions
includes Christoph T. Feddersen, Focussing on Substantive Law in International Economic
Relations: The Public Morals of GATT's Article XX(a) and "Conventional" Rules of Inter-
pretation, 7 MmiN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 75 (1988).
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door to that room. 4 1 7
Finally, the MAI would change the balance of state power in terms of
the role of the U.S. federal government. In WTO disputes that have
involved U.S. states, the parties have used diplomatic channels for an
extended period during which state and local policy created significant
leverage on the principal actors.418 In this process, the objective is not to
"win," but to reach "an equitable resolution on all of the issues."419
A crucial element of sovereignty protection, surfacing in the debate
prior to the adoption of the Uruguay Round, involves this capacity of the
federal government to serve as a buffer on behalf of U.S. states.420 Under
the MAI, the private companies that could bring complaints for monetary
damages would have much less interest in seeking a diplomatic resolution
that meets public policy objectives. The first NAFTA case brought by the
Ethyl Corporation against Canada is a case in point.4 2 ' The Ethyl Corpora-
tion had a capital investment to protect, which justified a further invest-
ment in legal fees based on the legal merits of the case. The U.S.
government declined the opportunity to bring a state-to-state case on
Ethyl's behalf. The government would have gained no immediate return
and would have risked considerable political capital by making the first
NAFTA investment case a state-to-state challenge against Canadian environ-
mental law.
417. Like the general exception of GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV(a), n.5, the MAI
defines its general exception for public order very narrowly to consist of only a "genuine
and serious threat" to "one of the fundamental interests of society." MAI Negotiating
Text, supra note 7, art VI(General Exceptions)(3). Unlike the MAI, however, GATS has a
carve-out for government procurement. GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV(e). Christopher
McCrudden explains how the textually unrestricted meaning of "ordre public" or "public
policy" in the Treaty of Rome has been interpreted in a comparably narrow way by the
European Court of Justice. See McCrudden, supra note 416, at 39. Nonetheless, the
AGP's general exception for "public morality and order" is not restricted by a textual
amendment as seen in the GATS or MAI exceptions. Thus, the WTO has an explicit
basis for recognizing a broader scope of sovereignty in public procurement, which com-
ports with U.S. constitutional law on market participation by states. If adopted, the MAI
language gives dispute panels an easy way to ratchet up "public morals and order" to a
burden of proof that U.S. states could not meet unless their internal security was
threatened.
418. Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat criticized the city and state treasurers'
initiative as a "counterproductive" intrusion into the Swiss bank negotiations. California
State Treasurer Matt Fong responded that "our aggressiveness brought the banks to the
table." Weinstein & Goldman, supra note 375, at Al. After the state initiative brought
the banks to a settlement, the pragmatic Undersecretary of State hailed the outcome as a
"historic agreement," which "carried the moral weight of the growing international con-
sensus . . . ." Id. He acknowledged the direct interest of U.S. citizens as evidenced by
state-level legislation, and he commended state insurance commissioners for organizing
their response to the controversy as advocates for their constituents. See Stuart Eizen-
stat, Justice After the Holocaust, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1998, at A5.
419. John Zarocostas, Bern Withdraws Threat over Holocaust Claims, J. COM., July 8,
1998, at 3A.
420. The U.S. Senate debated several times on the Uruguay Round. See 140 CONG.
REc. 58847, S8853, 58855, S8862-64 (uly 13, 1994). See also Letter from Michael Kan-
tor, U.S. Ambassador, to Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General of Maine, Attachment 11
2 (July 1994), reprinted in Special Report, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 22, 1994, at S-3.
421. See SFoRzA & VALLLANATOS, supra note 79, at 1.
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In sum, MFN provisions under the MAI could have three significant
effects on the power of U.S. states: (1) a substantial reduction in the scope
of legitimate market participation; (2) a virtual elimination of general
exceptions that are available under existing agreements; and (3) a short-
circuit on the role the federal government plays as a buffer and diplomatic
problem-solver on behalf of U.S. states.
The political effects of this altered balance of power could prove signif-
icant. For example, cities and states would no longer act as catalysts
within the U.S. federal system on issues of human rights, as they did in the
campaign against apartheid in South Africa. Nor would they continue to
experiment with consumer choice standards for doing business in a global
economy as they have with application of Sullivan or MacBride principles.
Nor would they offer hope to advocates for human rights and democracy
through a process of bottom-up policymaking when national governments
have other priorities.
4. Significance of Proposed MAI Revisions
The Chairman's proposals on labor and the environment include a pream-
ble and a slightly altered text for MFN Treatment. The relevant preamble
paragraph states that the MAI Contracting Parties would renew
their commitment to the Copenhagen Declaration of the World Summit on
Social Development and the observance of internationally recognised core
labour standards, i.e., freedom of association, the right to organise and bar-
gain collectively, prohibition of forced labour, the elimination of exploitative
forms of child labour, and non-discrimination in employment, and [the Con-
tracting Parties note] that the International Labour Organisation is the com-
petent body to set and deal with core labour standards world-wide. 42 2
The change in the MFN text would make permanent the bracketed phrase
that requires Contracting Parties to provide "treatment no less favourable
[than] the treatment it accords in like circumstances to its own investors and
their investments .... "423 This change in language would likely permit
only those differences that do not affect competition, not the kind of
explicit discrimination based on human rights standards. The preamble
suggests the need for general exceptions in the MAI concerning core labor
standards, but since the preamble is not part of the MAI text, it contains
only interpretive value.
The example in the text is limited in application to general domestic
standards of foreign investors. It is too limited to address the fundamental
question of whether MFN treatments permit a government to discriminate
based on behavior in a third country. Policymakers and courts will likely
read the Chairman's language as limiting the application of the preamble to
only defacto enforcement measures. In this context, the preamble is some-
thing of a tautology; it states that Contracting Parties may adapt their
domestic policies to comply with International Labor Organization (ILO)
422. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex 2(1) (Preamble).
423. Id.
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agreements, which is already the case. It does not authorize member
nations to enforce ILO agreements by choosing not to do business with
investors or nations that violate ILO agreements. With respect to MFN
treatment, the Chairman's proposal represents a pragmatic technical cor-
rection, not a response to sovereignty concerns.
C. Absolute Investor Protections
The MAI provides a number of "absolute" investor protections, so called
because they apply even when there is equal relative treatment (National
Treatment or Most Favoured Nation Treatment) when foreign investors are
compared to domestic investors. Apart from the MAI articles on financial
services and taxation, there are at least twelve absolute MAI provisions.424
The scope of this article permits only a summary of three absolutions that
could pose the greatest limits on state lawmaking authority: the limits on
performance requirements, provisions on compensation for expropriation,
and general treatment.
1. Limits on Performance Requirements
The MAI prohibits twelve specific types of performance requirements or
mandates that governments might impose on an investment in its terri-
tory.4 25 The first five prohibited requirements parallel those of the WTO
424. The absolute provisions include, id. arts. III(Transparency, Temporary Entry,
Nationality Requirements, Employment Requirements, Performance Requirements and
Monopolies/State Enterprises), and IV(General Treatment, Expropriation, Protection
from Strife, Transfers, Information Transfer and Data Processing, and Subrogation).
425. See id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(1). The full text is:
A Contracting Party shall not, in connection with the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, sale or other
disposition of an investment in its territory of an investor of a Contracting Party
or of a non-Contracting Party, impose, enforce or maintain any of the following
requirements, or enforce any commitment or undertaking:
(a) to export a given level or percentage of goods or services;
(b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content;
(c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services pro-
vided in its territory, or to purchase goods or services from persons in its
territory;
(d) to relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of
exports or to the amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with such
investment;
(e) to restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such investment
produces or provides by relating such sales to the volume or value of its
exports or foreign exchange earnings;
(f) to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge
to a natural or legal person in its territory, except when the requirement
- is imposed or the commitment or undertaking is enforced by a court,
administrative tribunal or competition authority to remedy an alleged viola-
tion of competition laws, or
- concerns the transfer of intellectual property and is undertaken in a man-
ner not inconsistent with the TRIPS agreement [referring to the WTO Agree-
ment on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights];
(g) to locate its headquarters for a specific region or the world market in the
territory of that Contracting Party;
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Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). 4 2 6 The 1vLAI
prohibits any requirement to export goods or services, achieve a given level
of domestic content, purchase domestic goods or services, or restrict
domestic sales to the volume of exports. 427 The other seven prohibitions
do not apply if a MAI country links the requirement to an "advantage" such
as a subsidy or tax benefit.428 Without such a link, the MAI prohibits any
requirements to transfer technology or proprietary knowledge, locate a
regional headquarters, conduct research and development, hire local per-
sonnel, establish a joint venture, or achieve a minimum level of local equity
participation. 42 9
The MAI provisions on performance requirements expand considera-
bly upon the limits that are already imposed under NAFTA chapter 11.
(h) to supply one or more of the goods that it produces or the services that it
provides to a specific region or the world market exclusively from the terri-
tory of that Contracting Party;
(i) to achieve a given level or value of research and development in its territory;
(j) to hire a given level of nationals;
(k) to establish a joint venture with domestic participation; or
(I) to achieve a minimum level of domestic equity participation other than nom-
inal qualifying shares for directors or incorporators of corporations.
Id.
426. See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-
ALA-7, Annex (Illustrative List) (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter TRIMS].
427. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. II(Performance Requirements)(1)(a)-
(e).
428. The exact language is:
A Contracting party is not precluded by paragraph 1 from conditioning the
receipt or continued receipt of an advantage, in connection with an investment
in its territory of a Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting Party, on compli-
ance with any of the requirements, commitments or undertakings set forth in
paragraphs 1(f) through 1(1).
Id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(2).
429. See id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(1)(f)-(1). Apart from the subsidy link,
there are two proposals for exceptions that could limit the negative impact of these MAI
provisions on state sovereignty. The first is a proposal to create an exception to the
prohibitions on requirements for using domestic content or purchasing domestic goods
or services. The exception would cover requirements designed to conserve resources
and perhaps those that protect human or animal life or health.
A majority of delegations do not see a need for these exceptions. If added, some
would support an interpretative note similar to the following:
Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable
manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on investment, nothing in
paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c) shall be construed to prevent any Contracting Party
from adopting or maintaining measures necessary to secure compliance with
environmental laws and regulations [that are not otherwise inconsistent with
the provisions of this Agreement and] that are necessary for the conservation of
living or non-living resources, [or that are necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health.]
Id. art. Ill(Performance Requirements)(4) n.30 (brackets in original). Paragraph l(b)
prohibits domestic content requirements, and paragraph 1(c) prohibits preferences for
domestic goods or services.
Another proposal is to create an exception for government procurement from the
prohibitions on requirements for using domestic content, purchasing domestic goods
and services, transferring technology, or supplying goods or services to a specific
region. See id. art. III(Performance Requirements)(5)(b).
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First, the MAI would extend the provisions to cover existing local law,
which NAFTA does not.430 Second, NAFTA provides two significant excep-
tions, which the MAI does not.
The first NAFTA exception allows governments to promote economic
development by linking subsidies with trade-related performance require-
ments.43 1 The MAI does not allow any of these requirements, even when a
subsidy is attached.43 2 Both NAFTA and the MAI prohibit state and local
economic development powers to the extent that they link program benefits
with export performance. The MAI, however, would extend the prohibition
to local government programs and expand the prohibition to cover domes-
tic content and purchasing preferences. 43 3 Under the dormant commerce
clause, these state programs are secure from constitutional challenge
because of the exceptions for market participation4 3 4 and subsidies.43 5
Another area where the MAI could constrain domestic lawmaking is
community lending policy. The federal government and many states
require a bank owner to demonstrate that it meets community credit needs
under a federal or state Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). New
York,43 6 Washington, 43 7 Connecticut, 43 8 Massachusetts, 43 9 West Vir-
ginia,440 Ohio,4 4 1 and Iowa4 4 2 are among the states that enforce CRA
requirements most rigorously when a bank owner applies to purchase,
expand, or move a banking business. A bank owner can demonstrate its
community lending performance through making specific kinds of loans,
undertaking joint ventures or contracts with nonprofit developers or public
agencies, or hiring and training community residents. 44 3 These perform-
ance measures would violate several MAI limits on performance require-
430. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1108.1-.2.
431. The NAFTA exception provides:
Nothing in paragraph 3 [which is parallel to MAI prohibitions (b) through (e)]
shall be construed to prevent a Party from conditioning the receipt or continued
receipt of an advantage, in connection with an investment in its territory of an
investor of a Party or of a non-Party, on compliance with a requirement to locate
production, provide a service, train or employ workers, construct or expand
facilities, or carry out research and development in its territory.
Id. art. 1106.4.
432. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. III(Performance Requirements)(2).
433. See supra notes 167-69 (examples of state domestic purchasing preferences).
434. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.e (Market Participation) and notes 323-39.
435. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.d (Subsidies) and notes 303-22.
436. See N.Y. BANKING LAWV § 28-b (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1987).
437. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. H2 30.04.010, 30.04.212 (West Supp. 1986).
438. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-32 (1996) (state-supervised banks); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 36a-412 (1996) (interstate acquisition).
439. See MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 167, § 14 (West 1984).
440. See W. VA. CODE § 31A-8B-1 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
441. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1111 (Banks-Baldwin 1978 & Supp. 1987).
442. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.1090 (West 1996).
443. Most state bank supervisors follow the lead of federal bank examiners in the
area of CRA performance standards. See generally 12 C.F.R. 25.21-25 and 25.21.29
(1998); 12 U.S.C. 2H 2901-07 (1997); Craig E. Marcus, Note, Beyond the Boundaries of
the Community Reinvestment Act and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a Market-Based
Framework for Generating Low- and Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 710
(1996).
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ments since no subsidies are involved. In addition, the MAI article on
financial services limits regulation to prudential measures, which includes
"safety and soundness" regulations, but not community lending
requirements.4 44
2. Expropriation
The MAI provides that Contracting Parties
shall not expropriate or nationalise directly or indirectly an investment in its
territory . . . or take any measure or measures having equivalent
effect ... except: a) for a purpose which is in the public interest, b) on a
nondiscriminatory basis, c) in accordance with due process of law, and d)
accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensa-
tion.. 445 Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the
expropriated investment...446
Apart from the MAI commentary, which explains that "measures having
equivalent effect" include "creeping" expropriation, there is no definlition
of expropriation.44 7
The MAI legislative history includes a Working Group report explain-
ing that measures having an "equivalent effect" to expropriation include
"confiscations, seizure, interventions, temporary takings, modalities on the
use and disposal of the investment, interference, government administra-
tion, even if it does not affect the title or ownership of the investment, and
forced sales.... A broad definition would be a safeguard against new forms
of expropriations in the future." 448
With somewhat poetic timing, news of the MAI's expropriation provi-
sions reached the U.S. environmental advocates shortly after they thought
they had turned back a series of congressional "property rights" initia-
tives. 44 9 Environmentalists had persuaded President Clinton to threaten a
veto, 45 0 because the bills would have relaxed the threshold for defining a
444. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VII(Prudential Measures)(1).
445. Id. art. IV(2)(2.1).
446. Id. art. IV(2)(2.3).
447. MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. IV(2)(5).
448. Working Group A, Existing Legislation, in OECD DocuMErrs, supra note 58, at
118.
449. See Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995); the
Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995). See also S. REP. No.
104-239 at 12 (1996); the Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1996, S. 1954, 104th Cong.
(1996); the Private Property Rights Implementation Act of 1997, H.R. 1534, 105th
Cong. (1997). For environmental perspectives on the legislative history, see Glenn P.
Sugameli, Takings Bills Threaten Private Property, People and the Environment, 8 FoRDHAM
ENvL. LJ. 521, 525-50 (1997); John D. Echeverria, The Politics of Property Rights, 50
OKLA. L. REv. 351 (1997).
450. President Clinton wrote the Senate Judiciary Committee stating that "S. 605
does not protect legitimate private property rights. The bill instead creates a system of
rewards for the least responsible and potentially most dangerous uses of property. It
would effectively block implementation and enforcement of existing laws protecting
public health, safety, and the environment." Letter from William Clinton, President of
the United States, to Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Dec.
13, 1995), quoted in S. REP. No. 104-239, at 55 (1996).
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"taking" as a partial percentage diminution of value of any part of an inves-
tor's property. 45 1
Environmental advocates read the MAI as a parallel strategy for gain-
ing a friendlier forum for investors, a more relaxed threshold for finding a
compensable taking, and a fiscal incentive for environmental deregula-
tion.4 52 Twenty organizations wrote President Clinton to suggest the con-
tradiction between his proposed veto of the property rights bills and his
support for the MAI and its expropriation provision.45 3 Their concern is a
reflection of the timing of the MAI proposal, its indeterminate coverage of
indirect and direct expropriation or measures "having equivalent effect,"
and the interpretive latitude of dispute panels that are unfettered by U.S.
constitutional law.45 4
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires the govern-
ment to compensate investors when the government "takes" their prop-
erty.4 55 Until the twentieth century, the Supreme Court applied the
takings clause only to direct appropriation of property or the "practical
ouster of [the owner's] possession."45 6 In 1922, the Court recognized that
government regulation could effect a taking if it goes too far,45 7 but gener-
ally, courts find that a government regulation results in a taking only when
451. For example, S. 605 would have required compensation for any regulatory action
that reduced by 33% or more of the value of any affected portion of real, personal, or
intangible property. The Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605, 104th Cong.
§ 204(a) (1995). S. 1954 expanded the scope of takings to include a temporary loss of
the value of any part of affected property. See The Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1996,
S. 1954, 104th Cong. § 204(a)(2)(c) (1996).
452. See Sugameli, supra note 449, at 567-70.
453. See Letter from the American Oceans Campaign, Center for Marine Conserva-
tion, Defenders of Wildlife, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, Environmental Defense
Fund, Friends of the Earth, Iszzk Walton League, League of Conservation Voters,
National Audubon Society, National Environmental Trust, National Parks and Conserva-
tion Association, National Trust for Historic Preservation, National Wildlife Federation,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Rails to Trails
Conservancy, Scenic America, Sierra Club, United States Public Interest Research
Group, and the Wilderness Society to the President of the United States (Feb, 10, 1998)
(on file with author) [hereinafter NGO Letter]. The reply to this letter sought to
assure you that we will oppose any international agreements that are inconsis-
tent with or that undermine our domestic takings law. To that end, we made
good progress on this issue over the past spring. We were also pleased that the
Ministerial Statement reflects a consensus that normal regulatory action, even
when it affects the value of investments, should not be considered an expropria-
tion or "taking" requiring compensation.
Letter from Susan Esserman, General Counsel, Executive Office of the President, to
Mark Van Putten, President and Chief Executive Officer of National Wildlife Federation
(undated, received IOct. 1998) (copy on file with author) (emphasis added). The
response also acknowledged that "difficult issues remain." Id.
454. NGO Letter, supra note 453. See also MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art.
IV(2)(2.1X2.2)..
455. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation."). The Fifth Amendment applies to states under the Four-
teenth Amendment.
456. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
457. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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it eliminates all or substantially all of a property's value.4 58 Consistent
with this rule, the Supreme Court recently affirmed that "our cases have
long established that mere diminution in the value of property, however
serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking."4 59
The open-ended meaning of direct or indirect expropriation, "meas-
ures having equivalent effect" and "creeping expropriation" would create
considerable latitude for MAI dispute panels to ignore or alter at least one
or more of the analytic tests that U.S. courts have developed over the years
to determine when a complete taking or elimination of economic value
occurs. These tests include:
- Elimination of economic value - Courts presume that a regulation is not a
taking of real estate unless the regulation has a severe economic impact
and interferes with investment-backed expectations. 460 Courts will not
find a taking if the investor could have reasonably foreseen a change in
policy.4 6 1 In cases involving non-real estate (such as equipment, con-
tracts or patents), courts usually presume that government action is
foreseeable and that even the complete loss of value of business prop-
erty is not a taking.46 2 A federal court has explictly ruled this way in a
case involving termination of foreign investor claims in an arbitration
forum.
4 6 3
- Voluntary participation - Courts presume that heavy regulation of a sub-
sidized industry (such as health care) is not a taking as long as provid-
ers are voluntarily participating in the regulated field.4 6 4 Courts refrain
from inquiring into the profitability of government regulations unless
the government regulates the entire industry as a public utility.4 6 5
458. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992)
("It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing,
while the landowner with total loss will recover in full."); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (holding that 75% diminution in value is not a taking). See
also Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Wis. 1996) ("[t]he rule emerging
from opinions of our state courts and the United States Supreme Court is that a regula-
tion must deny the land owner all or substantially all practical uses of a property in
order to be considered a taking for which compensation is required.").
459. Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S.
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993).
460. See Pennsylvania Coal. Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
461. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645.
462. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028.
463. See Abrahim-Youri v. United States, 139 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that
the expectations of foreign investors should include the changing diplomatic climate
between nations, which affects or extinguishes property rights just as the common law
of nuisance affects the uses and value of land).
464. See Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963 (11th Cir. 1986), (doctors claimed that a
freeze on Medicare'fees amounted to a taking because it denied a reasonable profit; held
not a taking because doctors were not required to treat Medicare patients, even though
Medicare patients comprised a substantial percentage of the doctors' practice).
465. See Minnesota Ass'n of Health Care Facilities Inc. v. Minnesota Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 742 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1984) (mandating Medicare rates that do not permit a
reasonable return on investment are not a taking because participation in the industry is
voluntary).
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- Law enforcement - Courts presume that complete forfeiture of property
as a sanction for violating criminal law or civil regulations is not a tak-
ing.46 6 The MAI apparently does not apply to seizures of property as a
penalty for violation of criminal law.46 7 Since civil penalties are not
mentioned, the inference is that the MAI expropriation provisions would
apply in the case of civil law enforcement. U.S. courts have rejected
takings claims brought against civil law mandates after the government
imposed a fine or tax for failure to comply with the mandate.4 68
- Military and public health - The MAI does not provide a general excep-
tion from expropriation in cases of military action to protect essential
security interests. 4 69 Nor does it provide an explicit exception for
destruction of property when necessary to control a threat to public
health. 47 0 The MAI general exception for preservation of public order
could conceivably apply to public health emergencies as a "serious
threat.., posed to one of the fundamental interests of society."47 1 If so,
the government would have to prove that the destruction of property
was "necessary,"4 72 which GATT and WTO dispute panels have con-
strued to mean least-restrictive.4 73
Most state and local governments mandate that land developers miti-
gate some or all costs of the environmental, aesthetic, or infrastructure
impact they have on the local community. A typical example is a local
zoning mandate that developers build streets, sewers and other utilities,
and dedicate land for schools and parks.4 74 Many jurisdictions go beyond
the norm. For example, most western states require reclamation of surface-
mined areas with requirements that exceed or differ from minimum federal
standards.4 75 Washington,4 76 California, 47 7 and the Chesapeake Bay
states 478 lead the majority of states that protect estuaries, tidal wetlands,
466. Examples include forfeiting a car or a boat used in drug trafficking or goods that
were fraudulently advertised.
467. This provision is provided in the MAI commentary, not the MAI negotiating text.
It reads: "The Drafting Group understands that the violation of criminal laws could
result in the loss of an investment (or part thereof) which would not be deemed expro-
priation, provided those laws and their application are non-discriminatory and other-
wise consistent with the standards of this agreement." MAI Commentary, supra note
101, art. IV(2)(2).
468. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (mandating ERISA fees for withdrawal from pen-
sion plan is not equivalent to government occupation of property).
469. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(General Exceptions)(1).
470. Id. art. VI.
471. Id. art. VI(General Exceptions)(3) n.2.
472. Id. art. VI(General Exceptions)(3).
473. See GATT Panel Report on Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Inter-
nal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1990).
474. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(General Exception)(3) n.2.
475. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1230-65 (1966).
476. See generally WASH. REv. CODE § 35.63 (1998) (Planning Commissions).
477. See California Coastal Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30240, 30241, 20350 (West
1996).
478. See CHEsAmA BAY FOUNDATION, WETLANDS PERMITING PROGRAMS IN THE CHESA-
PEAE BAY AREA app. C (Oct. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., ENvir § 5-901 (1996).
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and coastal areas by regulating the alteration of topography, mineral
extraction, timber harvest, conversion of agricultural land, and location of
construction. These laws can impose substantial design, mitigation, or
infrastructure burdens on developers, or alternatively, reduce the value of
land.
The environmentalists fear that under MAI expropriation, investors
will be able to argue that a portion of their property has been effectively or
temporarily taken by government action or regulation, an argument that
investors cannot make under takings law.4 79 There are many areas besides
land use where investors have litigated takings claims that U.S. courts have
rejected. These too could receive different treatment under the MAI. A
sampling of failed taking claims, which could receive different treatment
under the MAI, includes:
- Reduction of mining operations.480
- Alteration of wetlands.481
- Employment benefits. 48 2
- Employer mandates under civil rights laws.48 3
- Health care reimbursement. 48 4
- Housing fees and regulations. 48 5
479. See NGO letter, supra note 453. Professor Carl Rose argues that "[o]nce land can
be apportioned into 'relevant' portions, any diminution can be manipulated to become a
100% diminution... [v]irtually any regulation with any adverse impact on an owner's
parcel could become an occasion for compensation, without regard to the owner's
expectations and whether they were reasonable." S. REP. No. 104-239, at 258 (1996)
(minority views).
480. See Department of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d
1000 (Ind. 1989) (holding that historic designation of land to protect artifacts was not a
taking even though it curtailed access to a portion of coal reserves); M &J Coal Co. v.
United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 360 (1994) (reducing coal mining operation to avoid damage
to homes and highway is not a taking).
481. See, e.g., Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81 (1997) (denying dredging permit
which significantly impaired commercial value of property because owner should have
known that wetlands were subject to strict regulation; therefore, investor expectations
were not reasonable). The environmental risk of investing in wetlands development
takes on a double meaning in the booming market for floating casino resorts. See Joby
Warrick, Lott Backs Casinos Planned for Undeveloped Coastal Bays, WASH. POST, Oct. 18,
1998, at A8.
482. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (mandating that ERISA fees do not amount to
government occupation of property interests).
483. See, e.g., Pinnock v. International House of Pancakes Franchisee, 844 F. Supp.
574 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that ADA mandates for wheelchair access, which required
expenditures and loss of space, are not a taking); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (requiring renting rooms to people of color, which results in lost
profits, is not a taking).
484. See, e.g., Minn. Ass'n of Health Care v. Minn. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 742 F.2d
442 (8th Cir. 1984) (mandating Medicare rates that do not permit a reasonable return
on investment are not a taking because industry participation is voluntary).
485. See, e.g., Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that fee on commercial development to pay for low-income
housing has a sufficient nexus to be a rational burden and therefore is not a taking).
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- Drinking on premises or in public.48 6
- Entertainment licenses.
48 7
The Chairman's proposal to change the MAI text on expropriation
reads as follows: "A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalise
an investment in its territory of an investor of another Contracting Party or
take any measure tantamount to expropriation or nationalization except:
. . ."488 It drops the reference to expropriating "directly or indirectly," and
the reference to "any measure tantamount to expropriation" replaces the
reference to "measures having equivalent effect."48 9 These changes are
explained by insertion of an interpretative note, which reads in pertinent
part:
Articles - on General Treatment, and - on Expropriation and Compensa-
tion, are intended to incorporate into the MAI existing international legal
norms. The reference in Article IV.2.1 to expropriation or nationalisation
and "measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalisation" reflects the
fact that international law requires compensation for an expropriatory tak-
ing without regard to the label applied to it, even if title to the property is not
taken. It does not establish a new requirement that Parties pay compensa-
tion for losses which an investor or investment may incur through regula-
tion, revenue raising and other normal activity in the public interest
undertaken by governments. Nor would such normal and non-discrimina-
tory government activity contravene the standards in Article - 1 (General
Treatment)."4 90
The Chairman's proposal is significant to the extent that it assures
that the MAI is not creating new rights in international law that do not
already exist under the doctrine of compensation for expropriation. The
concern, however, is not only that the MAI could create new international
norms, but that it would substitute the existing international norms by
which foreign investors can seek to overcome the existing constitutional
norms of takings law.
The points of comparison are fundamental. First, any MAI dispute
panel reviewing an expropriation claim would be freed from the well-devel-
oped precedents of U.S. constitutional law. Second, the analytic frame-
work within international expropriation law is not finely tuned.4 9 1 The
486. See Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1992) (reducing
drinking on premises furthers public goal of protecting against drunk drivers); Glasheen
v. City of Austin, 840 F. Supp. 62 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (restricting consumption of alcohol
"in or on" public streets and sidewalks is not a taking because the law was properly
related to its goal).
487. See Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1991)
(denying license for night club supports a valid public interest).
488. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex 2(5)(2).
489. Id. art. IV(2)(2.1).
490. Id.
491. See generally PAUL COMEAUX & STEPHEN N. KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVEsT-
MENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1997); C.G. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Prop-
erty under International Law, 38 BrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307 (1964); Vance R Koven,
Expropriation and the Jurisprudence of OPIC, 22 HARv. INT'L LJ. 269 (1981); Patrick M.
Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International
Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474 (1991).
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U.S. cases involve garden-variety regulations that are close to a "taking."
The international cases, by comparison, tend to be more exotic. Many of
them involve noncomparable situations of civil unrest.49 2 The concept of
"public purpose" is not well defined,493 and the breadth of cultural and
governmental differences greatly complicate the comparison of cases.
Some international tribunals have awarded damages for "deprivation of
use," which could open the door to a flexible standard when a government
action is "tantamount" to expropriation. As noted below, General Treat-
ment protects investors from "impairment" of use. The ultimate problem is
the essential indeterminancy of these terms. A slight change in the defini-
tion could produce different results than U.S. takings law.
3. General Treatment
The MAI would protect investors with "General Treatment" under interna-
tional law with two provisions that dramatically expand the scope of the
agreement. The first requires Contracting Parties to give investors "fair and
equitable treatment and full and constant protection and security. In no
case shall a Contracting Party accord treatment less favorable than that
required by international law."49 4 This language is similar to general treat-
ment under NAFTA, 495 the model that the United States currently uses for
negotiating bilateral investment treaties (BITs). 496
Without this language, MAI panels could interpret MAI terms "in
accordance with the applicable rules of international law."4 9 7 With this
language, the MAI goes further to give investors a dispute forum where they
can claim that a nation has failed to comply with an international trade
agreement498 to buttress a claim under the MAI that a measure adversely
492. See generally ADEoYE A. AKINSAYE, THE EXPROPRIATION OF MULTINATIONAL PROPERTY
IN THE THmRD WORLD (1980).
493. See, e.g., Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 189 (1987).
494. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(1). The commentary explains that the
reference to international law is "worded in the most simple manner," which makes it
broadly inclusive. MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. IV(1)(3).
495. The comparable NAFTA provision reads: "Each Party shall accord to invest-
ments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security." NAFTA, supra
note 116, art. 1105.1.
496. See TREATY AFFARS OFFIcE, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES: 1994 MODEL
BILATERAL INvEsTmENT TREATY (1994) [hereinafter U.S. MODEL BIT]; Treaty on the Recip-
rocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Oct. 22, 1992, U.S.-Czech Rep.-
Slovk., art. II, S. TREATY Doc. No. 31 (1992) [hereinafter U.S.-Czech and Slovak Invest-
ment Treaty]; Treaty on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Nov. 14, 1991, U.S.-Arg., art. II, S. TREATY Doc. No. 2 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina
Investment Treaty].
497. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(D)(14)(a).
498. The standard of no less favorable treatment than "that required by international
law" appears to create an investor cause of action independent of other MAI investor
protections. Those protections are so broad, however, that the most likely scenario is
that an investor would use the non-MAI international law standard in conjunction with
an explicit MAI provision. As noted above in Part I.E.1, this is the area of law where
trade and investment agreements have overlapping jurisdiction. This overlap was antici-
pated by the OECD working group on investment protection, which acknowledged that
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affects an investment or investment opportunity.4 9 9
All MAI nations participate in several WTO agreements that could
amplify investor protection beyond the terms of the MAI. For example, the
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) requires that "tech-
nical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill
a legitimate objective. '500 In similar fashion, the Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) requires that a measure "is applied only
to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health
.. "501 As noted in Part II.A.1, GATT, WTO, and other dispute panels have
interpreted a "necessary" measure to mean one that is least-trade restric-
tive.502 This test is considerably more stringent than the standard applied
by modern U.S. courts, which require only that a law have a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate government purpose.50 3
There are many other standards of international law that could be
used to amplify investor protection under the MAI. These include the
requirements for national uniformity and performance characteristics in
standard-setting under the TBT,504 the requirement for risk assessment
under the SPS,505 the standards for prohibited and actionable subsidies
under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,50 6
and the standards for technical specifications and qualified suppliers
under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement,50 7 to name just a
few.
the overlap between trade and investment "may have the consequence that the MAI dis-
pute settlement mechanism would be available with regard to such rights irrespective of
whether these other treaties provide for arbitration or not." Working Group C, Invest-
ment Protection, in OECD DocutmEwrs, supra note 58, at 134.
499. The crucial difference between a trade agreement dispute and an investor dispute
under the MAI is that the MAI requires that
an alleged breach of the MAI must be causally linked to loss or damage to the
investor or investment... but the damage, while imminent, would not need to
have been incurred before the dispute is ripe for arbitration. Further [,] a lost
opportunity to profit from a planned investment would be a type of loss suffi-
cient to give an investor standing to bring an establishment dispute under this
article ....
MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. V(Invester-to-State Procedures)(D)(1)(a)(1).
500. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIA-6, art. 2.2
(Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter TBT].
501. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, GATT
Doc. MTN/FA II-A1A-4, art. 2.2 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter SPS].
502. See, e.g., Panel Report on Thailand, supra note 473, at 23. See also Panel Report
on Lobsters from Canada, USA-89-1807-01, 1990 WL 299945 (U.S. Can. F.T.A. Binat.
Panel) (May 25, 1990).
503. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (regarding price controls on milk);
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (concerning minimum wage for
women); see also Beatie v. City of New York, 123 F.3d 707 (2d Cir. 1997) (regarding anti-
smoking ordinance).
504. See TBT, supra note 500, art. 4.1, Annex 3, 111 H (uniformity), I (performance
characteristics).
505. See SPS, supra note 501, art. 5.1-3.
506. See SCM, supra note 188, arts. 3, 5 and 6.
507. See AGP, supra note 181, art. VIII.
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 31
While the MAI's incorporation of international law standards is a
somewhat subtle expansion of investor protection, the General Treatment
provision on impairment of use is not. It provides that "[a] Contracting
Party shall not impair by... [unreasonable and discriminatory] measures
the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of
investments in its territory.. ",508 This language has been used in bilateral
investment treaties 50 9 but was not used in NAFTA.510
MAI negotiators have yet to decide whether the unreasonable and dis-
criminatory tests of "impairment" would work independently of each other
or conjunctively. A conjunctive test would require that government must
not impair an investment in a way that is both unreasonable and discrimi-
natory. An independent test would require that government must not
impair use of an investment in a way that is either unreasonable or discrim-
inatory. Since the MAI would otherwise protect foreign investors from dis-
crimination under National Treatment and MFN Treatment, the
independent test for impairment would yield a more stringent test that is
absolute; meaning, it limits government power even in the absence of any
discrimination.511
Prior to the New Deal, U.S. courts provided strikingly similar protec-
tion to investors from "impairment" of "use" or "enjoyment" by legisla-
tion.512 The substantive due process doctrine513 allowed the courts to
second-guess the legislative purpose behind the law as well as to determine
whether the means validly effectuated that purpose.5 14 The Supreme
Court has since abandoned this approach in favor of greater judicial defer-
508. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(General Treatment)(1)(1.2).
509. U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 496, art. II; U.S.-Czech and Slovak Investment Treaty,
supra note 496, art. II; U.S.-Argentina Investment Treaty, supra note 496, art. 1I.
510. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1105.
511. See MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. IV(General Treatment)(1)(4)-(7).
512. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915) (discussing restrictions on
contract opportunities creating a "substantial impairment of liberty"); Standard Oil Co.
of La. v. Hall, 24 F.2d 455, 457 (M.D. Tenn. 1927) (citing Fairmont Creamery Co. v.
Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927)) (a statute that "impaired" the obligation of contracts
could be strictly scrutinzed); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (regarding a
liberty interest to "use" and "enjoy" personal investment).
513. The decision is most widely associated with the substantive due process doc-
trine in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), where the Court applied a two-pronged
test: whether the legislative means were "necessary and appropriate" to achieving the
legislative ends, and whether the legislative ends were "proper, reasonable and fair." Id.
at 62.
514. The Supreme Court struck down a range of legislation under the substantive due
process doctrine. See id. (regarding a 10-hour work day and 60-hour work week for
bakers); (Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (protecting workers from being fired
because of membership in a union); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (banning
"yellow-dog contracts," which conditioned employment upon not being a member of a
union); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (limiting working hours for women);
(Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (requiring insurance policies be issued by
companies registered to do business in the state); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.
Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (retroactive credit of employee tenure for computing pension
benefits).
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ence to legislatures.5 1 5 Given the similarity between the MAI's "impair-
ment" provision and the now diminished "substantive due process"
doctrine, the MAI could reverse sixty years of constitutional law.
In addition, because the MAI gives investors a remedy for damages, the
impairment provision could create a basis for applying a lower burden of
proof when challenging regulatory takings as compared to a case of expro-
priation under international law.5 16
A lower burden of proof under the impairment-of-use standard is the
most obvious impact General Treatment could have on sovereignty. The
outcome of the failed takings litigation cited above (reduction of mining
operations, limits on alteration of wetlands, etc.) could produce a different
result under an impairment doctrine of the MAI. 5 17 The MAI impairment
doctrine could similarly strike down many other non-taking, non-discrimi-
natory situations that courts had previously upheld. In these cases, the
courts currently uphold the statutes if they can find a rational relationship
between the legislative measure and a legitimate public purpose.5 1 8 Exam-
ples include:
- Affordable housing mandates for office developers. 5 19
- Regulation of restaurants and other public facilities.5 20
515. The seminal case in abandoning substantive due process was Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upheld price controls on milk), which, after a gap of several years,
was followed consistently, beginning with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (upheld minimum wage for women). See also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co. 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
516, There are at least three possible ways that investors could invoke General Treat-
ment. One way includes invoking constitutional doctrines such as substantive due pro-
cess if the more specific allegations such as expropriation or National Treatment fail.
See Graham v. Connor, 409 U.S. 386 (1989). Alternatively, investors could advance
General Treatment as a cause of first resort since it could reach measures that are
beyond the reach of discrimination arguments and the impermissible categories of per-
formance requirements. Like U.S. courts, MAI dispute panels may prefer the judicial
economy of deciding cases on the more concrete and specific basis of investor protec-
tion. See id. A third function of General Treatment consists of strengthening a pro-
investor interpretation of the other, more specific principles of investor protection. For
example, General Treatment could support a liberal approach to invoking the TBT as a
standard for reasonable or necessary use of regulatory power, and "impairment" could
liberalize the effects test under National Treatment.
517. See supra Part II.C.2 and notes 480-87.
518. The Supreme Court presumes state laws that affect or modify contracts do not
violate the contracts clause of the Constitution unless the impact is substantial. Even if
the impact is substantial, the law will survive a challenge if it promotes a legitimate
purpose and is reasonably tailored to achieve that purpose. See Allied Structural Steel
Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978). The contracts clause reads: "No State
shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... " U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 10, cd. 1.
519. See Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 94-1 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.
1991) (challenging impact fees on commercial development with a takings argument
that applied a test following the lines of substantive due process doctrine).
520. See Beatie v. City of New York, 123 F.3d 707 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that anti-
smoking ordinance was rationally related to the government's interest in protecting pub-
lic health as a matter of law).
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- Housing code enforcement.5 2 1
- Mandates to pay insurance benefits.5 2 2
- Mandates to pay employee benefits. 5 23
The MAI's impairment provision is also likely to provide stricter scru-
tiny than U.S. courts give to nondiscriminatory laws that impose burdens
on foreign commerce. For example, oil tanker companies recently failed in
an attempt to argue that a Washington state law created an impermissible
burden under the foreign commerce clause.52 4 The Washington law goes
into great detail in regulating the operation, management, and use of oil
tankers and crews, 52 5 which is essentially the test of MAI General Treat-
ment when combined with the causal link required under investor-to-state
dispute resolution.5 26 By adopting the first law that seeks to prevent rather
than react to oil spill disasters, the state was acting as a laboratory for the
thirty-four states with coastlines to protect. However, given the stricter
standards under the MAI's impairment doctrine, the result under General
Treatment could prove different from a result under U.S. constitutional law.
In terms of legislative process, General Treatment would impose
higher standards on legislatures for developing a factual record, identifying
multiple alternatives, and then justifying the alternative chosen. In addi-
tion to the thirteen specific rules for treatment of investors, General Treat-
ment (1) imports a least-trade-restrictive standard from several potential
sources of international law, and (2) provides an impairment rationale for
second-guessing the reasonableness of legislative objectives. General Treat-
ment would shift presumptions about the validity of legislative com-
promises. By shifting legislative choices to one end of the spectrum, the
MAI could accomplish a political power shift in the legislative process that
U.S. courts have resisted ever since the Great Depression.
The Chairman's proposal to change the MAI text on General Treat-
ment acknowledges the severity of the MAI's impairment provision by
deleting the entire paragraph from the MAI. 52 7 Of all the Chairman's pro-
521. See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing over-
enforcement of housing code to relocate criminals).
522. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Minnesota Life and Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 86 F.3d 766
(8th Cir. 1996) (involving retroactive limitation on payments to state residents).
523. See Chateaugay Corp. v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 1995) (mandating contri-
butions to health and benefit plan for retired coal miners).
524. Although the Plaintiffs were successful on appeal in part of their claim, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court ruling that the burdens created by the law do
not violate the foreign commerce clause. See International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Own-
ers (Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996), rev'd in part, 148 F.3d
1053 (9th Cir. 1998).
525. See WAsH. REv. CODE § 88.46.010 (1996).
526. See MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. V(Investor-to-State
Procedures)(D)(1)(a)(1).
527. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex 2(5)(1). There is no explanation
for why the second paragraph of General Treatment is deleted; it is simply not there. If
the absence of the impairment provision from the Chairman's proposal is not intended
to communicate its deletion, then the proposal would do nothing to alleviate the severity
of an impairment standard within General Treatment. Considering the legal signifi-
cance of an impairment standard, the absence of any commentary whatsoever in the
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posals, this is the one that would clearly fix a problem with the text.
The Chairman's proposal also includes an interpretative note that
"normal and non-discriminatory government activity" would not contra-
vene the general standard of treatment that is no less favorable than that
required by international law.5 28 Like the other proposals, except the dele-
tion of impairment, this footnote only begs the question. First, what is
"normal" in the eyes of a dispute panel? The laws of greatest concern
under the MAI are progressive laws; laws that are innovative and hence not
"normal." Progressive laws are not always brand new. They may stand at
the furthest extent of legal evolution when compared to the predominant
practice of other countries. Second, the discussion in Part II.A.3 shows at
length how the MAI standards of discrimination differ greatly from analo-
gous standards in U.S. constitutional law. For these reasons, the Chair-
man's proposed footnote is better understood as a restatement of, rather
than as a change in, the MAI text.
D. Scope of Potential Impact
The preceding section-by-section analysis of the MAI fails to convey the full
scope of the MAI's potential impact on state lawmaking powers. As noted
in Part I, direct preemption is neither the only nor the most immediate
threat. A change in the role of the federal government as buffer for U.S.
states and a significant shift of political power within the legislative process
represents the most immediate threat to state lawmakers. Threats of mone-
tary damages in investor-to-state disputes and retaliation by foreign nations
in the diplomatic arena of trade negotiations and dispute settlement would
propel the political shift.
The scope of the MAI's potential impact is a defining theme for both
global economic liberalization and domestic federalism. From an interna-
tional perspective, the complexity and commercial burdens created by the
federal system are already contentious issues. The MAI would increase
exponentially the opportunities to challenge these burdens with expanded
investor protections and investor-to-state challenges of state law outside of
the federal courts. The MAI monetary remedies would also create fiscal
pressure on Congress and state legislatures to preempt or change state law,
most likely with the backing of the federal Executive Branch.
The state-level targets for limiting government power are well known.
From the perspective of domestic federalism, the scope of the MAI rivals
the central values of diversity and experimentation at the state and local
level. The threat to federalism posed by the MAI is graphically demon-
strated by mapping the states with laws that stand just inside the boundary
of constitutional state power under the dormant commerce clause.529 The
scope of the MAI can also be graphed as a matrix of state and local govern-
ment powers and measures that could be challenged under various MAI
Chairman's proposal reveals an apparently high degree of political sensitivity within the
OECD.
528. See id. art. IV(1)(1.1).
529. See, e.g., charts infra Part llI.A.2.
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investor protections. The following chart is limited to the state law exam-
ples and MAI provisions previously cited in this article.
Scope of Potential MAI Impact on State & Local Law
State & Local M A I Investor Protections
Powers IMeasures Nationa General conpJor Llmts enTreatment ITreatment Fxprp. Perf. Rq ramn
Balancing Test: Ecomonic Regulation
Land ownership limits 19 states
Fishing fleet restrictions 8 states
Casino/gambling licenses 8 states
Local competition policy 6 states
Commun. reinvest policy 16 states
Balancing Test: Land Use & Environmental Regulation
Gen. zong lmits/mandates most states
Wetdandseoastal zone limits
Recycled content mandates 13 states
Packaging requirements 12 states
Market Participation: Selective Purchasing and Use of State Land
Domestic preferences 43 states
Minority preferences
Human rights preferences within 19 states
Environmental preferences 29 states
Limits on use of state land 9 states
Subsidies: Economic Development
Export finance pgrams
Targeted job training 44 states
Business recnuitment/retention criteria
The thirty-seven marked cells in this chart are only theoretical targets.
As the Beer II case illustrates,530 the real potential for conflict between the
MAI and state powers depends on the specifics of the statutes and their
effect on foreign commerce. The chart illustrates the difficulty of using
country-specific exceptions to assure state and local governments that the
MAI poses no threat to sovereignty.
III. The Viability of Country-Specific Exceptions
U.S. negotiators support MAI provisions that diminish sovereign regulatory
and market participation powers of state and local governments. At the
same time, they "are not going to reach agreements [in the MAI] that take
away [their] sovereign power in any regard."53 1 Their strategy for balanc-
ing this seemingly contradictory provision is to create a legal equation:
[MAI limits on state sovereignty] minus [U.S. exceptions from those MAI
530. Canada's National Treatment complaint targeted approximately 210 state and
local statutes; it prevailed on about 60. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLA-
Tumms, GATT Decision on Beer/Wine Threatens State Sovereignty, in INFORMATION ALERT
(1993); Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, 11 2.10-2.32 (targets in complaint),
6.1 (findings of the panel).
531. McGtrvr, supra note 10, at 8.
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limits] equals [no change in sovereign power of state and local govern-
ment]. In other words, two negatives make a positive.
Drafting exceptions to exceptions (double negatives) is a common
technique for avoiding direct conflict, but the resulting ambiguity can gen-
erate distrust, disbelief, and ultimately litigation.53 2 This article, however,
accepts the double-negative strategy at face value. Legally, the double-neg-
ative strategy might work, but only to the degree that the exceptions corre-
late with the MAI limits that they are supposed to neutralize. The following
analysis shows that the correlation does not yet exist and that the legal
scope of sovereignty protection falls short of the federal government's
assertions.
There are two complementary approaches to striking a balance with
double negatives. One is to change the multilateral structure of the MAI
itself - for example, by expanding the general exceptions or limiting the
right of investors to sue governments for damages. MAI negotiators have
avoided this approach 53 3 in favor of unilateral options, i.e. through coun-
try-specific exceptions. In the last stage of negotiations, all OECD coun-
tries will propose and negotiate lists of laws to which the MAI will not
apply in that country alone.5 34 The United States initially proposed 275
draft exceptions,53 5 which explains the complexity involved in the MAI
532. An exchange between AmbassadorJeffrey Lang and national talk-show host Der-
rick McGinty conveys the sense of the debate:
Lang: [We need to recognize that [MAI negotiations are] going to be
a two-way street. Now, in no case, no matter what we come up
with, are we going to limit our sovereign ability of our states or
our federal government to impose necessary regulatory restric-
tions? In some cases - and this is the next phase in the
negotiation, in fact, we are going to ask that whole sectors be
completely exempt from the rules of the MAI. And that is
going to be true for other countries.
But even in those sectors that are subject to investor-to-state
dispute settlement, we are not going to obligate ourselves except
in international law. Under domestic law, we are going to retain
our freedom to do things that are -
McGinty: ... now wait a minute, Mr. Ambassador... it seems to me if you
have that, every country can say that, and that means the treaty
is no good. I mean ... either you obey it or you don't. ...
Lang: Well, that's true .... And we hope that what we can get is an
agreement that we will be able to live with... We're not going to
agree to something that doesn't let us do the necessary kind of
domestic regulation we need to do.
Id. at 9.
533. The MAI article on taxation is an exception that partially carves out taxation
from MAI coverage other than expropriation. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art.
VIII.
534. See id. art. IX. Since the practice of listing country-specific "reservations" has a
reciprocal effect under treaty law, MAI drafters chose to use the term "exceptions" to
avoid any reciprocal effect. However, the norm of listing exceptions rather than reserva-
tions does not preclude listing a measure that has a reciprocity requirement. Id. art.
IX(A) n.1.
535. See Foreign Investment: Environmental Discussions Top Agenda of OECD Invest-
ment Treaty Negotiations, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1918 (Nov. 5, 1997) [hereinafter BNA,
Treaty Negotiations].
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negotiations.
This last stage represents the "greatest disharmony among MAI negoti-
ators,"536 when trade-offs on major sovereignty concerns are necessary
before the MAI's completion. The EU nations continue to press for deletion
of U.S. state-specific exceptions, while the United States continues to press
for deletion of the EU investment preferences 537 and protection of subsi-
dies for cultural industries.5 38 The country-specific exceptions serve two
purposes: first, as priorities for sovereignty protection, and second, as bar-
gaining chips to attain greater market access.539
The United States seeks two kinds of exceptions. The first consists of
a blanket exception for all existing, nonconforming state and local meas-
ures. The second acts as a "carve out" for broad categories of laws that
would continue into the future.5 40
A. Grandfathering of Existing Nonconforming Laws
1. Limits on Grandfathering
The most significant limit of the "grandfathering" strategy is that it only
covers existing law. The MAI would constrain future lawmaking on the
topics with standstill requirements,5 41 forbidding additional non-con-
forming measures and limiting amendments to those that do "not decrease
the conformity of the measure."5 42 In other words, other states may not
replicate a listed measure, and states may not substantially reform existing
laws except to increase compliance with the MAI.
536. Id. at 1919.
537. See id.
538. See European Information Service, European Parliament Weighs into Stalled
Investment Pact § 2299 (Mar. 14, 1998).
539. The United States acknowledges its strategy for binding states in exchange for
market access:
Many OECD countries want to bind state and local jurisdictions to the same
obligations as those undertaken at the federal level. If we succeed in negotiating
a strong and balanced agreement that provides the U.S. with access to substan-
tial new markets, we are prepared to bind the states and their subdivisions, sub-
ject to Congressional approval.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INvEsTMENT (MAI) 3 (1997).
540. "Our approach has been, as it was in the case of NAFTA, to grandfather all
existing non-conforming measures at the state and local level, first of all." Multilateral
Agreement on Investment: Win, Lose or Draw for the U.S.?, supra note 9 (statement of
Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, U.S.
Department of State).
541. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IX(Country Specification)(A) n.3; MAI
Commentary, supra note 101, art. IX(Standstill and the Listing of Country Specific Reser-
vations)(1), which states:
Standstill would result from the prohibition of new or more restrictive excep-
tions to this minimum standard of treatment. From this perspective, a violation
of standstill would be a violation of the underlying MAI obligations (e.g. of
National Treatment and MFN), and the dispute settlement provisions would
apply to such breaches of the MAI obligations.
542. MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. IX(Standstill and the Listing of Country
Specific Reservations)(3)(c), (d).
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Another limit of the grandfathering proposal is that it does not include
tribal law except for corporations organized under the Alaska Native
Claims Act.5 43 One version of the proposal covered "all existing noncon-
forming measures of all states, localities, the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico." 544 Tribal law is not included even though the United States
Trade Representative defines tribal governments as "subfederal jurisdic-
tions" for purposes of compliance with international agreements.545
There are 500 federally recognized reservations and Indian communi-
ties.54 6 Tribal governments consider themselves sovereign nations within a
nation. Their lands and affairs are often managed in trust by the federal
government under laws that defer to tribal sovereignty and treaty rights.547
In the context of the MAI, tribal sovereignty interests are even greater than
those of cities and states because of discrimination in favor of tribal resi-
dents, particularly in laws governing the role of private investors in eco-
nomic development, 548  economic regulation,549  environmental
protection, 550 resource conservation and land use.5 51 Tribal governments
543. See Partial Draft of Country-Specific Exceptions Proposed by the United States,
item 10 (Apr. 22, 1998) (on file at the reading room of the U.S. Trade Representative,
Washington, DC).
544. Id. item 22.
545. Id. item 10.
546. See id.
547. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1996) (Indian self-determination); 25 U.S.C. § 3101
(1996) (Indian forest lands); and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9, 2101-08 (1996) (Indian mineral
resources). "Among the attributes of tribal sovereignty [are] the power to manage and
control water and land resources, associated natural resources and environmental pro-
tection .... Federal recognition of these powers, whether arising from statute, executive
order, or treaty, is the supreme law of this land .... " U.S. DEP'T Of THE INTERIOR, TRIBAL
SELF DETERMINATION (1994).
548. For example, as a condition for granting service or construction contracts, min-
eral leases, or extraction permits, the Navajo Nation imposes explicit performance
requirements on private companies to create new jobs, hire and train Navajo residents,
and pay prevailing wages. See 3 NAVAJO TRIBAL CODE tit. 16, § 601 (1978) (dealing with
land use); 4 NAVAJO TRIBAL CODE tit. 18, § 1006 (1978) (dealing with extraction per-
mits); 4 NAvAjo TRIBAL CODE tit. 18, § 1506 (1978) (dealing with oil and gas leases). See
also 25 U.S.C. § 450e(b) (1996) (stating a federal procurement preference for Indian
organizations and Indian-owned enterprises to perform contracts or grants that benefit
Indian people).
549. For example, regarding intellectual property rights, the Indian Treaty Rights
Committee claims that multinational corporations have secured patents or trademarks
over indigenous symbols and traditional Indian seed crop genetics and horticultural
processes. By failing to involve tribal governments in negotiations and by acquiescing in
agreements that enable non-Indian investors to enforce these property rights, the Com-
mittee alleges that the federal government is not meeting its trust responsibilities. See
INDIAN TRATY RIGHTS COMMITTEE, GATT AND NAFTA AND INDIANs 2 (1994).
550. Over 300 reservations are threatened by severe environmental hazards that tribal
governments are responding to with reversals of traditionally lax conservation policies,
both federal practices and their own. The changes that Indian tribes either implement
or advocate involve limits on clear cutting and mining permits, mining and forest recla-
mation, dam sites and fish ladder construction, and other practices. These policies
could have adverse effects on foreign businesses compared to native Indian enterprise or
the MAI might consider them performance requirements or regulatory takings. See
Winona LaDuke, Like Tributaries to a River, The Growing Strength of Native Environ-
mentalism, 81 SIERRA 41 (1996) (citing a study by the World Watch Institute).
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are the second-largest land owners in the United States and own one-third
of all western low-sulfur coal and vast mineral and timber reserves. 552
The United States has not publicly disclosed exactly what it will
include in its list of grandfathered state and local laws. According to
OECD officials, the United States listed approximately five measures per
state, which follows the precedent of state-level reservations listed for
NAFTA. 553 After the NAFTA process, however, some state attorneys gen-
eral complained that the federal government failed to include many state
measures that the states identified as nonconforming with state law.554
Ultimately, the U.S. federal government informed state officials that
NAFTA reserved all pre-existing nonconforming state laws.5 5 5 A general
reservation of all existing nonconforming measures, however, "was not
contemplated by the wording of NAFTA and was incorporated only through
an exchange of letters among the three NAFTA parties. It is unclear
whether parties to the MAI would be prepared to accept general reserva-
tions of subnational measures."55 6
2. Technical Specifications
Although U.S. negotiators proposed to grandfather all existing state and
local law, the MAI has more specific listing requirements than NAFTA. The
MAI would require each nation to classify exceptions to the respective arti-
cles that they violate (e.g., National Treatment, MFN Treatment, etc.), and
then for each measure listed, add six other technical descriptions 557 "in the
551. Navajo law states that use of Navajo land by non-Navajo individuals or organiza-
tions should be kept to a minimum. See 3 NAvAjo TRIBAL CODE tit. 16, § 601 (1978).
552. LaDuke, supra note 550, at 41.
553. See BNA, Treaty Negotiations, supra note 535, at 1919. It is significant that the
NAFTA reservations were listed in the two years after the NAFTA text had been formally
adopted, whereas the MAI country-specific exceptions are part of the negotiations pro-
cess. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1108.2.
554. "Unfortunately, we do not understand why your office proposes to delete most
of our reservations." Letter from Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General of Oregon,
to Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative 1 (Dec. 15, 1995) (on file with
author).
555. See Letter from Phyllis Shearer Jones, NAFTA Coordinator for State Matters and
Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Intergovernmental Affairs and Public Liaison,
Office of the United States Trade Representative, to Enrique Martinez-Vidal, Department
of Legislative Reference, State of Maryland (May 1, 1996) (on file with author).
556. Testimony of Ian Waddell, Minister of the Legislative Assembly, and Noel
Schacter, Director of the International Branch of the Ministry of Employment and Invest-
ment, Government of British Columbia, Regarding the Proposed Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, House of Commons Standing Comm. on Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade 10
(Nov. 26, 1997) [hereinafter British Columbia, Testimony Regarding the MAI].
557. Each exception sets out the following elements:
(a) Sector refers to the general sector in which the exception is taken;
(b) Sub-Sector refers to the specific sector in which the exception is taken;
(c) Obligation specifies the MAI provision referred to in paragraph I for which an
exception is taken;
(d) Level of Government indicates the level of government maintaining the measure
for which an exception is taken;
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most precise terms possible."558 This level of precision is designed to limit
the scope of exceptions by creating a matrix of factors for narrow
interpretation.
Matrix for Grandfathering (or Challenging)
Country-Specific Exceptions to the MAI
MAI Obligations
Technical from Which
Specification the Country Takes an Exception
of Measures A B C D E F
1. Measure #1
2. Measure #2
3. Measure #3
Etc.
An investor could challenge a nonconforming measure on either side
of the matrix:
- Obligations: First, the MAI text may not allow countries to take excep-
tions from all MAI obligations.5 59 For example, the MAI general excep-
tion for "essential security interests" does not apply to expropriation,
5 60
and the United States does not apply its country-specific exceptions to
expropriation.5 61 The draft MAI article on country-specific exceptions
lists only National Treatment and MFN Treatment; it leaves the others
for later determination in the negotiating process.5 62 MAI exceptions
(e) Legal source or authority of the measure identifies the specific legal source of the
exception, whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, decision, or any other
form;
a) Succinct Description of the Measure sets out [the] non-conforming aspects of the
existing measures for which the exception is taken, together with any commitment
to eliminate or reduce the non-conformity of the measure; [and
(g) Motivation or purpose describes the rationale for a given measure].
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IX(Lodging of Country Specific Exceptions)(2)
(brackets in original).
558. MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. IX(Standstill and the Listing of Country
Specific Reservations)(3)(b).
559. "While some [OECD delegations] favoured an open list, others argued for a lim-
ited closed list of disciplines comprising National Treatment, MFN and new disciplines
(special topics)." Id. art. IX(Lodging of Country Specific Exceptions)(3).
560. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(General Exceptions)(1).
561. See Partial Draft of Country-Specific Exceptions Proposed by the United States,
supra note 543, at 19-21.
562. It is agreed that the disciplines listed in the chapeau text of parts A and B of
the draft Article should remain incomplete for the time being pending political
Cornell International Law Journal
may number as few as two or as many as fourteen. Furthermore, if the
MAI text does not preclude country-specific exceptions from applying to
a certain MAI article, the countries themselves may limit their excep-
tions as a result of trade-offs in the negotiations. For example, EU coun-
tries might agree to take an exception for their Regional Economic
Integration Organization from most MAI articles, but not from privatiza-
tion, monopolies, employment, or performance requirements. In
exchange, the United States might agree to take an exception from
National Treatment for government procurement, but not from MFN
Treatment.
- Technical specification. A measure is only excepted to the extent that it is
defined as an exception.5 63 For example, an investor could challenge a
government procurement measure by claiming: (1) the sector in which
the investor operates, such as banking, was not stated in the specifica-
tions, (2) the authorities cited covered, for example, central purchasing
agencies, but not airport authorities where the investor operates, or (3)
the motivations listed covered local labor and economic development
objectives, but not the human rights record of the company in a third
country that is not party to the MAI.
Some advocates argue that the acrimonious history of disputes
between the United States and Canada over softwood lumber subsidies is
grounds for concern that investors would challenge country-specific excep-
tions using all available arguments.5 64
In addition to promoting a narrow interpretation of country-specific
exceptions, the technical detail required by the MAI fosters the trans-
parency necessary for achieving a long-term "ratcheting effect" or an even-
tual phase-out of country-specific exceptions.5 65 "Ratcheting" is also
described as a "rollback" process, achieved through: (1) commitments by
MAI countries in their technical specifications for country-specific excep-
decisions by the Negotiating Group. The text could also be reviewed after nego-
tiators have decided how measures by sub-national entities and regional eco-
nomic integration organisations should be treated across the MAI.
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IX(A) n.4.
563. See id. art. IX(2)(a)-(D.
In the interpretation of an exception, elements (a) to (f) shall be considered. In
the event of a discrepancy between the non-conformity of the measure as set out
in the legal source or authority identified and the non-conformity as set out in
the other elements in their totality, the exception shall be deemed to apply to the
non-conformity of the measure as set out in the legal source or authority.
Id. art. IX(3). In other words, if the citation of legal authority in the MAI is narrower
than non-conforming laws in state or local codes, then it is the narrower MAI citation
that controls.
564. See LORI WALLACH, THE NGO PocKET TRADE LAWYER FOR THE MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENT ON INVEsTMENT 5 (1998).
565. In order to clarify the automatic ratchet effect of List A [grandfathered]
measures, the Chairman proposed the addition of the following phrase at the
end of paragraph (e)[which requires specification of the "legal source or author-
ity ... of the exception whether in the form of a law regulation, rule, decision or
any other form;"]: "as of the date of entry into force of the Agreement, or as
continued, renewed or amended after that date."
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dons (e.g., "liberalisation commitments," phase-out schedules or sunset
clauses); or (2) "obligations" that this or subsequent rounds might impose
on MAI countries to adjust their exceptions.5 66 MAI negotiators may
accomplish the latter by drafting the introductory clause to limit the scope
of country-specific exceptions.5 6 7
B. Exceptions for Future Nonconforming Measures
If the United States proposes a grandfathering list that averages only five
measures per state, it is not clear how U.S. negotiators can credibly adver-
tise sovereignty protection for "all nonconforming measures," and still
meet the MAI standard for technical specificity necessary for effectively
taking an exception. The only conceivable way is to "carve out" exceptions
for future lawmaking within fairly broad categories of federal, state and
local law, which include:
- Minority affairs: "[M]easures according rights or preferences to socially
or economically disadvantaged minorities, including corporations
organized under the laws of the state of Alaska in accord with the
Alaska Native Claims Act."5 68
- Social services: Social services includes public law enforcement, correc-
tions, income security or insurance, social security, social welfare, pub-
lic education, public training, and health care.5 69 The Canadian
government made a similar country-specific reservation to NAFTA for
health services, but provincial officials "remain deeply concerned that
the integrity of Canada's existing health care system and social services
will not be adequately protected by means of reservations. '5 70 The U.S.
government has a different view about the meaning of the reservation,
which could lead to a narrow interpretation of Canada's health reserva-
tion by a NAFTA dispute panel.5 7 1
- Subsidies: "[Any measures relating to subsidies and grants including
government-supported loans, guarantees and insurance."5 72 The draft
MAI includes a "compromise" section that would create a built-in
agenda for negotiating the standstill and rollback of country-specific
exceptions for subsidies.5 73
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IX(2)(e) n.15; id. art. IX(2)(a)-(f).
566. See MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. IX(Rollback)(1)-(4).
567. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IX(A).
568. Partial Draft of Country-Specific Exceptions Proposed by the United States,
supra note 543, item 10.
569. See id. item 13.
570. British Columbia, Testimony Regarding the MAI, supra note 556, at 11.
571. See NAFTA, supra note 116, Annex II-C-9; see also British Columbia, Testimony
Regarding the MAI, supra note 556, at 11.
572. Partial Draft of Country-Specific Exceptions Proposed by the United States,
supra note 543, item 23.
573. This section, which has not reached consensus, states that "[even if applied on a
non-discriminatory basis, investment incentives may have distorting effects on the flow
of capital and investment decisions.]" MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art.
Ill(Investment Incentives), (2.2). The agenda for negotiations would address "[the issue
of positive discrimination, [transparency], standstill and rollback.]" Id. art. 11(3).
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These categories do not cover the general exceptions in GATT Article
XX (such as laws that protect public morals, human and animal health, and
conservation of exhaustible natural resources), the General Agreement for
Trade in Services (GATS), NAFTA Chapter 11, or the WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement. They are generic categories of government
activity rather than types of legitimate purposes for nonconforming
measures.
"Carve-outs" for future lawmaking are opposed by some OECD delega-
tions as undermining the MAI disciplines to which they are applied.5 74
Consequently, the MAI text is bracketed to show that there is not agree-
ment on whether the categorical exceptions function as "carve-outs" or
grandfather existing measures within the listed categories.5 75 This is obvi-
ously a major tension in the negotiation process because the United States
has committed itself domestically to retain the carve-outs.5 76
Thus, the carve-out categories may be treated more like existing non-
conforming laws on the grandfathered list. This would mean that: (1) they
could be more narrowly negotiated within a matrix of obligations and tech-
nical specifications; and (2) the listing process could create the agenda for
future application of standstill and rollback requirements.
The strategy of turning the current round of country-specific excep-
tions into the agenda for future MAI negotiations is mentioned in draft MAI
provisions for developing countries. Developing countries would be
allowed to lodge exception lists that are "longer than ones lodged by devel-
oped countries. Their [exceptions] are, however, subject to the roll-back
process, as will be introduced for existing contracting parties."5 77 This
strategy reflects the bias against'carve-out exceptions to the MAI expressed
by the OECD in 1995.578
C. Interpretation by Dispute Panels
A final limitation of country-specific exceptions is that MAI dispute panels
could interpret an exception to restrict measures that it proports to cover.
Dispute panels narrowly interpreted general exceptions under GATT Arti-
574. See id. art. IX(B) n.9.
575. The text of this provision reads: "[B. Articles X; Y, [Article Z, ... , and Article
..] do not apply to any measure that a Contracting Party [adopts] or [maintains] with
respect to sectors, subsectors or activities, as set out in its Schedule to Annex B of the
Agreement.]" Id. art. IX(B) (brackets in original).
576. See McGINTY, supra note 10, at 9.
577. OECD, SPECIAL AND DiFFEEmrTL TRFATMENT FOR DEVELOPING CouNTEs II, Spe-
cific Points n.7 DAFFE/MAI/RD(97)56 (1997).
578. "The MAI would aim to raise the level of existing liberalization based on a "top-
down" approach under which the only exceptions permitted are those listed when
adhering to the agreement and which are subject to progressive liberalization." Commit-
tee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) and the Commit-
tee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT), A Multilateral Agreement
on Investment, OECD DOCUMENTS, supra note 58, at 11. See also Working Group A,
Existing Liberalization, OECD DOCUMENTS, supra note 58, at 119, which defines the
future liberalization process as a "'ratchet' mechanism [with] future rounds of
negotiation."
Vol. 31
1998 Sovereignty by Subtraction
cle XX so that the exception did not apply to the challenged measure.
These decisions are relevant to the viability of country-specific exceptions
under the MAI to the extent that the decisions are based upon principles of
international law that would apply to any multilateral agreement.
Before the WTO was created, two GATT panels ruled against U.S.
measures that limited tuna imports on grounds that the tuna-catching
methods unnecessarily killed dolphins. The Tuna I panel read into Article
XX a non-textual limit on U.S. jurisdiction to impose its dolphin conserva-
tion standards in a way that affected fishing practices outside of U.S. terri-
torial jurisdiction.579 The Tuna II panel used a more flexible approach, but
still found limits on the legal jurisdiction of the United States, which
extends beyond territorial waters only to U.S. nationals and U.S.-chartered
vessels.580 In short, both panels found jurisdictional limits on U.S. sover-
eignty that were not based on the text of Article XX. If jurisdictional limits
preclude the United States from limiting access to its own market under a
GATT general exception, then jurisdictional limits could preclude the use
of a country-specific exception.
Subsequently, the WTO Appellate Body analyzed the general excep-
tions of GATT Article XX in the broad context of rights and obligations that
are created by the agreement as a whole.58' Before listing the general
exceptions, Article XX articulates two tests designed to prevent the abuse of
general exceptions. The first test guards against measures that would con-
stitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination," and the second test
guards against creating "a disguised restriction on international trade."58
2
In its Gasoline opinion, the Appellate Body stated:
[t]he chapeau is animated by the principle that while the exceptions of Arti-
cle XX may be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be applied
so as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right
under the substantive rules of the General Agreement.583
In the context of the MAI, the question becomes whether the legal right to
exercise a country-specific exception should be limited by or balanced
against the substantive obligations of the MAI in the absence of the lan-
guage in the Article XX chapeau that guards against abuse of the
exceptions.
579. See GATT Panel Report on United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept.
3, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1991) (circulated but not adopted) [herein-
after Tuna I].
580. See GATT Panel Report on United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June
16, 1994, DS29/R 33 I.L.M. 839 [hereinafter Tuna II]. See also GATT Panel Report of
Thailand, supra note 473; GATT Panel Report on Canada - Measures Affecting Export of
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (adopted Mar. 22,
1988); GATT Panel Report on United States -Restrictions on Imports of Imports of Tuna
and Tuna Products of Canada, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 (adopted Feb. 22,
1982).
581. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, Apr. 24, 1996, 1996 WL 227476 (W.T.O.), WT/DS2/R
[hereinafter Gasoline].
582. GATT, supra note 111, art. XX.
583. Gasoline, supra note 581, at 15 (emphasis added).
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Is it conceivable that by omitting both the Article XX exceptions and
chapeau language, the MAI would afford greater sovereignty protection
than the GATT, simply through the device of country-specific exceptions?
One answer to this question would be "yes," based upon the assurances
that U.S. negotiators have given state government officials. Another
answer, however, appears to be "no," based upon the most recent Appellate
Body decision in the Shrimp/Turtle case before the WTO. 5 84
In the Shrimp/Turtle case, the Appellate Body explained what it meant
in the Gasoline decision when it said that the Article XX chapeau "is
animated by" the principle that the right to invoke exceptions should not
frustrate obligations to comply with the agreement.58 5 The chapeau of
Article XX is:
... but one expression of the principle of good faith. This principle, at once
a general principle of law and a general principle of international law, con-
trols the exercise of rights by states. One application of this general princi-
ple, the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits
the abusive exercise of a state's rights and enjoins that whenever the asser-
tion of a right "impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must
be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably."5 8 6
In Shrimp/Turtle, the Appellate Body concludes that the application of
international law principles to the Article XX chapeau results in a delicate
task of
marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke
an exception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under
varying substantive provisions ... so that neither of the competing rights
will cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the bal-
ance of rights and obligations... 5 8 7
In short, the Appellate Body recognizes a balancing test derived from gen-
584. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States - Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998, 1998 WL 720123 (W.T.O.), WT/
DS58/AB/R [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle]. The Shrimp/Turtle case involved a complaint
by India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Malaysia against a federal law that bans shrimp
imports from any country that the United States has not certified as meeting U.S. goals
for protecting sea turtles that are drowned in the process of harvesting shrimp. See 16
U.S.C. § 1537, amending the Endangered Species Act of 1973; 16 U.S.C. § 1531; Depart-
ment of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions Act, Pub. L. 101-162, § 609 (1989); Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining
Comparability of Foreign Programs for the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing
Operations, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,342 (1996).
585. See Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 584, 11 151, 156-60.
586. Id. 1 158, quoting BOM CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES Of LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNA.
TIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1953), which elaborates that,
[a] reasonable exercise of the right [to invoke an exception to an agreement] is
regarded as compatible with the obligation. But the exercise of the right in such
a manner as to prejudice the interests of the other contracting party arising out
of the treaty is unreasonable and is considered as inconsistent with the bona
fide execution of the treaty obligation, and a breach of the treaty.
Id.
587. Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 584, 159.
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eral principles of international law and the framework of the agreement.588
The test is based on principles of international law, not merely the lan-
guage of the Article XX chapeau. The chapeau is itself a reflection of the
underlying principles, which would also apply to interpretation of country-
specific exceptions under the MAI.
The Appellate Body further found that even though the purpose of the
U.S. shrimp conservation program fit within the scope of Article XX(g), it
was applied in a manner that resulted in "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrim-
ination" between countries where the same conditions prevail. 58 9 In so
doing, the Appellate Body stressed that "the most conspicuous flaw in this
measure's application relates to its intended and actual coercive effect on
the specific policy decisions made by foreign governments ... 590 It then
cited the failure of the United States to engage shrimp exporting nations in
"serious, across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding
bilateral or multilateral agreements.., before enforcing the import prohibi-
tion ..."591
The Appellate Body concluded that the lower dispute panel erred
because it focused on the design of the U.S. measure as it was written,
rather than as it was applied,5 9 2 and because the panel went beyond the
purpose of the Article XX chapeau, which is to prevent abuse of the specific
general exceptions.5 93 The erroneous result was the lower panel's overly
broad test of whether a measure would "undermine the WTO multilateral
trading system."5 94 By comparison, the Appellate Body's standard is
588. This balancing test weighs treaty rights and obligations, unlike the U.S. constitu-
tional balancing test under the dormant commerce clause, which balances legitimate
local needs against the burden that the method chosen places on interstate or interna-
tional commerce. See supra Part lI.A.3.b.
589. See Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 584, c 161-86.
590. Id. 161. The Appellate Body held that the standard under the U.S. measure
required other countries to adopt comparable regulatory programs, essentially identical
programs of using turtle excluder devices (TEDs) rather than comparable programs. See
id. l 163. The Appellate Body in Shrimp/Turtle did not address the Tuna I panel's
approach to limiting "coercive" measures through a territorial limit on U.S. jurisdiction.
The lower dispute panel in Shrimp/Turtle took pains to distance itself from the Tuna I
jurisdictional analysis: "[wie are not basing our finding on an extra-jurisdictional appli-
cation of U.S. law. Many domestic governmental measure can have an effect outside the
jurisdiction of the government which takes them." GATT Panel Report, United States -
Import Prohibition of Shrimp and Certain Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15,
1998 not adopted) 3.157, at 76 (Legal Arguments), 3.207, at 97 (Legal Arguments)
[hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle Panel].
591. Shrimp/Turtle Panel, supra note 590, 166.
592. See id. 1 115.
593. See id. 116. In the words of the Appellate Body,
[tihus, the Panel arrived at the very broad formulation that measures which
'undermine the WTO multilateral trading system' must be regarded as 'not
within the scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of Article XX.' Main-
taining, rather than undermining, the multilateral trading system is necessarily
a fundamental and pervasive premise underlying the WTO Agreement; but it is
not a right or an obligation, nor is it an interpretative rule which can be
employed in the appraisal of a given measure under the chapeau of Article XX.
Id.
594. Id. cl 116.
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whether a measure as applied "reduces the treaty obligation to a merely
facultative one and dissolves its juridicial character, and, in so doing,
negates altogether the treaty rights of other members."595 By focusing on
specific exceptions under Article XX, the Appellate Body was able to write a
much more conservative option, yet still reach the same result. Yet notwith-
standing its criticism of the panel's reasoning, the Appellate Body and the
lower panel both share the premise that GATT's general exceptions are lim-
ited by principles that are drawn from beyond the text of Article XX.
Whereas the panel cited the overarching purpose of the WTO multilateral
trading system,596 the Appellate Body cited established principles of inter-
national law that are synonymous with the text of the Article XX chapeau.
The MAI distinguishes itself from GATT in the way that it provides for
sovereignty protection through country-specific exceptions rather than gen-
eral multilateral exceptions. 597 The MAI article on country-specific excep-
tions has no provision comparable to the chapeau of GATT Article XX.598
If MAI countries were to defend their laws by invoking country-specific
"carve-out" exceptions, then MAI dispute panels could theoretically accept
that defense as absolute because of the absence of GATT-style provisions in
the text that guard against abuse. However, it is more likely that MAI
panels would follow the reasoning of the Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body.
That would mean invoking international law to interpret the exception as
"limited and conditional" and subject to a test of whether use of the excep-
tion unreasonably impinges on a treaty obligation.5 99 Such a reasonable-
ness test could include whether the measure being defended is "necessary"
(i.e., the least-trade or least-investment-restrictive alternative), whether it is
calculated to gain an unfair advantage, or whether it could otherwise be
more compatible with the obligation. 600
It is also possible that MAI panels could follow the broader reasoning
of the Shrimp/Turtle panel report. While the WTO Appellate Body rejected
that reasoning, it did so because the reasoning was not consistent with the
textual formula of the Article XX exceptions and chapeau provisions
against abuse of the exceptions. The MAI, however, has neither the GATT-
style general exceptions nor provisions against the abuse of exceptions,
595. Id. cl 156.
596. See Shrimp/Turtle Panel, supra note 590, 1 7.44.
597. The MAI limits general exceptions (apart from expropriation, compensation,
and protection from strife) to "essential security interests" and "public order," defined
as protecting a fundamental interest of society. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art.
VI(General Exceptions)(1)-(3).
598. See generally id. art. IX.
599. See Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 584, '1 158. In this regard, the argument of the
Shrimp/Turtle plaintiffs could be used by MAI panels to reject any country-specific carve-
out exception that results in "a fundamental redistribution of rights and obliga-
tions... one that handed nations with large markets the means to coerce other states to
conform their environmental laws, conservation and health policies with those of the
importing party as a condition of exercising rights that were otherwise guaranteed by
[the agreement]." Shrimp/Turtle Panel, supra note 590, C 3.207, at 97 (Legal
Arguments).
600. See Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 584, c 158.
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which the Appellate Body cited as the basis of error by the lower panel.
Thus, there are no textual reasons why MAI panels could not follow the
lead of the Shrimp/Turtle panel and invalidate any country-specific carve-
out that is used to defend measures that limit market access based on uni-
lateral criteria. The panel reasoned that, "[m]arket access for goods could
become subject to an increasing number of conflicting policy requirements
for the same product and this would rapidly lead to the end of the WTO
multilateral trading system."60 1 The panel found that a single law need not
threaten the global trading system by itself to be threatening. Rather, the
risk comes from the potential that other nations could adopt the same type
of law.60 2
The rules of the Vienna Convention could also limit the viability of
U.S. "carve-out' exceptions, even if MAI panels do not adopt the reasoning
of GATT or WTO cases.60 3 Another MAI country could ask a dispute
panel to invalidate a U.S. exception because it violates either of two provi-
sions of the Vienna Convention. These provisions provide that countries
may enter an exception unless (1) the agreement allows only specified
exceptions not including the one being challenged, 604 and (2) the excep-
tion is incompatible with the object and purpose of the agreement.605
Article 19 of the Vienna Convention governs "reservations," which the
Convention defines broadly to include any "unilateral statement, however
phrased or named, made by a State ... whereby it purports to exclude or
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their applica-
tion to that State."606 Thus, the international law of "reservations" would
cover the MAI's country-specific exceptions. The MAI replaces "reserva-
tions" with "exceptions" in order to avoid the Vienna Convention's rule that
reservations are reciprocal in nature.607 The MAI exceptions also do not
follow the Vienna Convention rule that countries may object to reserva-
tions, which suspends the reservation and the applicable treaty provisions
601. Shrimp/Turtle Panel, supra note 590, c 7.45, at 285 (Findings).
602. See id.
603. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; RESTATEMENT (THIaR) OF FOREGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STArEs § 313 (1987) [hereinafter RESrATEmENT THIRD]. See
generally Henry J. Bourguignon, The Belilos Case: New Light on Reservations to Multilat-
eral Treaties, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 347 (1989); Logan Piper, Reservations to Multilateral Trea-
ties: The Goal of Universality, 71 IowA L. Rnv. 295 (1985); Michael F. Glennon, Treaty
Process Reform: Saving Constitutionalism Without Destroying Democracy, 52 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 84 (1983); Jean Kyongun Koh, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How Interna-
tional Legal Doctrine Reflects World Vision, 23 Hv. INr'L LJ. 71 (1982); IAN SINCLAIR,
THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF TREATIEs (2d ed. 1984); D.W. Bowett, Reserva-
tions to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 67 (1976-77).
604. See Vienna Convention, supra note 603, art. 19(b); RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra
note 603, § 313(1)(b).
605. See Vienna Convention, supra note 603, art. 19(c); RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra
note 603, § 313(1)(c).
606. Vienna Convention, supra note 603, art. 2(1)(d). See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra
note 603, § 313 cmt. a.
607. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IX(A) n.1.
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between the excepting and the objecting countries. 608 The Vienna Conven-
tion clearly defers to such internal treaty interpretation rules.60 9 Without
more than a reference in one oblique footnote, however, it is unclear how
the MAI drafters intend to free the MAI from the option that the Vienna
Convention gives to participating countries to object to a reservation
within twelve months of its entry into force.6 10
The second constraint of the Vienna Convention is that the application
of country-specific exceptions must prove compatible with the object and
purpose of the MAI. This constraint is consistent with the reasoning of the
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body opinion, which sought to balance the rights
and obligations of WTO members based on the Article XX exceptions and
good faith principles of international law.6 11
From the perspective of compatibility with the object and purpose of
the MAI, the grandfathering exceptions are the least objectionable. The
"list A" exceptions of the MA16 12 (grandfathered measures) are country-
specific. They are also highly specific as to scope, subject to standstill, and
constitute the agenda for future negotiations on rollback. Since this closed
list of existing measures would be the result of bargaining, at least among
the original parties to the MAI, it is arguably a fair and noncoercive part of
the MAI framework. A challenge to a "list A" exception is most likely to
come under the MAI's internal scope and specificity requirements, as
explicitly provided under the Vienna Convention. 6 13
The "list B" exceptions of the MAI, which would cover the U.S. "carve-
out" exceptions, are a different matter. They are opposed by some OECD
countries because they are open categories of future lawmaking power and,
as proposed by the United States, are general categories that include large
segments of the economy. To the extent that the United States would
608. Vienna Convention, supra note 603, art. 21(3); RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note
603, § 321(3).
609. Vienna Convention, supra note 603, art. 20(5). The current rule also provides
that acquiescence for 12 months in the face of the a reservation amounts to acceptance
of the reservation. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 603, § 313 n.1 & cmt. e. Listing a
country-specific exception that "carves out" an economic sector or category of law is, in
effect, a counter-offer to the terms of a multilateral agreement. At one time, the rule was
that rejection of a country-specific exception (or broadly defined, a reservation)
amounted to a rejection of the entire agreement as between the reserving and the
objecting parties. See REsTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 603, § 313 n.1. The current rule is
that if one country objects to another country's reservation, the original terms of the
agreement remain in effect, absent the benefits of a reservation for the reserving country
with respect to the objecting country. This is particularly the case when a multilateral
agreement has a "legislative" character of providing benefits to private actors (such as
foreign investors), not just to the participating states themselves. An underlying
assumption, however, is that the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose
of the agreement. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 603, § 313 n.1. See Reservations
to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951
I.CJ. 15 (advisory opinion) [hereinafter Genocide Advisory Opinion].
610. Id. See also Piper, supra note 603, at 320.
611. See WALLACH, supra note 564.
612. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IX(Introduction to Annex A of the
Agreement listing country-specific exceptions).
613. See supra note 609.
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defend a measure that has extra-territorial effect or "coercive" influence on
the policy of other nations, the exceptions run counter to the principles of
the Shrimp/Turtle ruling.
The argument for challenging country-specific "carve-out" exceptions
as a distortion of the balance of MAI rights and obligations would be
strongest if brought by a developing country that later accedes to the MAI.
The argument would sound much like the complaint of India, Pakistan,
Thailand, and Malaysia in the Shrimp/Turtle case, which was that the
nation with the largest import market was using the general exceptions to
protect lawmaking authority that was applied to coerce them into expensive
compliance measures to meet unilateral U.S. standards.614 These nations
are not part of the original bargaining process over country-specific excep-
tions, and they would not enjoy reciprocal use of exceptions taken by
OECD members.615
While the Shrimp/Turtle decision and the Vienna Convention provide
broad arguments for a dispute panel to invalidate a country-specific excep-
tion, they provide little guidance on the exact scope exceptions that would
effect a "redistribution of rights and obligations" or violate the "purposes
and objectives" of the MAI. One clue lying on the surface of the Shrimp/
Turtle decision is the argument that the United States should not be able to
use its economic power (denial of access to its own market) to get around
the WTO's rule-based system.616 Professor Jackson describes treaty rights
and obligations in terms of a legal spectrum spanning between power and
rule, with most agreements falling somewhere in the middle. A power-
based agreement is one that enables countries to negotiate disputes by
utilizing their political and economic clout. A rule-based agreement is one
that requires countries to settle disputes by resort to the disciplines of the
agreement only.6 1 7
The degree of power orientation of a country-specific exception could
serve as a guide to the likelihood that the exception could be invalidated by
a dispute panel. The closer the exception comes to exercising economic or
political power of a large-market country (or state), the closer it comes to
"coercion" as defined in Shrimp/Turtle. The use of a power curve analysis
to challenge country-specific exceptions would look behind the form of the
exception, such as the broad exceptions for subsidies or procurement, to
the way that the exception is applied to protect laws that use economic
leverage to the disadvantage of foreign investors.
While the Shrimp/Turtle case focused on a law with explicit extraterri-
torial purposes, a power curve analysis of exceptions based on MAI objec-
tives would look for effects on foreign competition, not just explicit
614. See Shrimp/Turtle Panel, supra note 590, 1 3.207, at 97 (Legal Arguments).
615. Accession of non-OECD countries to the MAI would require approval by a
supermajority of OECD countries if the decision cannot be made by consensus. See
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, arts. XII(Accession)(2), XII(Parties Group)(7).
616. See Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 584, '1 3.207, at 97 (Legal Arguments).
617. See JOHN H. JACKSON, TiE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL EcoNoMic RELATIONS 85-88 (1989); Schaefer, supra note 13, at 622.
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purposes. In other words, the more effective a state law is at influencing
the location of investments or the competitiveness of domestic investors to
the disadvantage of foreign investors, the more likely it is that the law could
be challenged, regardless of whether it is protected by a country-specific
exception. For example, a procurement preference for environmental tech-
nology that is easily exported ranks low on the power curve. It would not
frustrate the objectives of the MAI because foreign investors have effective
access to that market. A procurement preference for recycled content in
heavy commodities like newsprint falls in the middle of the power curve.
It is more likely to place foreign firms at a competitive disadvantage
because of shipping or reinvesting costs. A procurement preference that
penalizes paper producers that engage in clear-cutting or furniture produ-
cers that operate in countries that promote forestry with forced labor is
high on the power curve. The curve discriminates in terms of production
methods that are either designed to influence policy of other jurisdictions,
much more likely to affect foreign as compared with domestic firms, or
both.
It is difficult to predict the viability of country-specific exceptions,
save that a MAI dispute panel has ample grounds under international law
to look behind the form of an exception and question whether it redistrib-
utes power under the MAI, coerces other nations with less economic power
or otherwise frustrates the investor-protection objectives of the MAI.
Taken as a whole, the assurance by U.S. negotiators that country-spe-
cific exceptions will protect U.S. state sovereignty interests is less than the
sum of its parts. First, the "List A" for existing nonconforming laws to be
"grandfathered" would do nothing to affect MAI constraints on future law-
making. Second, the exceptions do not cover the laws of most tribal gov-
ernments, which limit access to vast coal, mineral, timber, water, and other
resources. Third, the level of technical specificity required to make an
exception creates many options for narrowing the scope of MAI disciplines
covered, and economic sectors and state laws actually listed. Fourth, the
"List B" categories that would "carve-out" future sovereignty protection are
opposed by other OECD countries and are thus still negotiable. Fifth, even
if the "List B" categories survive as part of the MAI, there is a reasonable
risk that dispute panels will invalidate the exceptions as applied to laws
that use political or economic power of states to the disadvantage of foreign
investors. And finally, if the MAI comes into force, MAI negotiators envi-
sion a long-term process of ratcheting back those exceptions into compli-
ance with the MAI through future rounds of negotiation.
Conclusion
The goals of the MAI are generally consistent with economic interests that
are protected by the U.S. Constitution. But unlike the MAI, the Constitu-
tion balances those interests against the competing purposes of
noneconomic regulation, just as it balances federal and state power. Fed-
eral courts defer to significant state roles in terms of regulation, subsidies,
Vol. 31
1998 Sovereignty by Subtraction
and market participation. The MAI aims to subtract from the lawmaking
capacity of state, local, and tribal governments. It would alter the delicate
balance of power that the Constitution creates between levels of govern-
ment and between government and private investors. Defined as this bal-
ance of power, U.S. state sovereignty deserves greater attention from the
Americans who have a role in the process of MAI negotiations and congres-
sional action.
The MAI would act as a virtual amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
but for the buffering role of the United States government, which could
control enforcement of the agreement against state, local and tribal govern-
ments. This federal buffer, however, is significantly weakened because
investor-to-state dispute resolution reduces federal control of the negotiat-
ing process that exists with state-to-state dispute resolution. The federal
buffering role does not alter the fact that the MAI would give that power to
the federal government, which alters the political balance of power within
the federal system. The MAI's shift in power is from the states to the fed-
eral government, but the shift in political leverage is from government to
private investors. The risk of monetary damages would also put fiscal pres-
sure on the federal government to intervene on behalf of investors rather
state and local governments.
The power shift in federalism is already happening under the WTO
agreements. Federal officials have mediated challenges under the Agree-
ment on Government Procurement (selective purchasing related to human
rights), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (boycotts of Swiss
bank subsidiaries related to treatment of Holocaust family assets), and the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (labeling requirements).
The MAI would enable multinational corporations to avoid the WTO
diplomatic process by giving them their own forum to sue nation-states
directly for damages based upon 14 investor-protection standards that go
beyond the scope of existing agreements. Nonetheless, U.S. negotiators
advertise the MAI as an insignificant sovereignty threat based on country-
specific reservations. These reservations, however, (1) have not overcome
the opposition of European countries, and (2) do not yet conform to MAI
standards of technical specificity for purposes of later standstill and
rollback. Perhaps more importantly, federal officials have been relying on
the assumption that country-specific exceptions can protect future lawmak-
ing from being effectively challenged if it limits market access or otherwise
uses state economic or political power to place foreign investors at a com-
petitive disadvantage. That assumption was rejected by the Shrimp/Turtle
dispute panel for purposes of GATT Article XX. The stage is set for inves-
tors to challenge U.S. exceptions to the MAI using the same arguments.
Reliance on country-specific exceptions is not likely to afford full sov-
ereignty protection for U.S. states. The appendix to this article addresses
the risk in this reliance by providing a detailed outline of other options for
maintaining the constitutional balance of federalism and investor protec-
tion. These options include:
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- Stronger congressional oversight. If the goal of U.S. negotiators is less
than full protection for U.S. producers, then a more candid disclosure of
the legal impact of the MAI will achieve truth in advertising. Options for
a more open process of disclosure and congressional oversight are sum-
marized below in Part L.A of the appendix on options for balancing fed-
eralism and investor protection.
- Implementing legislation. If, on the other hand, the goal is to protect
state sovereignty, the most politically expedient approach is the cate-
gory of options for implementing legislation, which Congress can adopt
unilaterally. These are summarized in Part I.B below.
- General exceptions or carve-outs. Multilateral options, while more diffi-
cult to develop and adopt, go to the root of the problem. Part II.A of the
outline borrows from the model of GATT general exceptions to suggest
the options that would prove most appropriate for the MAI. These same
options could also be adopted as carve-outs rather than as exceptions,
which would put sovereignty safeguards on a stronger foundation.
- Limits on dispute resolution. Another multilateral approach would be to
set limits on dispute resolution, either through limits on investor stand-
ing or claims, or through broader limits on the investor-to-state dispute
process.
With all of its checks and balances, the United States Constitution
created the most successful free trade area in the world. The MAI would no
doubt open up more foreign markets to U.S. investors, but it would also
change the constitutional balance of power between states and the federal
government and between government and foreign investors. This tradeoff
is not necessary. In the previous decade, foreign investment coming into
the United States increased an average of 24% each year, a ten-year increase
of 202%.618 Foreign investment going out of the United States into other
countries increased an average of 34% each year, a ten-year increase of
785%. Should the United States change its constitutional balance of power
in order to increase investment outflows from 785% to 1,000%?
There are many tools to restructure the MAI or its emerging progeny
into a framework that respects the balance of power within federal systems:
general exceptions or carve-outs, limits on dispute settlement, implementa-
tion of legislation, and a more open and analytic process for congressional
oversight of negotiations. Best of all, the strategy of defining sovereignty by
subtraction should be replaced with the wisdom of positive checks and
balances on the exercise of power. In the words of Professor Conrad
Weiler:
Above all, the Founders did not justify the dangers and risks of the first
common market merely in terms of expected economic benefits and then let
the chips fall where they may; they attempted to simultaneously devise a
political solution to the problems as well as the opportunities of free trade,
618. OECD, INTERNATIONAL DiREcr INVEsMfENT STATISTI cAL YEA"OOK tbls. II, III
(1996).
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and they did this, as all else in the Constitution, in a federal fashion.6 19
619. Conrad Weiler, Global Trade Challenges to State Powers: Are There Federalistic
Limits to the Commerce Power? A Look at US Constitutional Law and the EU's Sub-
sidiarity Principle 32 (Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 1996) (Paper for the 1996 annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association) (on file with author).
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Appendix:
Options for Balancing Federalism & Investor Protection
I. Unilateral Options
A. Process for Congressional Oversight and Approval
The MAI did not receive public attention until a full year after the original
deadline for negotiations.620 By adopting the following options, Congress
could strengthen the process of disclosure and create an open forum for
testing the assumptions of U.S. negotiators. If Congress does not adopt the
following options, Congress will again vote "yes or no" on a global agree-
ment without time to analyze how the agreement affects U.S. sovereignty
interestS. These options are not a substitute for structural change of the
MAI. However, they would strengthen public participation and accounta-
bility to inform the negotiating process.
1. Legal Impact Statement
Congress could require that before the President signs a trade or invest-
ment agreement (e.g., at least 180 days), the responsible federal officials
must give Congress a legal impact statement. The statement could include
the potential impact of the agreement on federal, state, local, or tribal
capacity for lawmaldng, law enforcement, or procurement, and on capacity
of the United States to implement or enforce any international agreement
on the environment, labor, or human rights. In addition, the President
could include in this analysis the legal significance of proposing any agree-
ment as a treaty, as opposed to an executive agreement.
2. Disclosure of Legislative History
Congress could require that before the President signs a trade or invest-
ment agreement (e.g., at least 180 days), the federal officials must give Con-
gress a report that discloses material that is analogous to legislative
history:
- Complaints or requests from other countries related to federal, state, local,
or tribal capacity for lawmaking, law enforcement, or procurement; and
on capacity of the United States to implement or enforce any interna-
tional agreement on the environment, labor, or human rights.
- Requests or suggestions from industry, members of advisory committees,
and nonprofit organizations, including the record of communications
from these parties regarding the negotiations.
3. Hearings
Before Congress approves a proposed trade or investment agreement it
should hold public hearings, take public comments, and publish the rec-
ord. This is already congressional practice. However, without the previous
steps, the hearings would prove superficial.
620. Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Win, Lose or Draw for the U.S.?, supra note
9 (statement of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairperson of the Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade).
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4. Congressional Approval
The ultimate oversight power comes with congressional delegation of nego-
tiating authority and later approval of a trade or investment agreement.
Congress could adopt a positive and permanent statement of non-eco-
nomic goals that compliment the usual goals for negotiation of a trade or
investment agreement. For example, the goals could address (1) preserving
constitutional principles of democracy, and (2) preserving U.S. interna-
tional commitments to democracy, environmental protection, and human
rights. The goals would apply to any agreement that Congress must
approve, including fast-track agreements.
The options listed in this section would create a significant fiscal bur-
den on the Office of United States Trade Representative because of the staff
time necessary to support stronger legal analysis and congressional over-
sight. However, Congress has already anticipated that need by appropriat-
ing an additional $1 million to the USTR budget in order to identify the
effect of the MAI and other agreements on state and local laws.
B. Implementing Legislation
Without congressional implementing legislation, the MAI would give inves-
tors direct access to enforce their rights in domestic courts. 62 1 However,
Congress can build on the sovereignty provisions it adopted for NAFTA
and the WTO agreements to block this option, require congressional action
before the MAI can preempt a state law, and provide other safeguards as
follows.
(1) Standing. Congress could copy the NAFTA and WTO implementing
legislation to provide that only the federal government, not a private
party or a foreign government, may use domestic courts or agencies to
enforce the terms of the MAI. 6 22
(2) Legal effect. Congress provided (in the NAFTA and WTO implement-
ing legislation) that a provision of the agreement has no legal effect if it
is inconsistent with "United States" (federal) law, but this provision
does not extend to state or tribal law.6 23 In implementing legislation
for the MAI, Congress could extend the "no legal effect" treatment to all
621. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(Investor-State
Procedures)(D)(2)(a).
622. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(c) (1993); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) (1994).
623. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a) (1993); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a) (1994). The following sub-
section distinguishes "state law" from "United States law." It provides that, "No state
law, or the application thereof, may be declared invalid as to any person or circumstance
on the ground that the provision or application is inconsistent with the Agreement,
except in an action brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or
application invalid." 19 U.S.C. §§ 3312(b)(2), 3512(b)(2)(A) (1994). For purposes of
this section, however, "state law" is defined to include (i) any law of a political subdivi-
sion of a State; and (ii) any State law regulating or taxing the business of insurance. 19
U.S.C. §§ 3312(b)(3), 3512(b)(3) (1994). The result of this subtle drafting is that state
law enjoys no protection from the legal effect of NAFTA or the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments, except for local and state laws that regulate or tax insurance business. However,
a court may declare the latter two categories of "state law" invalid if the action is brought
by the U.S. government. As for other categories of state law, this section provides no
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laws of a state, local, or tribal government. This would provide parity
to subnational law. Extending the "no legal effect" language to subna-
tional law would inhibit legal action by the federal government to pre-
empt state law directly under the MAI. Instead, Congress would have
to preempt state law under the MAI by repealing it (assuming that the
WTO implementing language is used for the MAI). Through this
action Congress could avoid a sweeping preemption of state law that
could result from making such broad MAI terms as "treat-
ment ... required by international law"6 24 applicable to state law.6
25
If Congress chooses not to change federal or state law, the MAI would
still provide investors with a remedy for damages through an interna-
tional arbitration process.626
(3) Subnational Consultation and Self-defense. In the WTO implementing
legislation, Congress strengthened informal commitments under
NAFTA. These informal commitments provided state and local offi-
cials notice of WTO challenges to their laws, an opportunity to partici-
pate in defending against those challenges, and notice of any U.S.
complaint against subnational laws in another country.627 MAI imple-
menting legislation could follow this model.
- Meaningful notice. State officials do not receive notice "on a contin-
uing basis of matters under the [WTO agreements] that . . .will
potentially have a direct impact on[,] the States."628 These matters
include a WTO challenge to a Massachusetts procurement law or
relationship of WTO obligations to MAI negotiations. In addition,
the risk of retaliatory challenges to state law may prove a greater
protection from legal challenges under NAFTA or the Uruguay Round Agreements. Tri-
bal law receives no mention and no protection.
624. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. IV(1).
625. In June 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had exceeded its power
under the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the constitutional right to free exercise of
religion. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court struck down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which prohibited any law that "substantially
burdens" the exercise of a person's religion, even if the law had nothing to do with
religion and was permissible under the First Amendment. The Court held that Congress
exceeded its authority by attempting to impose RFRA's quasi-constitutional standard on
state and local governments, noting that,
[RFRA's] sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government,
displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and
regardless of subject matter .... [Tlhis is a considerable congressional intrusion
into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the
health and welfare of their citizens.
Id. at 2170. The Boerne decision is distinguishable because it interprets congressional
power under First Amendment religious freedom. However, its approach to preemption
of state law without clear standards of congressional accountability is analogous to the
issues presented if the U.S. government sought to preempt state law under the MAI. See
Karen Ryan Denvir et al., Survey of 1997 Nonprofit Case Law (January-June), 32 U.S.F. L.
REy. 365, 391 (1998).
626. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(Investor-State
Procedures)(D)(2)(c).
627. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b) (1994) with 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b), (c), (d) (1994).
628. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994).
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risk than an unprompted challenge. 629 A country that wants to
counter-sue the United States is likely to challenge laws at all levels
of government. Therefore, a meaningful process of consultation
should provide states notice of all imminent complaints by the time
the United States is consulting with other governments. Addition-
ally, the process should ensure that states are aware of disputes that
directly involve them, and regulations that could alter sovereignty
protection.
- Meaningful parties to notify. The United States Trade Representative
sends notice of WTO issues to governors' representatives. While
this system is efficient for the USTR, it ignores separation of powers
at the state level and effectively excludes state legislatures and attor-
neys general, both of whom have a more significant jurisdictional
interest in WTO (or MAI) legal impact than do governors. Federal
notice should go to the relevant branch of state government.
- Meaningful consultation. The consultation process envisioned by
the WTO implementing legislation presumes that "consultation"
will actually occur. For example, federal consultation with the
intergovernmental policy advisory committees (lAG) on trade630 is
efficient because such an advisory committee integrates multiple
branches of state government, and enables state officials to develop
expertise. MAI implementing legislation should retain IPAC consul-
tation requirements. Most of the notice and consultation require-
ments, which already exist for NAFTA and WTO agreements, are
not seriously implemented. MAI implementing legislation could
strengthen these provisions by limiting federal enforcement options
against states if notice and consultation requirements are not
followed.
(4) Notice of Adverse Decision and Hearings. Congress could mandate that
when a dispute panel rules against a U.S. federal or subnational law,
the USTR must notify Congress. Subsequently, Congress must hold
hearings on the issue before they or the Executive Branch takes any
action to enforce the decision. On the eve of the congressional vote on
the WTO agreements in 1994, Senator Robert Dole proposed a process
for congressional oversight of adverse WTO panel decisions.63 ' The
Dole proposal required analysis of an adverse WTO decision by a
629. After the United States challenged a New Brunswick statute in the Beer I case,
Canada challenged 210 state and local laws in the Beer II case, prevailing in 60 of these
challenges. See Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 33, at 206.
630. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(A) (1994).
631. See A Bill to Establish a Commission to Review the Dispute Settlement Reports of the
World Trade Organization and for Other Purposes, S. 16, 104th Cong. (1995). Bill S. 16
was never reported from the Senate Finance Committee, primarily for reasons that had
little to do with the merits of the review commission. Members of the Senate Finance
Committee contested bill S. 16 because they opposed another Dole initiative to promote
a WTO complaint to pressure Colombia and Costa Rica to withdraw from a banana
framework agreement with the European Union. See Daniel Mazuera, The Americas: A
Trade Dispute Gone Bananas, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1995, at A19; Opponents of Dole
Banana Bell Step Up Fight Against Measure, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 27, 1995, at 28.
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panel of federal judges, prior to congressional hearings or considera-
tion of a motion to withdraw from the WTO. With or without the aid
of a review panel, Congress could create a formal process for review of
decisions from MAI panels (or any other panels) that are adverse to
U.S. sovereignty interests.
(5) Enforcement of Arbitration Awards. The MAI would provide investors a
choice of international arbitration fora, each with its own rules for
enforcement of awards.632 These include arbitration under the Inter-
national Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 633 the
ICSID Additional Facility,6 34 rules of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 635 and rules of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC). 6 36 If Congress can use imple-
menting legislation to bar access to U.S. courts under NAFTA and the
WTO agreements, 637 then it can likewise limit the arbitration rules
that it will recognize for enforcement of awards against the United
States. For example, Congress might not recognize ICSID, which
would require MAI nations to automatically enforce arbitration awards.
Instead, Congress could support the less automatic process that is
632. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(Investor-State Proce-
dures)(D)(2)(c). The MAI includes no provisions of its own for enforcement of arbitra-
tion awards. See id. art. V(Investor-State Procedures)(D)(18).
633. ICSID is an arbitration agency created by the World Bank in 1966. Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 159 [hereinafter ICSID].
ICSID was submitted for ratification in March 1965 and entered into force on October
14, 1966, after ratification by 20 countries. See id. art. 68(2). It is the only arbitration
convention that provides for both adjudication and enforcement of itsjudgments. ICSID
signatories waive sovereign immunity and, in federal systems, ICSID judgments are
enforceable in sub-federal courts at the discretion of the national government. See id.
art. 54(1).
634. The ICSID Additional Facility rules are designed for disputes where only one
party to the dispute has signed the ICSID Convention and the dispute does not result
from an "ordinary commercial transaction." Rules Governing the Additional Facility for
the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the ICS1D, Sept. 27, 1978, art.
4(3), 21 I.L.M. 1446 [hereinafter ICSID Additional Facility Rules].
635. The U.N. General Assembly adopted UNCITRAL rules in 1976 to guide investor-
to-investor dispute settlement before international arbitration bodies such as the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce. See United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 182 (1976). Parties to com-
mercial contracts often specify that they will use UNCITRAL rules to resolve a dispute
under their contract. Because UNCITRAL rules were designed for private investor dis-
putes and not investor-to-state disputes, some OECD countries oppose using UNCITRAL
rules for arbitration of claims under the MAI. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art.
V(Investor-State Procedures)(D).
636. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) founded an International Court
of Arbitration in 1923. In 1995 alone, the ICC received 427 new requests for arbitration
involving 1,012 parties from 93 countries. Contractual claims against nation-states or
their agencies accounted for 14.1% of the parties. Several ICC cases involved claims
exceeding $1 billion; 62% of the claims exceeded $1 million. See 1995 Statistical Report,
in THE ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 3-6 (1996).
637. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(c) (1993); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) (1994).
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available under the New York Convention, 638 which provides rules for
enforcing awards under the ICSID Additional Facility,6 39 UNCITRAL
or the ICC.6 40 Whereas ICSID awards "are binding and shall not be
subject to any appeal,"'6 41 the New York Convention provides a signifi-
cant role for domestic courts, 6 4 2 which need not enforce an award if it
is "contrary to the public policy" of the United States.6 43 In effect, the
New York Convention provides a role for Congress to define the public
policy interests that domestic courts should consider in whether or not
to enforce an award by a MAI dispute panel. In fact, there is already a
model for this option in the implementing legislation for NAFTA and
the Uruguay Round agreements, which provides that the agreements
do not "amend or modify any law of the United States, including any
law relating to (i) the protection of human animal, or plant life or
health, (ii) the protection of the environment, or (iii) worker
safety... unless specifically provided for in this Act."64 4
In the context of MAI implementation, Congress could create a
similar list of essential public policy goals. Congress could expand the
NAFTA/WTO implementation language to cover other policy interests
such as GATT Article XX exceptions, state sovereignty, congressional
authority to adopt unilateral measures that implement multilateral
agreements on human rights, environmental protection, or core labor
standards. A more inclusive outline of essential policy interests is dis-
cussed below under multilateral general exceptions.
II. Multilateral Options
A. General Exceptions or Carve-Outs
The fact that the MAI includes only two of the thirteen GATT general
exceptions is not only a break from tradition, it also creates a presumption
that MAI negotiators chose to exclude consideration of policy objectives
that they did not include in the general exceptions.6 45 The Shrimp/Turtle
panel followed this logic when it cited a GATT exception (products of
prison labor) that has been interpreted to permit limits on market
638. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 38-65 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08
(1988)) [hereinafter New York Convention].
639. See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 634, art. 20.
640. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. V(Investor-State Procedures)(D)(3),
(5).
641. ICSID, supra note 633, art. 53(1).
642. The New York Convention was implemented by the United States Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1994).
643. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).
644. 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(2) (1993); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2) (1994).
645. The maxim of construction is expressio unius est alterio exclusius. See WILIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRicKEY, CASES AND MATERIAs ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 637 (2d ed. 1995); George H. Taylor, Structural Textual-
ism, 75 B.U. L. REv. 321, 343 (1995); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Construc-
tion of Statutes, 47 COLuM. L. REv. 527 (1947).
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access 6 46 as authority for not permitting limits on market access under
other general exceptions.64 7 This reasoning maximizes the jurisdiction of
multilateral agreements and minimizes legislative jurisdiction under
domestic constitutional law.
Even if the MAI included all of the options for general exceptions, they
still would not offer the level of sovereignty protection that U.S. negotiators
claim that their country-specific exceptions can provide. Any additional
general exceptions to the MAI would include the kind of language that
introduces the exception for maintaining public order.6 48 That language
sets a series of tests, including "discrimination," "disguised restriction"
and "necessary," all of which trade panels used under GATT to define a
contested measure as outside the scope of the exception or to limit the
jurisdiction of the nation seeking to defend the measure.64 9 The Shrimp/
Turtle panel went even further and found that general exceptions cannot
apply to measures that limit market access because use of the exception in
that way would threaten the world trading system.6 50
The increasingly limited scope of general exceptions has led Canadian
provincial officials to advocate sovereignty protections within categories
like GATT Article XX, but in the form of "carve-outs" rather than general
exceptions.65 1 There are several examples of general carve-outs already in
the MAI. From a state and local point of view, the most prominent one is
taxation carve-outs. 65 2
/ The logic of a general carve-out is that it would limit the scope of the
agreement, whereas a general exception operates within the set of expected
benefits of the agreement as a whole. Having stated the logic, however, it
would have to be accepted by a dispute panel, which would have as much
latitude to interpret a carve-out as a general exception. Nonetheless, the
very concept of limiting the jurisdiction of an agreement like the MAI may
hold up, considering that there is no other provision on the scope of the
agreement except for the universal definition of "investment" as "every kind
of asset."653
With both approaches in mind, general exceptions versus general
carve-outs, the following options are offered as merely a classification of
646. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(e).
647. See Shrimp Report, supra note 104, ( 3.165, at 78 (Legal Arguments).
648. That provision reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between Contracting Parties, or a disguised investment restriction, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Contracting Party from taking
any measure necessary for the maintenance of public order.
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(General Exceptions)(3).
649. See Steve Charnovitz, The Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, J.
WoRLD TRADE 49 (1992); Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA.J.
INr'L L. 689 (1998).
650. See Shrimp Report, supra note 104, cl 7.51, at 287 (Findings).
651. See British Columbia, Testimony Regarding the MAI, supra note 556, at 11.
652. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VIII(1)-(3).
653. See id. art. II(Definitions)(2).
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legitimate purposes that merit consideration for protection of sovereign leg-
islative authority. The few MAI general exceptions are noted with a
subheading.
The following options are offered as a classification of legitimate pur-
poses that merit consideration for protection of sovereign legislative
authority.
1. Security Interests
Other than a narrow scope of public order, the only general exception of
the MAI is for security interests. The exception, however, does not cover
provisions on expropriation or protection from strife.65 4 This means, for
example, that the MAI provides an investor with a claim for losses sus-
tained in military action taken to enforce resolutions of the U.N. Security
Council.6 55 The following are related to security interests:
- MAI: Reservation of power to protect "essential security interests."
65 6
- MAI: Nondisclosure of information related to security interests.
65 7
- MAI: Reservation of power to implement obligations under the United
Nations Charter to protect international peace and security.
65 8
2. National Economic Security
While some of the following legislative purposes are based on humanita-
rian values, they all have direct economic consequences to the security of a
nation's human and economic resources.
- Relating to products of prison labor.
65 9
- Protection of national treasures of artistic, historical or archaeological
value. 66 0
- Relating to importation or exportation of gold or silver.
6 6 1
- Restrictions on exports of domestic materials that are necessary for a
domestic processing industry during periods when the domestic price
is held below the world price under government price controls.
662
- Restrictions on exports of domestic materials that are in short
supply.663
654. See id. art. VII.
655. See discussion of expropriation supra Part II.
656. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(General Exceptions)(2)(a) (defines
essential sqcurity interests to include: (i) action taken in time of war; (ii) non-prolifera-
tion policies related to weapons of mass destruction; and (iii) production of arms and
ammunition). See also NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 2102(b); GATT, supra note 111, art.
XI(b).
657. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(General Exceptions)(2)(b);
NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 2102.1(a); GATT, supra note 111, art. XXI(a).
658. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VI(General Exceptions)(2)(c);
NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 2102.1(c); GATT, supra note 111, art. XXI(c).
659. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(e); NAFTA, supra note 116, art. XXI.1.
660. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(f); NAFTA, supra note 116, art. XXI.1.
661. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(c); NAFTA, supra note 116, art. XXI.1.
662. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(i).
663. See id. art. XX(j).
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- Measures necessary for collection of direct taxes or avoidance of double
taxation.664
3. Domestic Regulatory Powers
Most of the GATT general exceptions are designed to preserve traditional
regulatory powers. The Chairman's proposal for MAI limits on perform-
ance requirements recognizes three of these exceptions (health, conserva-
tion, and compliance) for two of its limits. 6 65 The options for regulatory
general exceptions or carve-outs include:
- MAI: Preservation of public order. 66 6
- Protection of public morals.66 7
- Protection of human or animal life or health.668
- Conservation of exhaustible resources. 669
- Environmental protection, generally.670
- Protection of consumers and workers. 671
- Enforcement of otherwise consistent laws.6 72
4. Domestic Constitutional Limits
Two principal doctrines could serve this purpose:
- Balancing test for regulatory measures under the Commerce Clause. 673
664. See GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV(d), (e).
665. The proposed revision to performance requirements is:
4. Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable
manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on investment, nothing in
paragraphs l(b) [achieve a given level of domestic content] and 1(c) [preference
for domestic goods or suppliers] shall be construed to prevent any Contracting
Party from adopting or maintaining measures, including environmental
measures:
(a) necessary to secure compliance with measures that are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Agreement;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or
(c) necessary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural
resources.
MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, Annex 2(Environmental Related Matters)(6). See also
144 CONG. REc. H7262-77 (daily ed., Aug. 6, 1998) (amend. by Rep. Kucinich).
666. See id. art. VI(General Exceptions)(3) n.2 ("where a genuine and serious threat is
posed to one of the fundamental interests of society"); GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV(a)
n.2; AGP, supra note 181, art. XXIII(2) n.5.
667. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(a); GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV(a); AGP,
supra note 181, art. XXIII(2); NAFTA, supra note 116, art. XXI.1.
668. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(b); GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV(b); AGP,
supra note 181, art. XXIII(2); NAFTA, supra note 116, art. XXI.1.
669. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(g); NAFTA, supra note 116, art. XXI.1.
670. See AGP, supra note 181, United States Annex II n.3; 19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(2)(ii)
(1994); 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(2)(ii) (1994).
671. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(d); GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV(c); 19
U.S.C. §§ 3312(a)(2)(iii), 3512(a)(2)(iii) (1994).
672. See GATT, supra note 111, art. XX(d); GATS, supra note 114, art. XIV(c).
673. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 & amend. X. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
449 U.S. 456 (1981); Exxon v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). See gener-
ally TRIBE, supra note 212, §§ 6-5, 6-13.
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B. Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution
The potential limits on investor-to-state dispute resolution include:
Limits on investor standing and claims. The MAI would empower even a
minority shareholder who resides in an MAI country6 75 to bring a
claim on behalf of an enterprise or other investment located anywhere
in the world if the claim is based on National Treatment or Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment. 6 76 An alternative is provided by NAFTA,
which takes a more cautious approach. NAFTA requires that for an
investor to make a claim on behalf of an enterprise, the investor must
own or control the enterprise. 67 7 Nor does NAFTA permit an investor
of any kind to "make a claim if more than three years have elapsed
from the date on which the investor first acquired, or should have first
acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the
investor has incurred loss or damage."6 78
Limits on investor-to-state dispute process. A much bolder limit on
investor-to-state dispute settlement enjoyed a brief life in the taxation
article of the MAI; however, it disappeared from later drafts. The May
1997 draft of the article,6 79 which applies the MAI expropriation pro-
visions to taxation, provided that the national government challenged
by the claim could refer the dispute to "Competent Tax Authorities of
the Contracting Party of the Investor and the Contracting Party to the
dispute,"68 0 which would have nine months to "determine that the
measure does not involve an expropriation."6 8 ' If the tax authorities
did not so decide, the investor-to-state case could go forward at the
request of either government.68 2 This direct form of sovereignty pro-
674. See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8 & amend. X. See White v. Massachusetts Council of
Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980);
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Atldn v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207
(1903).
675. The MAI defines "investor" as (i) a "natural person having the nationality of, or
who is permanently residing in, a Contracting Party" and (ii) "a legal person or any
other entity organised under the applicable law of a Contracting Party, whether or not
for profit, and whether private or government owned or controlled, and includes a cor-
poration, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture, association or organisa-
tion." MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. II(Definitions)(1).
676. See id. art. Ill. MAI negotiators intended to protect investments beyond a Con-
tracting Party's territory so as to "not to unduly limit the scope of the agreement, for
example by excluding the international activities of established foreign investors and
their investments." MAI Commentary, supra note 101, art. II(National Treatment and
Most Favoured Nation Treatment)(2).
677. See NAFTA, supra note 116, art. 1117.1.
678. Id. art. 1116.2.
679. Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, MUL-ILATERAL
AGEm N r oN INvEsTmENT: THE MAI NEGOTATNG TExr art. VIII (May 13, 1997).
680. Id. art. VIII(4)(b)(i).
681. Id. art. VIII(4)(b)(ii).
682. See id. art. VIII(4)(b). The entire text of art. VIII.4, which provided for dispute
settlement of taxation claims, was bracketed as language that had not reached a suffi-
cient level of consensus at that time.
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tection disappeared in subsequent drafts.68 3 The concept, however,
remains available for MAI negotiators to consider not just for taxation,
but for broader sovereignty protection.
683. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 7, art. VIII(4) (retaining only the first para-
graph authorizing both state-to-state and investor-to-state dispute settlement).
